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Water pollution poses important challenges worldwide. In developed
countries, most of the challenges from water pollution have to do with recre-
ational and amenity use of water, as well as the negative impact on ecosystems.
For instance, in the United States, dead zones caused by nutrient pollution oc-
cur annually in many major coastal waters, including Tampa Bay, the Gulf
of Mexico, Chesapeake Bay, and coastal North Carolina, causing large wel-
fare effects in these regions. In developed countries like the United States,
the aging drinking water infrastructure, such as the presence of lead pipes, is
also a threat to human health. In developing countries, water pollution has a
pronounced impact on human health given that safe drinking water is limited
in many areas.
Economic analysis plays a critical role in the making of environmen-
tal policy. In designing and assessing a water pollution control policy, it is
viii
important to understand the costs and benefits of such policies and be able
to empirically evaluate their effectiveness. However, there are still important
challenges in understanding the costs and benefits of water pollution control
policies. Water quality improvement is a non-market good, so no direct price
signal is available for valuing it. To overcome this problem, economists have
developed several non-market valuation techniques, such as hedonic property
models and recreation demand models. Each valuation method only captures
a piece of the price consumers are willing to pay to improve water quality.
This dissertation comprises three papers that answer some critical ques-
tions on the economic analysis of water pollution policies. In the first paper, I
estimate the marginal willingness-to-pay of homeowners for water quality im-
provement in Florida,using a two-stage model that combines the recreational
value and amenity value of both local and regional water quality improve-
ment. This paper, which focuses on nutrient pollution problems related to
the dead zones discussed earlier, generates a more comprehensive estimate of
the benefits of water pollution reduction than that used in prior work. In the
second paper, I estimate an important cost of water pollution by investigating
the short-run and long-run educational impacts of lead pollution in drinking
water. Using data from Texas, I find that drinking water lead exposure at
birth has a significant negative impact on both 3rd-grade standardized test
scores and the high school graduation rate. While many prior papers in envi-
ronmental economics quantify short-run and long-run human capital costs of
air pollution, this paper is one of only a few to do so for an important water
ix
pollution problem. Switching to the third paper, I examine the existing liter-
ature on the policy instruments that can be used to reduce water pollution.
With a focus on developing countries, I describe the empirical evidence on the
effectiveness of various water pollution control policies, identify the challenges
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Water pollution poses important challenges worldwide. In developed
countries, most of the challenges from water pollution have to do with recre-
ational and amenity use of water, as well as the negative impact on ecosystems.
For instance, dead zones are a phenomenon in which the amount of oxygen
dissolved in water become too low to support many aquatic organisms, due
to excess loading of nutrients like Nitrogen and Phosphorous from farms, and
other sources. The occurrence of coastal dead zones has increased dramatically
in recent decades, doubling to over 400 zones from 1995 to 2008 and increased
to 515 sites in 2011(Rabotyagov et al. 2014). In the United States, dead zones
occur annually in many major coastal waters, including Tampa Bay, the Gulf
of Mexico, Chesapeake Bay, and coastal North Carolina, causing large welfare
effects in these regions (Massey et al. 2006). In developing countries, water
pollution has a pronounced impact on human health given that safe drinking
water is limited in many areas. For example, Ebenstein (2012) finds that one-
grade degradation of water quality on a six-grade scale is associated with a
9.6% increase in the digestive cancer death rate in China.
The rapid development of environmental economics over the past 20
1
years provides economists theoretical bases and methodological tools to esti-
mate the benefits and costs of alternative courses of action (Morgenstern 2014).
Economic analysis plays a critical role in the making of environmental policy.
Water quality is a non-market good, so no direct price signal is available for
valuing pollution control. To overcome this problem, economists have devel-
oped several non-market valuation techniques, such as hedonic price models
and recreational demand models. Each valuation method only captures a piece
of the price consumers are willing to pay to improve water quality.
Governments enact water pollution control policies to reduce water
pollution, which may improve water quality. Economists use water quality
parameters in economic analyses to evaluate the effectiveness of water pollution
control policies and to estimate their benefits and costs,to inform the future
policy-making process. Figure 1.1 describes this process and also serves as a
road map of this dissertation.
This dissertation includes three papers that answer some critical ques-
tions on the economic analysis of water pollution control. In the first paper,
I estimate the benefits of water quality improvement. I calculate marginal
willingness-to-pay of homeowners for water quality improvement in Florida by
utilizing a two-stage model, combining the recreational and amenity value of
both local and regional water quality improvement. This paper, which focuses
on pollution problems related to the dead zones discussed earlier, generates a
more comprehensive estimate of the benefits of water pollution reduction than
that found in prior work. For my second paper, I focus on the cost of a different
2
Figure 1.1: Road map of dissertation
water pollution problem, investigating the short-run and long-run educational
impacts of lead pollution from drinking water. This is one of the first studies
on both the short-run and long-term costs of water pollution. Switching to the
third paper, I examine the existing literature on the policy instruments that
can be used to reduce water pollution. With a focus on developing countries, I
describe the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of various water pollution
control policies, identify the challenges for implementing and assessing such
policies, and provide recommendations for future research.
Paper 1: The Value of Water Quality: Separating Amenity
and Recreational Benefits
Hedonic property studies that value water quality improvements generally fo-
cus on waterfront homes, or those very close to affected water bodies. The
3
estimated marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for pollution reduction in
these studies is typically small and drops sharply with distance from the wa-
ter body. One challenge with the hedonic approach is that it is unclear what
these MWTP estimates capture. Unlike in the case of air pollution, health
benefits from ambient water quality improvements are unlikely to be a signif-
icant share of estimated MWTP. Existing estimates likely combine primarily
amenity benefits of water pollution reductions and recreational benefits. While
amenity benefits may be highly localized, as prior studies have shown, recre-
ational benefits may not be, and prior hedonic work may have failed to capture
the potentially significant influence of recreation on MWTP for water quality
improvements. Using the case of nutrient pollution reductions in Tampa Bay,
Florida, we estimate a two-stage model that combines a random-utility recre-
ational demand model with a hedonic housing model, allowing households to
optimize over regional aquatic recreation opportunities (influenced by pollu-
tion in recreational waters), as well as local ambient water quality very close
to homes. Preliminary results indicate that Tampa homeowners exhibit sig-
nificant MWTP for both improvements in local ambient water quality, and
improvements in regional recreational waters.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, using
repeat-sales from 1998-2014, this paper is the first to use a property fixed-
effects model to estimate the WTP for water pollution control. This is an
important contribution, given that we are able to control flexibly and compre-
hensively for non-time-varying property characteristics. A second contribution
4
is that our approach allows us to expand the spatial extent of water quality im-
pacts on property prices. Our approach, by integrating a random utility model
with a hedonic model, allows us to estimate the value of recreational water
quality improvements across the whole metro area housing market, rather than
valuing water quality benefits to only homeowners near water bodies or visitors
only at recreation sites.
This paper is coauthored with Dr. Sheila Olmstead and Dr. Yusuke
Kuwayama. Kuwayama, Olmstead, and I designed the study, I cleaned the
data and performed the analysis, and Kuwayama, Olmstead, and I wrote the
manuscript.
Paper 2: The impacts of drinking water lead exposure on
short-run and long-run educational outcomes
In this paper, I estimate the short-run and long-run impacts of early childhood
lead exposure from drinking water on educational outcomes, the spatial and de-
mographic distribution of these impacts, and the welfare effects of lead abate-
ment policies. Using data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
on lead violations under the Safe Drinking Water Act and data on individual
standardized test scores and educational attainment from restrictive–use data
from Texas, I use two instrumental variables (IV) strategies and a difference-in-
difference model to plausibly causally estimate the impact of lead. I find that
lead exposure at birth has a significant negative impact on students’ 3rd-grade
standardized test scores and on students’ ability to pass standardized tests. In
the long run, experiencing a drinking water lead treatment violation at birth
5
also significantly reduces high school graduation rates. Moreover, I find that
drinking water lead disproportionately affects female children, children from
African American families, and families with economic disadvantages. These
results contribute to a growing literature documenting substantial long-term
consequences of lead exposure and its contribution to inequality.
This paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, I
provide the first evidence of the impacts of contemporary U.S. drinking water
lead level on elementary school test scores, showing that exposure even at the
low levels typical of regulated U.S. water systems may cause damages. Most
papers that estimate damages from lead exposure focus on airborne lead from
gasoline, few studies examine the impact of lead exposure from drinking water,
and most of those consider historical exposure at much high levels, where lead
pipes were more common in the United States.
Second, this paper provides the first evidence that these effects persist
through longer educational milestones, such as high school graduation. Previ-
ous studies have documented lead’s impact on children’s early cognitive abil-
ity, intelligence score (Ferrie et al. 2012), educational outcomes (Reyes 2015b,
Aizer & Currie 2019), and later crime rate, risky behavior (Reyes 2015b) and
juvenile delinquency (Aizer & Currie 2019). However, few studies estimate the
long-run impacts of lead exposure, such as the impact on higher educational
attainment or future earnings.
Third, this paper also contributes to the literature on lead exposure’s
implications for inequality. Economic and racial inequality can cause poor and
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minority children to have greater exposure to lead, and prior work suggests that
lead may be one cause of continuing disparities in test scores (Aizer & Currie
2019). Following the resurgence of the Environmental Justice (EJ) literature,
understanding the causes of inequality in lead exposure and consequences of
lead exposure for social inequality could contribute to the discussion on new
approaches and policies for reducing inequality (Banzhaf et al. 2019).
Fourth, this paper also proposes a new instrumental variable to charac-
terize potentially endogenous drinking water lead exposure. For this purpose,
I develop a novel instrument based on water chemistry– the surface source
water chloride concentration – that has not been applied previously in the
economics literature.
Paper 3: Water Pollution Control in Developing Countries:
Policy Instruments and Empirical Evidence
Severe ambient water pollution is common in many developing countries. A
broad array of regulatory and other policy instruments can be used to im-
prove water quality. However, some approaches have been studied more than
others, and there are many additional challenges that are specific to the de-
veloping country setting. This article describes a range of prescriptive and
market-based regulations, voluntary programs, and other policy instruments
to control water pollution and reviews the empirical evidence on the effective-
ness of these approaches in practice, with a focus on developing countries. We
also examine additional challenges for implementing and assessing such poli-
cies in developing countries, including data availability and quality issues, in-
7
sufficient monitoring and enforcement, rent-seeking in regulatory systems, and
jurisdictional spillovers where regulation is decentralized. Finally, we highlight
important gaps in the published empirical research in this area.
This paper is co-authored with Dr. Sheila Olmstead. Olmstead and I




A More Comprehensive Estimate of the Value of
Water Quality
2.1 Introduction
Valuation of non-market environmental amenities such as clean air
and water is a long-standing challenge in economics. Revealed preference
approaches tend to be preferred over stated preference approaches, and the
literature (especially for air pollution) has developed significantly over the
past few decades. The hedonic property model, a prominent valuation tool
attributed to Rosen (1974), monetizes pollution and pollution control impacts
via their influence on property prices.
Plausibly causal estimates of the value of environmental amenities and
disamenities using hedonics have valued proximity to hazardous waste sites
(Greenstone & Gallagher 2008), shale gas wells (Muehlenbachs et al. 2015),
and improvements in air quality under the Clean Air Act (Bento et al. 2015,
Bajari et al. 2012). The general approach in contemporary hedonics defines a
circle of influence around properties in the sample – for example, assuming that
air quality affects property values at some standard radius – usually performing
sensitivity analysis around the baseline radius and reporting a range of results.
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This seems, intuitively, to be good practice when household members tend to
be exposed to the environmental condition primarily at or near their home.
Water pollution has also been valued using hedonic property methods
using this approach (e.g. Keiser & Shapiro (2019b)). The assumption that
exposure to water pollution occurs primarily at or near one’s property may
not be tenable, however. In this paper, we argue for a departure from the long
prior literature using hedonics to value water quality changes, based on this
premise. Our basic intuition is that, while property owners likely have some
marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for pollution reductions in small creeks,
canals, streams, ponds, lakes and other waterbodies near their homes, their
MWTP for water quality is likely also influenced by the degree to which water
quality affects regional recreational opportunities. For example, a resident of
Brooklyn, New York, may value improvements in water quality in the Gowanus
Canal if they live nearby; the canal may smell better and be more visually
appealing, for example. But Brooklyn residents may also value improvements
in water quality at Brighton or Rockaway Beaches, or the fact that they can
compete in the New York City triathlon with a swim portion in the Hudson
River. However, the standard hedonic approach may not capture such benefits
of improvements in waterbodies that are farther away from the homes of these
residents. A more comprehensive economic valuation framework is needed
in order to evaluate the benefits of major water quality improvements and
compare them with costs.
In this paper, we apply such a framework to the case of water pollu-
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tion abatement in Tampa Bay, Florida. We show that the recreation benefits
of reducing water pollution are substantial, and that excluding them results
in dramatic underestimation of benefits. We demonstrate that the hedonic
property model may not be well-suited in its basic formulation to capture
the recreational benefits of water pollution abatement. The standard hedonic
property approach fails in this setting because, unlike air pollution, individuals
in high-income countries like the United States are exposed to ambient water
pollution via recreation at times and in places of their choice, at locations
that may be some distance from where they live. Thus, an accurate estimate
of water pollution abatement benefits at recreation sites requires an approach
that matches property owners with the sites they frequent.
Theoretically, we are motivated by an integrated, two-part model of
recreation and housing demand developed by Phaneuf et al. (2008). The first
stage consists of a random-utility model of recreation demand, with which
we estimate Tampa Bay households’ indirect utility from recreational fishing
trips. The second stage involves a hedonic property model. The time-varying
independent variables in the hedonic model include both local ambient water
quality very close to each home and estimates of indirect utility from the first-
stage recreation demand model, such that our hedonic estimates of MWTP
reflect the value of both amenity and recreational improvements due to wa-
ter pollution abatement. As a result, we are able to estimate separately the
portions of property value increases due to water quality improvements that
can be attributed to amenity and recreational benefits. In their original ap-
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plication, Phaneuf et al. (2008) used cross-sectional property price and water
quality data, and assessed recreation behavior with a household survey. We
adapt this model in two ways. First, we adopt a panel data approach and
exploit variation from repeat home sales using both property FE models and
an innovative long-difference hedonic model. Second, we match households
with recreation behavior using a national recreational fishing survey in which
visitation is captured at the zip code level, rather than at the household level.
The first adaptation is an improvement over prior work with respect to iden-
tification. The second is done out of necessity; because household surveys are
costly, the approach we take to dealing with measurement error in attribut-
ing zip-code-level average recreation behavior to individual households may be
useful in other applications.
The water pollution problem we examine in Tampa Bay is nutrient over-
enrichment and eutrophication, a common water quality problem, especially
in coastal areas. During our study period, 1998–2014, the region successfully
reduced nutrient pollution in the watershed and experienced notable improve-
ments in water quality. We find significant household MWTP for these nutri-
ent pollution reductions driven by both local amenity benefits and improved
recreation opportunities; both factors are capitalized into housing prices and
both are statistically and economically significant. Using our more conserva-
tive long-difference approach, for the observed average 10 percent increase in
dissolved oxygen (our main indicator of good water quality) in the watershed
from 1998 to 2014, our baseline estimates suggest that homeowners’ valua-
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tion of the marginal improvement in very local water quality—an indicator of
amenity values—is about $440 per home. Applied to all the repeat-sales homes
in our sample, the total value of the observed improvement in amenity values
is about $75 million; applied to all owner-occupied homes in the Tampa metro
area, the aggregate value is about $356 million. The Tampa housing market
capitalized much larger values for the impact of water quality improvements
on regional recreation opportunities over the same time period: about $980
per household, which aggregates to $167 million for our entire repeat-sales
sample and $789 million for all owner-occupied homes in the metro area. A
comparison of these benefit estimates to a very rough estimate of the costs
of obtaining the observed water quality improvements suggests a favorable
benefit-cost ratio. Though we focus only on a single coastal city, our results
suggest that omission of recreational benefits within a hedonic framework may
result in dramatic underestimation of the value of water quality improvements
to homeowners. More comprehensive estimates that that capture homeowner
benefits from both local and regional water quality improvements—like the
ones we present in this paper—may serve as counterpoints to the existing lack
of evidence that the benefits of water quality exceed the billions of dollars that
are spent controlling water pollution in the United States every year.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, we review
the prior literature on the economic benefits of water quality improvements.
Section 2.3 presents our theoretical model. Our data and study area are de-
scribed in Section 3.5, and econometric models are presented in Section 2.5.
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Section 3.6 summarizes the main results and robustness checks. In Section 3.7,
we implement our rough benefit-cost analysis and we conclude.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Hedonic Analysis and Water Quality
Many hedonic analyses in the prior literature estimate the impacts of
one or more water quality parameters on property prices, starting with Epp
& Al-Ani (1979) and continuing through Keiser & Shapiro (2019b).1 While
all of these published studies find significant positive effects of water quality
improvements or, conversely, negative effects of water pollution, on property
prices, only one (Mendelsohn et al. 1992) uses property fixed effects to control
flexibly and comprehensively for non-time-varying property characteristics.2
Omitted variables are a significant concern in these analyses, given the likely
correlation between unobserved drivers of property prices (such as proxim-
ity to areas with high runoff or point source emissions) and water pollution.
Some of the later papers in this literature use neighborhood fixed effects and
difference-in-differences approaches (Horsch & Lewis 2009, Keiser & Shapiro
1The full list of hedonic analyses includes: Epp & Al-Ani (1979), Young (1984), d’Arge
& Shogren (1989), Mendelsohn et al. (1992), Steinnes (1992), Boyle et al. (1999), Leggett
& Bockstael (2000), Poor et al. (2001), Gibbs et al. (2002), Boyle & Bouchard (2003), Poor
et al. (2007), Phaneuf et al. (2008), Horsch & Lewis (2009), Zhang et al. (2010), Walsh et al.
(2011), Netusil et al. (2014), Wolf & Klaiber (2017), Walsh et al. (2017), Keiser & Shapiro
(2019b).
2Theoretically, hedonic analysis involves two stages. The first stage is the use of property
prices and characteristics to obtain a marginal implicit price. The second stage estimates
a demand curve for the environmental good or service to use for welfare analysis. Given
limitations in data availability, most empirical analyses focus on the first stage.
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2019b) that likely provide a good approximation to models in which the identi-
fying variation comes from repeat sales of the same property over time. How-
ever, given that the repeat-sales approach has become standard in the hedonics
literature for non-water-quality applications (Bajari et al. 2012, Muehlenbachs
et al. 2015, Walls et al. 2015), applying this approach in an analysis of water
pollution is one of our significant contributions.
A second critical difference between our paper and prior work is our
approach to defining the spatial extent of water quality impacts on property
prices. Because the benefits of water quality improvements may vary with
distance to the waterbody, some papers only attempt to quantify impacts on
waterfront homes (Leggett & Bockstael 2000, Poor et al. 2001, Gibbs et al.
2002, Zhang et al. 2010). Other papers estimate benefits at different distances
from the waterbody (Poor et al. 2007, Walsh et al. 2011, 2017, Guignet et al.
2017, Keiser & Shapiro 2019b). In this literature, MWTP for water quality
diminishes quickly with distance, generally between 2 and 3 kilometers (km)
from the water.
Our concern with these findings is that they may not fully capture the
recreational benefits of water quality. Most individuals do not recreate in wa-
ters within 3 km of their property. For example, in our sample, recreational
anglers’ average roundtrip travel time to fishing sites is almost 90 minutes.
Unlike in the case of air quality, where health impacts occur everywhere in-
dividuals spend time (e.g., at home or on a commute), individuals generally
choose when and where they recreate in or near water (and thus experience
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water pollution), and examining impacts based on simple spatial criteria of
proximity of houses to water may be misleading.
In theory, hedonic property studies like those cited above could pick up
both amenity and recreational benefits of water quality improvements. When
economists have looked for effects outside of a very tight radius around prop-
erties, however, many have not found such effects (Walsh et al. 2011, Keiser &
Shapiro 2019b). This has been interpreted as evidence that homeowners only
value water quality close to their homes. However, the maps in Figure 2.1
demonstrate our concern about this interpretation. The red dots at the center
of each panel in the figure represent two households in our study area. The
house at the center of Figure 2.1a is an inland property, and the house in Fig-
ure 2.1b is located near Tampa Bay. The black dots and triangles indicate the
location of water quality monitors. Concentric circles are drawn with radii of
1, 2, 3, and 5 km from the property at the center of each panel. First, consider
the property in Figure 2.1a. A 2-km circle captures a handful of water quality
monitors that, when averaged, may yield a reasonably good representation of
water quality very close to the home. If one wanted to capture water quality
in waterbodies that this household could use for recreational purposes, draw-
ing increasingly larger circles nets many additional water quality monitors but
few, if any, are in locations with which the household has any regular contact.
Thus, increasing the assumed “zone of influence” for this household by drawing
larger circles will attenuate any impact of willingness to pay for nearby water
quality, and it will not capture recreational values.
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In a coastal metropolitan area like Tampa Bay, averaging observations
from water quality monitors in larger circles for properties closer to the coast
like that in Figure 2.1b will capture some recreation sites, as the 5-km circle
does in Figure 2.1b. However, the ability of an econometric model to effectively
detect the signal of recreational water quality values from the monitors in the
Bay (to the east of the property) will depend on how many irrelevant monitors
(i.e., those inland and quite far from the home) are also captured. In addition,
the standard hedonic model does not capture households’ actual recreation
sites—it only links homes to sites by proximity. Given these challenges, it is not
surprising that regressing housing prices on average measures of water quality
within circles around properties frequently generates null results beyond 2 km.
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(a) An inland property
(b) A property near Tampa Bay
Figure 2.1: Two sample properties in Pinellas County
Notes: The red polygons in Panel A and Panel B indicate
two properties in Pinellas County. The black dots are local
water quality monitors, and the black triangles are recre-
ational water quality monitors in Tampa Bay. The radii of
the four circles are 1km, 2km, 3km and 5 km.18
2.2.2 Recreation Demand Analysis and Water Quality
Another commonly used approach to estimate water quality benefits
is recreation demand estimation using random utility models (RUMs). We
identified 11 papers in the literature that use these models to value water
quality changes (Mullen & Menz 1985, Smith et al. 1986, Bockstael et al.
1987, 1989, Phaneuf et al. 2000, Phaneuf 2002, von Haefen 2003, Phaneuf
et al. 2008, Egan et al. 2009, Abidoye et al. 2012, Abidoye & Herriges 2012).
Similar to the hedonic literature, all but one of these studies finds that water
quality improvements increase recreational visitation and willingness to pay,
but omitted variables bias is a concern for interpreting these results (Moeltner
& von Haefen 2011, Phaneuf 2013). Only two of the studies (Abidoye et al.
2012, Abidoye & Herriges 2012) control comprehensively for both site and
visitor characteristics. Three additional papers control for either unobserved
site characteristics (Phaneuf et al. 2008) or visitor characteristics (von Haefen
2003, Egan et al. 2009), but not both.
The recreation demand component of our two-stage approach breaks
no new ground. Rather, our contributions lie in: (1) a focus on a large,
charismatic water body (Tampa Bay) that is the locus of recreational activity
in a major coastal metro area and has experienced noticeable water quality
improvements over the study period; and (2) integration of a RUM with a
hedonic model, which allows us to estimate the value of recreational water
quality improvements across the whole metro area housing market, rather
than valuing water quality benefits to visitors only at recreation sites.
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2.2.3 Economic Impacts of Nutrient Pollution
Nutrient over-enrichment is caused by the addition of excess nutrients,
primarily nitrogen and phosphorous, to waterbodies via agricultural and ur-
ban nonpoint source pollution, which stimulates excessive algae growth. When
the algae die, they decay and deplete dissolved oxygen (Morrison & Greening
2006). Because nitrogen and phosphorous enter waterbodies over a broad
catchment area, there are negative impacts not only locally in small streams
but also regionally in large streams, rivers, bays and estuaries. Among the
serious consequences of eutrophication are hypoxic or dead zones, in which
many kinds of marine life cannot be supported. Reported dead zones world-
wide doubled between 1995 and 2008 to more than 400 zones, and increased
to 515 sites in 2011 (Rabotyagov et al. 2014). Other than Tampa Bay, U.S.
waters that experience this phenomenon include other estuaries connected to
the Gulf of Mexico, Chesapeake Bay, the Great Lakes (especially Lake Erie),
Puget Sound, Long Island Sound, and the North Carolina coast. Economists
have estimated significant impacts of eutrophication on commercial and recre-
ational fisheries (Massey et al. 2006, Smith et al. 2017), though other economic
damages are largely unknown (Barbier 2012).3
3Anecdotal evidence suggests that recreational impacts could be significant. In 2005, one
of the years included in our study period, Florida’s swimming beaches experienced almost
3,500 closures and health advisories due to high levels of bacteria caused by algal blooms,
including toxic cyanobacteria blooms (Clean Water Network of Florida 2008).
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2.3 Theoretical Model
We adapt the theoretical model in Phaneuf et al. (2008), which has long-
run and short-run decision-making components. In the long run, consumers
evaluate neighborhood and property amenities, including pollution, to choose
a home. In the short run, once a location is chosen, a household allocates its
resources (including time) to market goods and recreation, that is, households
evaluate the benefits of outings to recreation sites conditional on residential
location. Since short-run recreation decisions are affected by long-run residen-
tial location choices, we assume that when making property purchase decisions,
consumers will consider each location’s accessibility to recreation opportuni-
ties.
Let x(Q) represent a household’s utility from recreation trips, where
Q measures water quality at recreation sites in the region. In addition, let
px be the price of a trip, z be a numeraire good with price equal to 1, and
h(a, q) be the value of housing services which is quasi-fixed in the short run
and is a function of a vector of property attributes, a, and water quality close
to the home, q (which can differ from regional recreational water quality Q).
The household maximizes its utility for recreation trips and market goods
conditional on its income after housing expenditures. Thus, the household’s
short-run maximization problem is:
max
x,z
U(x(Q), z|h(a, q)) s.t. m = pxx(Q) + z, (2.1)
where m is household income net of the property price. Note that this model
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assumes that households can perceive a change in Q. For instance, if nutrient
pollution results in excessive algae in a recreational waterbody, households
notice a change in the color of the water, a decline in fish catch, or a beach
closure. Solving the problem in (2.1) yields the household’s conditional indirect
utility function:
V = V (px,m,Q, q, ε), (2.2)
where ε captures unobserved property heterogeneity.
Suppose that water quality at recreation sites improves from Q0 to Q1.
A welfare measure for this improvement is compensating surplus (CS), which
can be described implicitly by the following equation:
V (px,m,Q0, q) = V (px,m− CS(m), Q1, q). (2.3)
That is, CS measures the income that a household is willing to forgo to obtain
the improved water quality (Kim et al. 2015).
We can estimate the indirect utility from recreation using a recreation
demand model. Let CS(Q, ε) measure the gains to a household from visiting
recreation sites in Tampa Bay with water quality Q. When households make
recreation decisions, they consider potential benefits and costs from visiting
each possible site. If water quality and recreation costs vary spatially, dif-
ferent neighborhoods will offer different potential net benefits from recreation
to households located in those neighborhoods. Thus, we can model expected
recreational net benefits as an attribute of location:
ECS(Q) = E[CS(Q, ε)] (2.4)
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In long-run equilibrium, housing prices should capitalize the expected benefits
from recreation at a given location. Since recreation decisions are made condi-
tional on residential location decisions, we replace the x(Q) in equation (2.1)




U (ECS(Q), h(a, q), z) s.t. m∗ = ph(a, q) + pxx̃+ z. (2.5)
Households choose a residential location such that the sum of their expected
marginal benefit from recreation and from services directly available from the
property (including environmental services) is equal to the marginal property
purchase price.4
2.4 Study Area and Data
The Tampa Bay watershed (Figure 2.2) covers more than 400 square
miles. It contains Florida’s largest open-water estuary and second-largest
metropolitan area, and is the second-largest city on the Gulf of Mexico. The
Bay provides important social value through species habitat and other ecosys-
tem services, recreational use such as boating and fishing, power plant heat ex-
change, and commercial ports. Our study area comprises three counties within
this watershed—Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Manatee counties—in which more
than 2.3 million people live. Almost 90 percent of the total employment within
4Our model does not incorporate the fact that local water quality q and recreational
water quality Q are often correlated, an important potential extension of this work.
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the three counties is located in the watershed (Tampa Bay Estuary Program
& Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council 2014).
Nutrient loading to the Bay originates from a variety of sources in-
cluding agricultural runoff, phosphate mining, fertilizer production, urban
stormwater runoff, municipal sewage treatment discharges, industrial point
sources, and atmospheric deposition from power plants (Greening et al. 2014,
Sherwood et al. 2016). Paired with other aspects of urbanization (for example,
construction of causeways that modified the Bay’s hydrology), nutrient load-
ings generated between the 1950s and the 1980s caused a dramatic shift from
a “clear-water, seagrass-based system” to a “turbid, phytoplankton-based sys-
tem” in which blooms of harmful phytoplankton were common and macroalgae
mats covered large portions of open water, tidal flats, and seawalls (Greening
et al. 2014). One impact of this water quality shift was an estimated 50 percent
decline in seagrass coverage, an important indicator of the health of aquatic
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Figure 2.2: Map of study area: Tampa Bay watershed, Florida
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Beginning in the late 1970s, citizens pressured the Florida legislature to
impose advanced wastewater treatment standards on municipal sewage treat-
ment plants discharging to Tampa Bay, and the resulting changes in point
source emissions have been statistically associated with water quality improve-
ments (Beck et al. 2019). This legislation was followed by new regulations and
practices including statewide permitting requirements for urban stormwater
systems, coastal habitat acquisition and restoration projects, fuel-switching
and nitrogen oxide (NOx) abatement technology upgrades by local power
plants that reduced atmospheric deposition of nitrogen, and residential fer-
tilizer use ordinances (Beck et al. 2019). These actions led to a recovery from
widespread, frequent eutrophic conditions. Tampa Bay’s seagrass coverage
in 2016 exceeded that observed in 1950—considered by local recovery propo-
nents to be the “reference state” for the Bay (Greening et al. 2014). Other
water quality measures are also approaching the conditions last observed in
the pre-disturbance 1950s (Greening et al. 2014).
Tampa Bay’s recovery and the existence of rich long-term monitoring
data documenting that recovery motivate our work. While we do not observe
property transactions during the entire recovery period, water quality improves
noticeably over our study period, 1998–2014. In addition, the region’s recre-
ation opportunities, rapid growth and active housing market make it an ideal
place for this study.
At the beginning of our study period, the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) developed a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) pollution
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budget for Tampa Bay covering 189 different sources, based on management
targets set by the Tampa Bay Estuary Program. The Tampa Bay Nitrogen
Management Council (TBNMC), a public/private partnership of local govern-
ments, agencies, and industries, developed an action plan for TMDL compli-
ance and for supporting the Bay’s continued recovery. From 1998 to 2014,
the TBNMC implemented more than 600 projects to reduce nitrogen loading
to the Bay (Beck et al. 2019).5 While we cannot causally link the observed
improvements in water quality to these projects, at the end of the paper, we
compare our water quality benefit estimates to a rough estimate of the costs
of these nutrient removal projects over our study period.
2.4.1 Recreation Demand Data
For the recreation demand model, we use angler data from the Ma-
rine Recreational Fisheries Statistics Survey (MRFSS) and the Marine Recre-
ational Information Program (MRIP) produced by the National Ocean and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (NOAA Fisheries 2008). The MRIP
surveys a random sample of U.S. recreational anglers (NOAA Fisheries 2013).
From the MRIP, we are able to obtain the year, month and time that each
interview takes place, the zip code of each angler’s residential address, fish-
ing site locations, the number of people in each fishing group, and other visit
characteristics.
Since the MRIP data do not have anglers’ full address or self-reported
5Hundreds of additional projects also preceded the TMDL.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Water quality measures
Local dissolved oxygen (DO) (mg/L) 146903 5.79 4.07 0.20 104.00
Average local DO 1998-2003 (mg/L) 14390 5.88 8.42 0.61 104.00
Average local DO 2009-2014 (mg/L) 14390 5.89 1.40 1.04 12.37
Change in average DO (mg/L) 14390 0.01 8.45 -100.22 7.99
Tampa Bay DO (mg/L) 146903 6.40 0.83 3.16 10.53
Local parks DO (mg/L) 41618 5.38 1.60 1.12 12.01
Dummy for local DO ≥ 5mg/L 146903 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Seagrass abundance (index) 146903 2.35 0.91 0.00 4.79
Recreation demand
Travel time (minutes) 146903 87.24 34.95 1.64 267.06
Travel cost ($) 146903 43.12 20.64 0.34 152.33
Estimated ECS ($) 146903 35.98 2.42 29.28 38.67
Average ECS 1998-2003 ($) 14390 35.30 1.56 29.28 37.40
Average ECS 2009-2014 ($) 14390 34.35 2.46 30.69 38.15
Change in average ECS ($) 14390 -0.95 2.89 -6.54 8.80
Distance to water
Distance to Tampa Bay (m) 146903 15317.35 15212.89 0.00 120557.70
Distance to local waters (m) 146903 2796.27 1742.42 0.00 11372.92
Property characteristics
Repeat-sales sample sale price (2014$) 146903 229306.50 154742.5 5262.23 1541511.00
Long-diff. sample sale price (2014$) 21639 166442.50 120243.80 5000.00
Average sale price 1998-2003 (2014$) 14390 204674.30 137652.90 6873.87 1395970.00
Average sale price 2009-2014 (2014$) 14390 195782.90 140483.20 7724.32 1097957.00
Change in average price (2014$) 14390 -8891.35 63111.49 -581720.80 684031.80
Year 146903 2005.76 4.44 1998.00 2014.00
Property age (years) 146903 32.99 21.07 1.00 133.00
travel cost, we use latitude and longitude information for fishing sites and an-
glers’ residential zip codes to estimate travel costs for each trip. We use the
2010 Census Bureau zip code tabulation area (ZCTA) maps and population
data to create a population-weighted center for each zip code in the three coun-
ties using ArcGIS, and assume that all anglers live in the population-weighted
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center of their zip code.6 We then use the Open Source Routing Machine
API to calculate round-trip travel time from the zip code-weighted population
centers to fishing sites (Luxen & Vetter 2011). Our travel cost estimate has
two components: the value of this estimated travel time and the operational
cost of travel. The value of travel time is estimated at 1/3 of visitors’ forgone
wages, using the mean hourly wage in the Tampa-St.Petersburg-Clearwater
Metropolitan Statistical Area from the Occupational Employment Statistics
(OES) Survey (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). For the operational cost
of travel, we multiply the round-trip distance by the driving cost per mile re-
ported by the American Automobile Association (AAA 2019). Both the wage
and the cost-per-mile estimates vary over time. Table 2.1 reports summary
statistics for our estimated travel times and costs. The mean round-trip travel
time in our angler data is 87.24 minutes, or about an hour and a half, and the
average trip costs $43.12.
2.4.2 Property Transaction Data
We collect property sales data from the property appraiser’s offices
in Hillsborough, Manatee and Pinellas Counties. In order to better identify
the effect of water quality on residential property prices and maintain con-
sistency with prior hedonic analyses, we restrict the sample to single-family
6Figure A.1 in the online appendix shows the locations of fishing sites, along with recre-
ational water quality monitors and geographic boundaries in the region. The Census Bureau
generates ZCTAs to represent the United States Postal Service (USPS) zip code service ar-
eas. Going forward, we refer to the US Census ZCTAs as zip codes given the fact that, in
most instances, they are the same.
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homes. Sales dates, dates of construction, parcel size, and transaction prices
are available for all three counties. The Hillsborough County Property Ap-
praiser’s Office provided additional information, including dates of major im-
provements, size of living spaces, number of stories, and number of bedrooms
and bathrooms. Our sample includes only homes sold at least twice between
1998 and 2014, given our desire to include property fixed effects in our hedo-
nic specifications (Manatee County data are only available from 2005-2014).
Hillsborough County has 186,289 repeat property sales that occurred during
this period, Pinellas County has 107,701 repeat sales, and Manatee county has
20,699 repeat sales.7
We geocode the sales records and relate them in ArcGIS with shapefiles
of house locations and characteristics. We then relate these property data with
water quality data, also using ArcGIS. For each model we estimate, we use
only properties that have at least one water quality monitor within the relevant
distance and time window prior to a transaction. For example, our baseline
model uses monitors within 3 km of a home to capture local water quality
and uses water quality observations in the calendar year of each property
transaction. Thus, for this model, we drop the 153,304 repeat sales in our
data that lack water quality monitors within 3 km in the calendar year of the
sale.8
7Repeat sales represent 63.2% of all sales in Hillsborough County (1998-2014), 59.7% of
all sales in Pinellas County (1998-2014) and 44.9% of all sales in Manatee County (2005-
2014).
835.1% of repeat sales in Hillsborough (1998-2014), 62.1% of repeat sales in Pinellas
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We also link properties with the zip code-year level recreational in-
dex we create, resulting in additional narrowing of the sample (in our baseline
model, this requires dropping 14,482 properties). The remaining 146,903 prop-
erties comprise our full sample for the property fixed effects model—65,301
in Hillsborough County, 66,926 in Pinellas County, and 14,676 in Manatee
County. The mean property price in the sample is about $230,000 (Table
2.1).9 Properties in our sample were sold on average three times from 1998 to
2014 and were about 32 years old when a transaction occurred.
2.4.3 Water Quality Data
2.4.3.1 Local Water Quality Data
We obtained waterbody shapefiles from the Tampa Bay Water At-
las (University of South Florida Water Institute 2017), which is derived from
the 1:24,000 USGS National Hydrography Dataset (NHD) and contains 749
water resources, including 12 bays, 506 lakes, 230 rivers and the Gulf of Mex-
ico. We define ponds, lakes, wetlands, rivers, swamps, reservoirs and canals
as local waterbodies and refer to water quality monitors in these waterbodies
as “local water quality monitors.” Water quality measures at these monitors
are obtained from EPA’s STOrage and RETrieval (STORET) data warehouse,
which includes water quality monitoring data collected by states, tribes, water-
(1998-2014) and 70.9% of repeat sales in Manatee (2005-2014) have reporting water quality
monitors within 3 km in the calendar year of the sale.
9All prices are in 2014 dollars. Table A.2 in the online appendix lists summary statistics
for the additional property attributes available for Hillsborough County.
31
shed groups, federal agencies, volunteer groups, and universities. We keep all
observations for which monitoring date, station latitude, and station longitude
are reported. The resulting sample includes 209,336 water quality observations
collected from 5,913 monitoring stations. The mean number of readings from
each station per year is 53, and the monitors report on average for 8 years (see
Table A.1 in the online appendix).10
There is no single accepted best indicator for water quality in hedonic
and recreation demand analysis. Water quality measures used in past hedonic
studies include dissolved oxygen (DO), fecal coliform, total suspended solids,
dissolved inorganic nitrogen, pH, Secchi depth and harmful algal concentra-
tions. We use DO, one of the most common measures of water quality in
research on water pollution’s economic impacts (Keiser & Shapiro 2019b), and
a key indicator of nutrient pollution. Higher DO levels indicate better water
quality. DO is critical for fish survival, and water quality that meets the cri-
teria for fish survival also meets criteria for most other beneficial water uses
and is often of good ecological status (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
2001). DO is also a good indicator of water quality conditions that are noticed
by people, and are thus likely to correlate with property prices. Noticeable
impacts of low DO include reduced fish catch and the presence of algae mats.
The large red dots in Figure 2.2 depict the location of the STORET
10Some monitors change names slightly, and monitor identification numbers are not unique
across counties. Following Keiser & Shapiro (2019b), we define a station as a unique latitude-
longitude pair when we link properties with nearby monitors.
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local water quality monitors and the smaller dots in pink, yellow, and green
show the locations of repeat-sales properties in our sample. We calculate the
mean DO concentration of all the monitors within varying radii in the calendar
year of a property sale to generate the local water quality measure for each
property. For our baseline model, we choose a 3-kilometer radius, based on
existing evidence that nationwide water pollution impacts are capitalized for
homes within 3 km (Keiser & Shapiro 2019b). We also test the robustness of
our results to other radii, from 300 meters (m) to 5 km, and to varying time
windows around the date of a property sale.
We also create a dummy variable indicating whether the DO level for
any given observation is above 5 milligrams per liter (mg/L); a DO concentra-
tion of 5 mg/L is a critical value for fish survival and may capture a threshold
for detectable impacts (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1994). Table
2.1 shows that the mean DO value in our sample is 5.79 mg/L, with about
36 percent of properties near waters having less than 5 mg/L DO, on average.
We use the continuous DO concentration in all models in the paper, reporting
the 5 mg/L threshold results in the online appendix.
Table A.2 in the online appendix lists summary statistics for properties
categorized by our principal independent variable, the DO level in local water
bodies. Properties near polluted water bodies are older, smaller and have fewer
bedrooms, bathrooms and stories on average. They also are located further
from nearby water bodies and from Tampa Bay. These differences highlight the
importance of controlling comprehensively for property characteristics when
33
estimating the impact of water pollution on property prices.
2.4.3.2 Recreational Water Quality Data
For the recreation demand model, we use DO values from STORET
monitors near fishing locations in Tampa Bay, which we refer to as “recre-
ational water quality monitors,” mapped in Figure A.1 in the online appendix.
Consistent with the methods we use to define water quality in local waterbod-
ies, we spatially join all monitors within a 3 km radius of each of our 85 fishing
sites and calculate the annual mean DO. The mean DO level at recreational
water quality monitors is 6.4 mg/L (Table 2.1).
In addition to observations from water quality monitors, we rely on sea-
grass acreage measurements from the Tampa Bay Estuary Program (TBEP)
(Johansson 2016). The health of Tampa Bay seagrass meadows has become
an important issue in recent decades as scientists and environmental managers
have worked to reverse the effects of nutrient pollution in the Bay. In 1997, the
TBEP coordinated the creation of a Bay-wide seagrass monitoring program to
document temporal and spatial changes in seagrass species composition, abun-
dance, and distribution. Currently, 62 locations are monitored (Florida Fish
and Wildlife Conservation Commission 2003). The TBEP’s seagrass abun-
dance data are reported as an index, with higher values representing greater
abundance. We match fishing sites with their closest seagrass transects.11
11We exclude seagrass transects more than 11,000 m from each fishing site in order to
avoid spatially joining fishing sites located along the west coast of Pinellas County with
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Average seagrass coverage (converted from the TBEP index) is about 29,920
hectares (ha) from 1998-2014 (Table 2.1). While seagrass coverage is an im-
portant positive indicator of ecosystem health and fish abundance, it may also
be a disamenity for anglers because these plants can get caught on fishing lines
and boat propellers (Guignet et al. 2017), and boaters can be fined for scarring
seagrass beds with their motors.
The yellow line in Figure 2.3 shows the trend in the average annual DO
concentration over time, using all of the local and recreational water quality
monitors in the data. While the year-to-year variation can be substantial,
the trend is increasing, reflecting the regional water quality improvements
described in the literature. The annual average DO concentration in 2014
is 11% higher than in 1998. Similarly, the average DO over the earliest six
years (1998-2003) and latest six years (2009-2014)—the periods we will use to
calculate long-run changes in some of our models—is 10%. Thus, throughout
the discussion of results in Section 6, we use a 10% improvement in average DO
concentrations over the 16-year study period to interpret coefficient estimates
and compare them across models.
seagrass transects in Tampa Bay, which lie across the peninsula formed by Pinellas County
(Figure A.1).
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Figure 2.3: Average property prices in the three counties and average DO
concentration among all water quality monitors, 1998-2014
Notes: “All sales” averages annual property transaction prices across the 241,909
properties sold in Hillsborough, Pinellas and Manatee Counties at least once,
1998-2014. “Repeat sales” averages annual prices across the 170,192 properties
sold at least twice, 1998-2014. “Long difference repeat sales” averages prices
across the 14,390 properties sold at least once during 1998-2003, and at least
once during 2010-2014. Mean DO is the average dissolved oxygen concentration
observed at all local and Tampa Bay water quality monitors each year.
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2.5 Methods
2.5.1 Random Utility Specification for Recreation Demand
In the random utility model, properties in Tampa Bay are located in
J zip codes, and anglers can choose to fish at K recreation sites in the re-
gion. Each recreation site k ∈ K has an observable level of water quality,
WQkt, which can vary over time. The literature recognizes the need to control
for unobserved site characteristics in random utility models (Moeltner & von
Haefen 2011, Phaneuf 2013). One strategy is the use of Alternative Specific
Constants (ASCs)–equivalent to site fixed effects–in the basic RUM model.
Following Phaneuf et al. (2008), we assume the indirect utility for a visit to
site k by individual i in year t is a linear function. The RUM specification is:
Vikt = α0 + α1Travelikt + α2WQkt + ηk + νikt, (2.6)
where Vikt represents indirect utility of fishing trips and Travelikt denotes
the round-trip travel cost. ηk is an ASC that captures time-invariant site
characteristics, such as the number of boat ramps or slips, whether the fishing
site has lodges, and other attributes we assume remain constant over time.
We use a conditional logit model, so νikt is an error term distributed Type-I
Extreme Value.




exp(V̂ikt)] + C (2.7)
where V̂ikt is the observed element of utility, and C is an unknown constant
indicating that the absolute level of utility cannot be measured. Because the
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term C in equation (2.7) does not affect utility differences, we drop it in the
remaining equations (Haab & McConnell 2002). The average compensating





We divide EVit by the coefficient on the travel cost variable, interpreted as
the marginal utility of income, to obtain a monetary measure of E(CS)it. If
water quality improves from WQ0 to WQ1, indirect utility rises from V̂ 0ikt to



















Our estimate of E(CS)it varies across zip codes and over time. The average
recreational compensating surplus in zip code j in year t can be expressed as








We incorporate this estimated ECSjt into our hedonic model to capture how
recreational impacts of water quality improvements may be capitalized in hous-
ing prices.
2.5.2 Hedonic Specification
Our hedonic specifications control for observable and unobservable prop-
erty attributes by exploiting only price changes within a property over time
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(Palmquist 1982). We use two approaches: a standard property fixed-effects
model and an innovative model using long differences. Further extensions to
both of these basic models are discussed in Section 6.
2.5.2.1 Property Fixed Effects Model
Using a log-log specification in line with the previous literature, the
basic property fixed-effects model is as follows:
lnPijt = β0 + β1Ageit + β2lnWQit + β3ÊCSjt + αi + γt + εijt. (2.11)
Home age is the only time-varying property characteristic in our data. The
main coefficients of interest are β2 and β3. Using DO as the main local wa-
ter quality measure, we expect β2>0 since higher DO represents better water
quality. We also expect β3>0 if buyers are willing to pay higher prices for
properties that offer more and better recreation opportunities. We will inter-
pret β2 as homeowners’ MWTP for an increase in DO within water bodies
close to homes. We will use β3 and equations (2.7) through (2.10) to estimate
MWTP for an increase in DO in the regional recreational waters frequented
by residents of homeowners’ zip codes. The property fixed effect, αi, removes
the effects of time-invariant omitted variables, and we also include a year fixed
effect, γt.
As noted in Section 4.1, the MRIP data include anglers’ zip codes, but
not their street addresses. Thus, our estimate of ECSjt is a zip-code-level av-
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erage measure of recreational utility in each year. The sample of anglers in the
MRIP data in any individual household’s zip code in a given year is small, and
different households have different numbers of fellow anglers from the same zip
code who are surveyed in the MRIP. In estimating equation (2.11), we treat
the resulting potential bias from heteroskedastic measurement error as a par-
tial missing-data problem, using multiple imputation (Blackwell et al. 2017).
We first generate 250 stand-alone recreational demand datasets—representing
what could have been observed if there were no measurement error—randomly
drawing (with replacement) 20% of anglers (10,373 individuals) from the full
MRIP sample each time. We estimate equation (2.6), and then use each set
of coefficients and equations (2.7) through (2.10) to estimate ECSjt. On av-
erage across the 250 replications, we obtain 1,790 estimates of ECSjt.12 We
then merge the ECSjt estimates with the hedonic data, creating 250 datasets
with which to estimate equation (2.11). We combine the estimates from these
regressions using Rubin’s Rule (Rubin 1987), reporting the mean of each re-
sulting vector of coefficient estimates in the results tables.
To calculate the standard errors, we first estimate the within impu-




k/250 and between imputation vari-
ance as Varbetween =
∑250
k=1(βk − β̄)2/(250 − 1), where k indexes the individ-
ual replication sample. We then calculate the total variance as Vartotal =
Varwithin +Varbetween +Varbetween/250.The standard error is the square root of
12There are 2,083 zip-code-years in the data with some visitation, but our data-generating
process excludes some zip-code-years from each replication dataset.
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total variance. The individual replication standard error estimates are clus-
tered by property or zip code, depending on the model.
The repeat sales model is not without its challenges. Only a subset
of housing units in the data have sold more than once, given the limited
market and time period of the study, and homes that sold more than once
may have different attributes than properties that sold only once (or not at
all) in given study period. Thus, restricting the sample to repeat sales may
produce a selective implicit price (Freeman et al. 2014). The 300,207 repeat
sales in our data, and 146,903 sales in the sample for our baseline model,
account for more than 50% and more than 25% of qualified sales in our original
data, respectively. Thus, they may be reasonably representative of the housing
market in the Tampa metropolitan area. Figure 2.3 shows that average repeat-
sales prices (red line) and average prices for all observed property transactions
(blue line) in the three counties during the study period have very similar
trends over time.
2.5.2.2 Long-Difference Model
Although the property fixed-effects model represents an advance over
the cross-sectional approaches in the literature on water quality, we make an
additional modification in the interest of better matching the econometric ap-
proach with the theoretical model in Section 3. Recall that in that model,
households make short-run recreation decisions, conditional on home location,
based on water quality at recreation sites. Thus, the impacts of recreational
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water quality on visitation are identified from short-run variation. The home
purchase decision, however, is a long-run choice, and home prices should cap-
italize the expected long-run benefits from recreation and amenity value of
water quality. In our view, a long-difference hedonic model may better fit this
theory than the standard fixed-effects approach described above, in which the
identifying variation for both the local water quality and recreational utility
parameters is short-run.
The climate literature uses long-difference models to identify the im-
pacts of medium- to long-run variation in temperature on economic outcomes
of interest (Dell et al. 2014). Following this literature, we construct aver-
age long-run housing price changes, average local water quality changes, and
average recreational utility index changes in two time periods for the same
property. The two time periods in our main long-difference specification are
1998–2003 and 2009–2014, which we refer to as period a and period b, respec-
tively. We choose these two periods because they represent the earliest and
latest six-year periods in our data, and because doing so allows us to avoid the
unusual property price changes during the housing boom and bust, evident
in Figure 2.3. Our long-difference sample is very small because inclusion in
the sample requires that a property sell at least once in both the early and
late time periods, so that we can take differences, instead of at least twice in
the full sample (the inclusion constraint in the property fixed-effects model).
In addition, we only observe Manatee County transactions beginning in 2005,
so properties in this county drop out entirely. In Figure 2.3, we can see that
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the average price in the long-difference sample (green lines) starts out some-
what lower than the full and repeat-sales samples in 1998, but then tracks
very closely with the larger groups through 2003 (the pre-housing crisis, early
period used for differencing). Post-housing-crisis, the price level for this small
sub-sample is again slightly lower than the larger groups, but the trends over
time are very similar.








where n is the number of times the property sold in time period a. We then
construct the following equation:
lnPija = θ0 + θ1Ageija + θ2lnWQija + θ3ECSja + αi + εija, (2.13)
where WQija, Ageija, and ECSja measure the average local water quality,
average property age and average recreational utility index of property i in
zipcode j during period a. An analogous equation can be written for period
b, in which the subscript a in equation (2.13) is replaced with the subscript b.
Differencing the two time periods drops the time-invariant property
fixed effect αi and results in:
∆lnP ij = θ0 + θ1∆Ageij + θ2∆lnWQij + θ3∆ÊCSj + ∆εij, (2.14)
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where ∆lnPij is the change in the log housing price of property i in zipcode j
between period a and period b. The independent variables are interpreted in
a similar way.
The coefficients of interest are θ2 and θ3, which measure how long-
run changes in local water quality and recreational opportunities affect the
housing price. Similar to β2 and β3 in equation (2.11), we expect θ2 and θ3 to
be positive. The interpretation of θ2 and θ3 is complicated by the fact that
the dependent variable is the difference in log prices, and our independent
variables are differences in log water quality and average ECS. We interpret
the coefficients as marginal effects, instead of actual MWTP estimates. For
instance, we interpret θ2 as the marginal effect of the average water quality
increase from period a to period b on the average housing price in period b,
holding constant the average housing price and water quality in period a.
As we did for the property fixed-effects models, we use multiple impu-
tation to obtain coefficient estimates and associated standard errors for equa-
tion (2.14), in order to address potential measurement error from estimating
ECSj at the zipcode, rather than the property level, following the procedure
described in Section 5.2.1.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Demonstration of the Typical Hedonic Approach
Before estimating our preferred two-stage model, we start with a demon-
stration of the typical hedonic approach, providing some analysis to support
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the heuristic critique we developed around Figure 2.1. We estimate equa-
tion (2.11), leaving out the recreational utility component (ECSjt), and as-
signing water quality monitors to properties as long as they are within a spec-
ified radius of the home—defined at 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10 km—ignoring actual
recreation behavior. We do this, first, using only the local water quality mon-
itors, and leaving out the recreational water quality monitors in Tampa Bay.
Next, we run the same set of regressions using all (local and recreational) water
quality monitors within the specified radii, so that the contribution of recre-
ational waters to homeowners’ WTP for pollution abatement can be captured
within the five different radii.
Coefficient estimates and their 95 percent confidence intervals, mea-
sured against the lower horizontal axis, are reported in Figure 2.4, with the
local-monitor results in blue and the all-monitor results in red. The sample
size for each regression is reported above each estimate; sample size grows with
the specified radius for the “zone of influence” because there are many fewer
properties with reporting water quality monitors a short distance away, so the
number of property transactions with reporting monitors grows as we draw
larger circles. To ease interpretation, the implied MWTP for the observed
average 10% increase in DO in the Tampa Bay watershed from 1998-2014 can
be read from the upper horizontal axis.
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Figure 2.4: Coefficient estimates and MWTP for DO from a typical hedonic
approach when water quality measurements are averaged for monitors within
varying radii of properties.
Notes: Red point estimates and confidence intervals are from regressions using
only local water quality monitors. Blue point estimates and confidence intervals
are from regressions using all (local and Tampa Bay) water quality monitors.
Sample sizes for each regression are reported above each estimate.
Several insights arise from Figure 2.4. First, estimated coefficients for
the local measures of DO are mostly small and positive, hovering around 0.01,
for an implied MWTP for the average water quality improvement in the wa-
tershed during the study period of $100-$300. Second, once we include the
recreational monitors, the estimated coefficients increase appreciably. For the
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smallest radii, the red coefficient estimates in Figure 2.4 imply a MWTP for
the average water quality improvement from 1998 to 2014 of between $2,500
and $3,000 per property—an order of magnitude larger than those without
the recreational waters included. Third, the all-monitor coefficients decrease
in magnitude as we draw larger and larger circles around Tampa Bay homes
to describe water quality, until the estimates at 10 km are in the range of the
local-monitor-only estimates. This is consistent with the issue we raised in the
heuristic discussion of Figure 2.1; it may be the case that the larger “zones
of influence” capture so many irrelevant water quality monitors (those that
describe water quality in locations that a household does not value) that the
signal of pollution abatement’s value at key sites gets lost in the noise from
the sites with little or no value.
This last insight is also consistent with households further from water
having systematically lower MWTP for water quality improvements. As we
allow monitors at increasing distances from each property to influence our
coefficient estimates, we are also able to include homes in the sample that
are further and further from any water quality monitor, and are thus further
from water altogether. If heterogeneity in MWTP among property-owners
depending on water proximity explains the observed pattern of decreasing “all-
monitor” coefficient estimates, then it is a real phenomenon that one would
want to capture in any estimate of the monetized benefits of water pollution
abatement. We do not observe this pattern consistently in the local-monitor
results, however. The value of local water pollution abatement is quite similar
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when we use monitors between 1 km and 10 km.
Though this analysis—comparable to the standard hedonic approach
when valuing changes in pollution—points to the importance of recreational
benefits in estimating MWTP for water pollution abatement, it is naïve rel-
ative to actual recreation behavior. A different approach is needed to match
homes with the recreation sites that individuals living in those homes typically
visit. Thus, we implement the two-stage approach described in Sections 3 and
5.
2.6.2 Main Model: First Stage Recreation Demand Results
Results from the recreation demand model are reported in Table 2.2.
Columns 1 and 2 define water quality as the average DO at Tampa Bay mon-
itors within 3 km of each fishing site in a given year; column 3 uses a 5-km
radius to define average water quality in a site-year. Column 2 reports esti-
mates from a model using travel time, rather than travel cost, as the relevant
travel cost variable, an alternative approach in the literature (Cesario 1976,
Wilman 1980), using the 3-km radius. Results are robust to these differences
in specification. As the travel cost to a site increases by $1, the probability
of an angler fishing at the site decreases by about 11%. In columns 1 and
3, this coefficient can be interpreted as the marginal utility of income, and
our estimate is similar to others in the literature (von Haefen 2003). In the
recreation demand model, there is little difference in the estimates when we
use monitors within 3km of a fishing site to describe water quality, or those
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within 5km.
Table 2.2: First-stage recreation demand model
(1) (2) (3)
Travel cost (3km) Travel time (3km) Travel cost (5km)
Travel cost (US dollars) -0.110*** -0.113***
(0.00078) (0.00080)
Travel time (minutes) -0.0640***
(0.00044)
DO (mg/L) 0.0722*** 0.0789*** 0.0663***
(0.0089) (0.0083) (0.0114)
Seagrass abundance -0.170*** -0.135*** -0.141***
(0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0104)
Alternative-specific constants Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,765,796 1,765,796 1,801,615
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Models are estimated using conditional logit, with a choice set of 85 fishing sites visited
during the study period. Columns 1 and 2 link fishing sites to Tampa Bay water quality monitors
within 3km. Column 3 links sites with monitors within 5km. Travel cost is estimated as the
sum of the value of travel time (1/3 of foregone wages times round-trip travel time) and the
operational cost of travel (AAA’s driving cost times round-trip distance).
The effect of DO on visitation is positive, significant, and very similar
across all three models. Anglers from the three counties are 6.6 to 7.9% more
likely to recreate at a site if the DO level increases by 1 mg/L, equivalent to
a 16% increase from mean DO at the Bay monitors in our sample.
The coefficient on seagrass abundance is statistically significant and
negative. A 1-unit increase in seagrass abundance (a 43% increase over the
mean) lowers the probability of fishing at a site by 13.5 to 17%. Though
seagrass abundance is correlated with high water quality in Tampa Bay, the
negative coefficient may be due to the fact that seagrass can be a disamenity
to anglers. For example, anglers in shallow water must take care not to scar
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seagrass beds with a boat motor’s propeller, and seagrass can catch and tangle
fishing lines.13
In the online Appendix, we re-estimate the recreation demand model
using the 5 mg/L DO threshold instead of the continuous DO concentration
(Table A.3). Results are similar, except that the local DO coefficient is not
significantly different from zero in the model using a 5-km radius to describe
water quality at fishing sites.
Using the estimated parameters in Table 2.2, we then estimate the
expected utility from recreation trips initiating from each zip code j in each
year following Equation (2.8) through Equation (2.10). The average value of
expected utility (ECSjt) from the RUM model calculated from trips occurring
in each zip code-year is $35.98 (Table 2.1).
Figure 2.5 maps the mean values over the study period of our recre-
ational utility estimate by zip code, as well as mean DO values at each recre-
ational fishing site. The heat map of ECSjt quintile by zip code shows some
predictable results. For example, values are high in Pinellas County (the
peninsula that separates the Bay from the Gulf). Some other coastal zip
codes, especially those in southern Hillsborough County, also have high aver-
age recreational utility. Figure 2.5 also shows, however, that residents of the
region’s less densely-populated zip codes further from the coast (e.g., in north-




ern Hillsborough and eastern Manatee County) also obtain high utility from
recreational fishing in the Bay. This is not surprising, given the relatively high
average travel time (about 90 minutes round trip) to fishing sites in the MRIP
sample. It does support our contention, however, that accounting for actual
recreation behavior may paint a different picture of the value of recreational
water quality than approaches that proxy for behavior using proximity.
To estimate the marginal effect of DO increases at Tampa Bay recre-
ational fishing sites using the RUM model, we can recalculate the ECSjt using
the DO coefficient estimate from column 1 of Table 2.2 and use equations (2.7)
through (2.10). Given that the mean DO level in the Tampa Bay watershed
increases by about 10% from 1998-2014, we use Equation (2.9) to estimate the
change in ECSjt associated with this increase in water quality. The increase
in ECSjt is $0.42 per trip on average, which is about a 1.2% increase over the
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Figure 2.5: Average ECS and average DO (mg/L), 1998-2014
Notes: This figure maps average ECS and average DO for all zip codes and recreational fishing
sites, respectively, associated with properties in the repeat-sales sample.
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2.6.3 Main Model: Second-stage Hedonic Results
Results from estimating Equation (2.11) are reported in Table 2.3. In
column 1, our baseline property FE model, a 10 percent increase in local DO
leads to a 0.114% increase in mean property prices.14 Households’ MWTP
for local DO is about $261 per property for the observed 10% increase in DO
from 1998-2014. This is in line with the previous literature’s small, positive
estimates of MWTP for local water quality improvements.15
The recreational utility index coefficient in column 1 of Table 2.3 is large
and statistically significant. From the previous section, a 10% increase in DO
is associated with a $0.42 increase in ECSjt. From column 1 of Table 2.3, a
$1 increase in ECSjt is associated with a 24.9% increase in the housing price,
1998-2014. Thus, the $0.42 increase in ECSjt is associated with a 10.46%
increase in the average housing price, or about $23,980 per property – almost
two orders of magnitude larger than our estimated MWTP for local water
quality improvements.
One test of whether our amenity and recreational estimates are really
separable is to observe what happens to our estimates of the amenity value of
local water quality improvements when the recreational utility index is omit-
14Results using the 5 mg/L DO dummy at a 3-km radius are similarly positive and
significant (online Appendix, Table A.5).
15If we estimate the typical hedonic model using a vector of property characteristics
instead of property fixed effects, we obtain intuitive results for property characteristics, and
counter-intuitive results for water quality—better water quality has a negative, insignificant
effect on property values. Results are reported in the online appendix, Table A.4. This
underscores the importance of controlling comprehensively for property characteristics when
estimating MWTP for water pollution abatement.
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ted from the model. Column 2 of Table 2.3 shows that the local DO coefficient
is insensitive to the exclusion of ECSjt. This suggests that the two param-
eters are, in fact, picking up different aspects of MWTP for water quality
improvements.
In column 3 we repeat the model from column 1, except that we use a
5-km radius to characterize water quality at local waterbodies and Bay recre-
ational fishing sites. The sample size grows for this model, because we can
now include repeat-sales properties that are located between 3 and 5km from
at least one local water quality monitor. In column 3, neither the local DO
nor the ECSjt coefficient are statistically different from zero, and both are
smaller than their counterparts in column 1.
In column 4 we report estimates that use the travel-time parameters
from the RUM model (column 2 of Table 2.2) to construct the recreational
utility index, rather than using the travel cost estimates (column 1 of Table
2.2). The coefficient on local DO does not change, while the ECSjt estimate is
less than one-half that in column 1. The coefficient on ECSjt, together with
the DO coefficient estimate in column 2 of Table 2.2, implies a MWTP for
recreational water pollution abatement of about $10,200 per property.
In the online Appendix (Table A.5), we re-estimate the property FE
models in Table 2.3, using the 5 mg/L DO threshold. Results are qualitatively
similar and perhaps a bit stronger. The coefficient on local DO is small,
positive and significant using a 3-km radius, and positive and weakly significant











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.6.3.1 Models with interactions between time trends and spatial
controls
One threat to identification in our baseline model is that we do not con-
trol for factors influencing housing prices that vary over both time and space
that could be correlated with water quality. For example, the economic reces-
sion and housing crisis that occurred during our sample period and are visible
in Figure 2.3 may have had heterogeneous effects by county or neighborhood,
and those effects could be correlated with water quality and recreational utility.
This would bias our coefficient estimates. The most comprehensive approach
to this challenge would interact our year fixed effects with geographic controls
at a higher spatial scale than the property. However, given that recreational
utility is estimated at the zip code level, and there are only a small number of
zip codes in the data (and even fewer counties, subdivisions, or other levels of
spatial aggregation), this approach leaves too few repeat sales to identify the
effect of recreational utility on property prices.16 We estimate two alternative
models that include different levels of interactions between a time trend and
geographic controls, as well as year fixed effects, as in equation (15):
lnPijct = β0 + β1Ageit + β2lnWQit + β3ÊCSjt +αi + γt +λc ∗T + εijct (2.15)
16There are 138 zip codes in the data (66 in Hillsborough County, 26 in Manatee, and 46
in Pinellas). There are 16 census subdivisions in the three counties: 7 in Hillsborough, 4 in
Manatee, and 5 in Pinellas.
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where λc indicates that a property is located in county or census subdivision
c, and T is a linear time trend. Results are presented in Table 2.3, columns 5
and 6.
The effect of local DO on property prices, identified using variation in
water quality over time within 3 km of a property, and within a year, is rela-
tively insensitive to the inclusion of these additional controls. The estimated
effect of recreational utility on property prices changes substantially, however.
The coefficient on ECSjt in column 5 is about one-fourth the magnitude of
that in our baseline model in column 1. In column 6, when we include the
subdivision-specific trends, it is even smaller and also statistically insignificant.
The identifying variation for the recreational utility index coefficient
comes from changes in recreation within zip codes over time. In column 5,
the trend in recreational utility (which may be more important to property
owners than periodic departures from the trend) at the county level is removed
from the identifying variation for the recreational utility index. The model in
column 6 is even more restrictive. In our view, the variation in recreational
utility across census subdivisions and counties is important variation to capture
in the coefficient on ECSjt, thus the column 1 model is preferred to those with
the county-specific trend and subdivision-specific trend controls. However,




Table 2.4 reports results from the long-difference models. Column 1
reports results from our baseline long-difference model, with standard errors
clustered by property. In the baseline model, if we hold average property
price and average local DO in the first time period (1998-2003) constant, a
1% increase in average local DO in the second time period (2009-2014) is
associated with a 0.0226% increase in the average second-period property price.
If the average second-period local DO increases by 10% (the average change
observed in the data between period a and period b), the average property
price increases by 0.226%. From Table 2.1, the average property price from
2009-2014 is about $196,000. Thus the marginal effect of an 10% increase
in average local DO from the first to the second period is about $440 per
property, almost a 70 percent increase over the $261 estimate using column 1
of Table 2.3. Note that the property FE model estimates MWTP for a change
in DO using short-run variation, while the long-difference models in Table 2.4
exploit the change between period a and period b, with more than a decade
separating the midpoints of the two periods.
Interpreting the ECSj coefficient in column 1, recall that a 10% increase
in DO is associated with a $0.42 increase in ECSjt. From Column 1, a $1
increase in ECSj is associated with a 1.19% increase in property prices. Thus,
the $0.42 increase in ECSjt is associated with a 0.5% increase in the average
housing price, or about $1,000 per property. Property markets appear to have
capitalized a value of regional recreational fishing benefits from water quality
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improvements in Tampa over two decades that is more than twice the size of the
value of improvements in ambient water quality very near to properties. Again,
the property FE ECSjt coefficient and the long-difference coefficient measure
different things. But if we compare the two qualitatively, the recreational
utility component of the estimated value of water quality improvements in the
long-difference models is much smaller than in the property FE models.
In column 2, we estimate the same long-difference model (equation
(2.14)), clustering standard errors by zip code, rather than by property. While
we measure property-specific local DO, the recreation demand index is con-
structed by zip code, so it may be more appropriate to cluster at this higher
level of aggregation (Cameron & Miller 2015). Our estimate of the marginal
effect of local DO is no longer significant, but the ECSjt coefficient is.
As we did for the property FE models, we also try dropping ECSj from
the long-difference model (in column 3). The effect of improved local DO on
property prices is slightly smaller, but not different enough to raise a concern


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the next two columns of Table 2.4, we include a set of interactions
between counties and the two time periods (column 4) and a set of interac-
tions between census subdivisions and the two time periods (column 5). Our
reasoning is similar to that in equation (15); if inter-temporal shocks common
to counties or neighborhoods are correlated with water quality improvements
from period a to period b, this could bias our estimates of the effects of water
quality on property prices. The inclusion of these additional covariates does
not change our estimates much compared to column 1. If anything, the es-
timates increase a bit in the model with subdivision*period controls (column
5).
In the final two columns of Table 2.4, we re-estimate the basic property
FE model from Table 2.3, restricting the sample to the same properties that
appear in the long-difference sample, and clustering at two levels (property and
zip code). (These models still use more observations than the long-difference
models, because we include all transactions from 1998-2014 for these homes,
and not just those that occur in the first and last six years of the sample pe-
riod). We cannot directly compare the coefficient estimates in columns 6-7 with
those in columns 1-2. However, we note that when using the long-difference
sample with the property FE approach, neither coefficient is statistically dif-
ferent from zero. This suggests that the differences between our long-difference
estimates and our FE estimates may be due both to different samples, and to
different specifications.
In the Appendix, Table A.6, we also test the robustness of the long-
62
difference results to different definitions of period a and period b: allowing
the period a sample to extend to just before the recession and housing crisis
(period a: 1998-2006 and period b: 2009-2014), and splitting the full time
period in half (so: 1998-2007 and 2008-2014). In both cases, the marginal
effects of both local DO and recreational utility are quite a bit larger than
our estimates in Table 2.4. The sample sizes are also about twice those in
Table 2.4. As in column 2 of Table 4, When we cluster standard errors by
zip code in these models, the marginal effect of local DO (a small share of
our total estimated value of water quality improvement) is not statistically
significant. Both of these alternative models include transactions during the
housing boom, and the second approach also includes the subsequent bust.
Thus, we report the Table 2.4 results as the main long-difference results.
Given its comportment with the theoretical model and ability to control
comprehensively for unobservables, the long-difference model may be the pre-
ferred approach to valuing water quality improvements. However, the choice
between long differences and property FEs creates a stark tradeoff in sample
size (and possible selection). The long-difference repeat-sales sample is less
than one-tenth of the full sample, because we must observe properties sold at
least once in each time period, as well as recreation at fishing sites from each
zip code in each time period, in order for those properties and zip codes to be
included in the models. Figure 2.3 suggests that the trends in property prices
in the long-difference sample are similar to those for all sales and repeat sales
in both periods, with the exception of a low start in 1998 for the long-difference
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sample. However, Figure 2.6 shows that the long-difference sample drops many
zip codes entirely, including all zip codes in Manatee County, many of which
have high average recreational utility from fishing in the Bay (mapped in Fig-
ure 2.5). As noted earlier, Manatee County drops out because we only observe
transactions there from 2005-2014. Figure 2.5 also shows that average water
quality at coastal fishing sites in Manatee County are among the highest in our
sample. Thus, the long-difference sample may not be representative of Tampa
area property owners’ willingness to pay for water quality improvements, espe-
cially in recreational waters. The exclusion of these properties likely matters
for the magnitude of our estimates, and may explain some of the differences
between the property FE and long-difference results. For these reasons, in
the benefit-cost analysis in Section 7, we use both the property FE and the
long-difference results, reporting a range of estimates.
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Figure 2.6: Percent change in average ECS and percent change in average DO,
1998-2003 to 2009-2014
Notes: This figure maps the change in average ECS and the change in local




2.6.5.1 Effects of proximity to water
Although Equations (2.11) and (2.14) capture the overall effect of wa-
ter quality on property prices, they do not allow us to examine how this effect
varies with proximity to water, as is common in the prior literature. To this
end, we also estimate models that interact both local DO and the recreational
utility index with a property’s distance to water. Table A.7 in the online Ap-
pendix reports results. The FE model is in column 1, and the long-difference
model is in column 2. In both columns, higher DO in local water raises prop-
erty prices, and the effect of recreational utility is also positive and significant.
The FE model suggests that recreational value falls with distance from water,
but amenity value does not. The long-difference model indicates no effect of
distance on the marginal value of water quality improvements.
2.6.5.2 Allowing for recreation in local waterbodies
One potential challenge to our results is that some local waterbodies
may also provide recreation opportunities. This would not be a problem for
our estimates in a benefit-cost analysis—a comprehensive estimate is desirable.
But to claim that our local MWTP estimate is primarily an amenity value
while the recreational index captures recreational value, further analysis is
needed. Thus, we divide local waterbodies within close radii of properties into
those in or near public parks, and those well outside of parks. To categorize
local park monitors, we use the Florida parks shapefile from OpenStreetMap,
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an online map database built and maintained by volunteers worldwide (Open-
StreetMap contributors 2018). We define park monitors as monitors within
150 m of park boundaries. We estimate the mean annual DO concentration of
waters in all parks within 3km of a property, and join this new time-varying wa-
ter quality measure with property sales. We then include the log-transformed
local park water quality measure in the property FE model. Note that we
do not observe recreation at these sites, so we are stuck using the standard,
naive approach to estimating the benefits of local park aquatic recreation by
proximity.
Table A.8 in the online Appendix reports the results of a property FE
model and a long difference model including the mean park DO concentration.
Because DO is not measured in many neighborhood ponds, our sample size
shrinks to fewer than 42,000 repeat sales, and fewer than 3,600 long-difference
repeat sales. Note that in this selected sample of homes near parks with water
quality data, the results may say more about homeowners who locate near
parks than it does about average MWTP for water quality. It is difficult to
conclude much from this test, given the very different results in the two models,
and the very small and select sample. Nonetheless, if anything, including local
(non-Bay) recreational waters in the analysis increases the coefficient estimate
on the Bay recreational utility component of our models. Given the long-
difference results in Table A.8, it is possible that our local DO estimates in
the main models are picking up some recreation benefits, for homes near parks
with non-Bay aquatic recreation.
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2.6.5.3 Smaller spatial radii for local water quality monitors
Recall that our main models take the average of all monitors within
a 3-km radius of a property to represent local water quality, with additional
results reported for a 5-km radius. To further test the robustness of our results
to this choice, we estimate models using radii of 1 km, 500 m and 300 m.
Table A.9 in the online appendix reports results for both continuous DO and
the 5mg/L threshold. We report only the local DO results, with the full set
of coefficients available on request. In the property FE models, the property
value effect of local water quality gets larger as the radius gets smaller, to 500m,
consistent with previous literature indicating larger effects for properties closer
to the water (Walsh et al. 2011, 2017, Wolf & Klaiber 2017). The effects lose
significance for the smallest radius, likely due to the very small number of
observed repeat sales within 300 m of one or more reporting water quality
monitors. In the long-difference models, the impacts of local DO are not
statistically significant below a 3-km radius—these samples of homes sold at
least once in each period that are located very close to monitors are very small.
2.6.5.4 Moving average DO concentrations
While it is common in the literature to use the average water quality
measure from the calendar year of a property’s sale to represent water qual-
ity conditions in hedonic regressions, as we do above, we implement a set of
robustness checks using average DO concentrations within a 3 km radius of
a property 3 months, 6 months, and 1 year before each sale date, reporting
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results in Table A.10 in the online appendix.17 Column 1 uses the mean DO
concentration in the 12 months prior to a property’s sale date. The magnitude
of the coefficient on ln(DO) in this model is very similar to that in our baseline
model in column 1 of Table 2.3. Results from column 2 of Table A.10 suggest
statistically insignificant MWTP for local DO increases 6 months prior to a
sale. Column 3 indicates (counter-intuitively) that local DO improvements 3
months prior to a sale are actually associated with lower property prices. Prop-
erty transactions can take several months, so homeowners may have no or low
MWTP for local DO increases while waiting to close transactions. However,
we would not expect water pollution abatement to reduce property values in
this shortest window. The coefficients on ECSjt in Table A.10 show consis-
tently that homeowners have positive and statistically significant values for
recreational utility (a function of Bay water quality), and that these values
are robust to varying time windows prior to a sale, though somewhat smaller
than in our baseline model.
17The number of observations varies by specification in Table A.10 because the number
of repeat sales for which we are able to estimate average water quality in each time window
varies. Note that the 12-month moving DO average (column 1) actually gives us a larger
sample than the models in Table 2.3 (which use average DO in the calendar year of each
property transaction). Also, in Table A.10, as the time window for calculating the DO
average shrinks, so does the sample. This is due to the fact that some monitors do not
report very frequently, and properties are dropped from the sample when there are no DO
observations in the relevant time window.
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2.7 Discussion and Conclusions
Our empirical results demonstrate that valuation of water pollution
abatement using hedonic analysis is strongly downward-biased if recreational
waters are omitted, and if they are included but the analysis ignores actual
recreation behavior. Taken together, our integrated two-stage model and ro-
bustness checks suggest that increases in dissolved oxygen (DO) improve both
recreational and aesthetic amenities and that homeowners in Tampa Bay have
significant MWTP for both of these improvements. Our baseline MWTP esti-
mates for recreational water quality improvements in Tampa Bay from 1998-
2014 are much larger than our estimates of MWTP for local amenity improve-
ments. The two effects appear to be separable in Tampa Bay, suggesting prior
hedonic studies of the value of water quality could provide unbiased estimates
of local amenity values, but may exclude the potentially much larger regional
recreational values.
From 1998-2014, the average DO concentration in the Tampa Bay re-
gion increased by about 10%. Table 2.5 summarizes our monetized benefit
estimates for this water quality improvement. Using the property FE esti-
mates reported in column 1 of Table 2.3 (panel A), the local amenity benefits
from this improvement range from about $16.8 million if we apply them only
to our sample households, to about $210.4 million if we apply them to all
owner-occupied households in the Tampa Bay metro area in the 2010 Cen-
sus (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2015). In contrast,
when we use the two-stage model coefficient estimates to also monetize the
70
recreation benefits from DO improvements over the 16-year study period, our
benefit estimates range from $1.5 to $19.3 billion, depending on the scope of
the property market to which these benefits accrue.
In panel B of Table 2.5 we use the long-difference estimates from Table
2.4 for the same exercise. The monetized estimates of MWTP for a 10% local
DO improvement range from $6.4 to $356.3 million, depending on the geo-
graphic scope of homeowners to whom benefits accrue. The MWTP estimates
for recreational improvements are substantially smaller than those calculated
from our baseline estimates (from $20.4 million considering only our long-
difference sample properties to $1.2 billion for the whole Tampa metro area).
At the low end, they are smaller due to both a much smaller repeat-sales sam-
ple, and smaller coefficient estimates. At the high end, the difference is due
only to our differences in estimates.
How do these benefit estimates compare to the costs that firms, home-
owners, governments (taxpayers), and other stakeholders incurred to achieve
the water quality gains observed in the Tampa Bay watershed between 1998
and 2014? There are several challenges to answering this question. First, the
water pollution control projects that contributed to DO gains over this period
were incredibly diverse in scope and type, implemented by dozens of different
public and private sector institutions (Beck et al. 2019). Second, the impact of
each project has not been rigorously evaluated to determine its causal impact
on water quality. One working paper suggests that some types of projects, par-
ticularly point-source nitrogen controls, may be statistically associated with
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Table 2.5: Range of monetized benefit estimates for the observed 10% increase
in average DO concentration in the Tampa Bay watershed, 1998-2014





– sample households only
WTP
– all repeat sales, 1998-2014
WTP
–Tampa Bay metro area
Amenity benefit $261 x 64,353 = $16.8million
$261 x 170,192 = $44.4
million
$261 x 806,000 = $210.4
million
Recreational benefit $23,980 x 64,353 = $1.54billion
$23,980 x 170,192 = $4.08
billion




$24,241 x 64,353 = $1.56
billion
$24,241 x 170,192 = $4.13
billion
$24,241 x 806,000 = $19.5
billion




– sample households only
WTP
– all repeat sales, 1998-2014
WTP
–Tampa Bay metro area
Amenity benefit $442 x 14,390 = $6.36million
$442 x 170,192 = $75.2
million
$442 x 806,000 = $356.3
million
Recreational benefit $979 x 14,390 = $14.1million
$979 x 170,192 = $167
million




$1,421 x 14,390 = $20.4
million
$1,421 x 170,192 = $242
million
$1,421 x 806,000 = $1.15
billion
Notes: Sample households in panel A column 1 are the 64,353 homes sold twice or
more in Hillsborough, Pinellas and Manatee counties from 1998-2014, and for which we
also observe water quality variables and estimate the zip-code-level annual recreational
utility index. Sample households in panel B column 1 are the 14,390 homes sold at
least once between 1998-2003 and at least once between 2009-2014, and for which we
also observe water quality variables and estimate the zip-code-level recreational utility
index. All repeat sales in column 2 include all 170,192 homes sold twice or more in
the three counties, 1998-2014. This includes properties dropped from our sample due to
missing water quality or recreational visitation data. All homeowners in the Tampa Bay
metro area in column 3 include the approximately 806,000 owner-occupied households in
the 2010 Census in the Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater metro area (U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development 2015), which includes Hillsborough and Pinellas
counties, as well as two counties excluded from our sample (Hernando and Pasco),
and excludes Manatee County (which is in our sample). The amenity and recreational
benefit estimates are calculated using the estimated coefficients from models reported
in column 1 of Table 2.3 for panel A, and those reported in column 1 of Table 2.4 for
panel B.
subsequent water quality improvements at downstream water quality monitors
over time (Beck et al. 2019). Other approaches (for example, nonpoint source
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control and habitat restoration projects) may be less strongly associated with
water quality improvements (Beck et al. 2019). However, we are not able
to determine which projects actually caused the water quality improvements
we observe in the data, and for which we estimate Tampa property owners’
MWTP.
From the Tampa Bay Estuary Program, we obtained a catalog of the
more than 800 projects implemented between 1971 and 2017. If we consider
only those 600 projects implemented between 1998 and 2014 (our study pe-
riod), and only those for which cost estimates exist (311 projects), the costs of
these projects sum to about $585 million, about 8% of our estimated benefits
for all repeat-sales properties between 1998 and 2014, using the property FE
results in panel A of Table 2.5. Using the long-difference results in panel B,
estimated benefits are about 24% lower than this very rough cost estimate. If
the benefits accrued more broadly—to all owner-occupied single-family homes
in the metro area—then the benefits are about twice the costs, even using
the long-difference results, which as noted earlier drop transactions for many
properties with high average recreational utility. These are very favorable
benefit-cost ratios when compared to other water quality benefit-cost analyses
in the literature (Keiser & Shapiro 2019b,a, Keiser et al. 2019).
Though our benefit estimates are more comprehensive than prior work
using hedonics or recreation demand modeling, they are still incomplete. We
exclude the recreational fishing benefits that improved water quality has af-
forded non-residents such as tourists visiting Tampa Bay, as we used only the
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MRIP survey data for anglers whose trips originated from zip codes in the
three sample counties. Mitigating eutrophication also reduces emissions of
methane, a greenhouse gas (Beaulieu et al. 2019), which could be valued using
estimates of the social costs of GHGs and would almost certainly not be capi-
talized into local property prices. Moreover, the rebound in seagrass coverage
in Tampa Bay results in additional nitrogen removal (as these healthy plants
absorb nutrients for growth), generating a positive feedback. Scientists have
estimated that the additional nitrogen removal services associated with the
rebound in seagrass in Tampa Bay between 1982 and 2010 has, itself, removed
enough nitrogen from the Bay to avert more than $20 million per year in ex-
penditures for additional denitrification by municipal wastewater treatment
plants and other sources (Russsell & Greening 2019). These kinds of avoided
costs are also unlikely to be capitalized into local housing prices, as it would
be difficult for homeowners to be aware of them. Thus, our benefit estimates
are almost surely conservative.
We cannot assess the quality of the 311 available nutrient project cost
estimates from the TBEP, or the projects for which costs have not been es-
timated. In addition, projects implemented before 1998 may contribute to
the water quality changes we observe after 1998. Thus, costs may be over- or
under-estimated.
This work adds to our understanding of how people value water qual-
ity improvements, especially nutrient pollution abatement. Eutrophication,
a consequence of nutrient pollution, may cause large economic damages in
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the United States and elsewhere. Many local, state and federal regulations
have been implemented to address this problem. Further work to help poli-
cymakers better understand how people value nutrient pollution abatement,
and how these values are capitalized in housing markets, can contribute to a
more comprehensive evaluation of such regulations.
We also contribute to the literature on hedonic valuation of pollution
control, more generally. We estimate the first hedonic model valuing water
quality that controls comprehensively and flexibly for property characteristics,
using two different approaches. Our long-difference hedonics approach may
comport better with hedonic theory than other approaches in the literature,
given that the hedonic model considers the property location decision in long-
run equilibrium. Lacking data on recreation site visitation at the property
level—likely a problem faced by other researchers examining similar questions,
unless they implement a household survey—we use multiple imputation to
address the resulting measurement error relative to recreation data observed
by property. These innovations may enable future work valuing water pollution




The impacts of drinking water lead exposure on
short-run and long-run educational outcomes
3.1 Introduction
The effects of environmental pollution on human health and welfare
are fundamental parameters for designing and evaluating environmental reg-
ulation. The literature in epidemiology and economics documents significant
negative impacts of contemporaneous air pollution on population health and
welfare (see Currie et al. (2014) for a recent review). Studies suggest that
early exposure to pollutants impacts long-term outcomes(Isen et al. 2017, Za-
veri et al. 2019). However, only a few existing papers focus on the impact of
water pollution on health and the long-term consequences of early exposure
to drinking water pollution. It is important to understand these questions
since existing studies suggest that drinking water quality is an ongoing prob-
lem, even in a developed country like the United States (Grooms 2016, Allaire
et al. 2018). This is an important gap in the literature, especially if the long-
run returns to environmental pollution regulation are large, because they have
generally been excluded from the benefit-cost analysis of regulation.
In this paper, I investigate how early childhood exposure to lead in
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drinking water affects both short-run and long-run educational outcomes, pro-
viding important information for the economic assessment of the impacts of
lead regulation. Additionally, I quantify whether and how lead exposure’s im-
pacts differ by socioeconomic characteristics such as gender and race, allowing
me to describe the likely distributional impacts of lead regulation and lead
mitigation investments.
Using confidential education data from Texas on the educational out-
comes for over 2.6 million students and data on drinking water lead contamina-
tion from the US EPA via two Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, I
use two identification strategies to plausibly causally estimate the educational
impact of drinking water lead exposure. In the short run, I employ two instru-
mental variables (IV) strategies to estimate the impact of lead on third-grade
standardized test scores. My first IV strategy exploits the plausibly exoge-
nous variation of surface water chloride (Cl–) concentration that affects the
lead concentration in finished drinking water. My second instrument interacts
surface water Cl– with the historical presence of lead pipes. I find that even a
very low level of drinking water lead exposure in a child’s birth year has sig-
nificant negative impacts on third-grade standardized test scores. Specifically,
I find that eliminating lead in Texas drinking water could increase average
reading scores by 0.58 percent and math scores by 4.7 percent of a standard
deviation. My estimates are in line with standard estimates from the literature
using blood lead levels (BLLs), a more precise physiological measure of lead
exposure that is not systematically available at a spatial and inter-temporal
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scale to allow this kind of analysis.
I then employ a difference-in-difference (DID) model using plausibly
exogenous variation from the timing of drinking water lead treatment tech-
nique violations. Linking the timing of a violation of the federal regulation
of drinking water lead treatment with the year of birth, I find that students
who experience a new violation in their birth year have a statistically signifi-
cantly lower probability of graduating high school. Given the income premium
of having a high school diploma, a lead treatment violation at birth may be
associated with a 0.14 percent decrease in annual income through its impact
on high school graduation. For the cohorts in my sample, the benefits in
terms of increased income from eliminating such violations in Texas would be
around $12 million annually. Additionally, this paper finds that girls, children
from African American families and children with economic disadvantages are
more vulnerable to lead exposure, suggesting that early childhood lead ex-
posure may be one contributing factor of the gender-achievement gap and
racial-achievement gaps in the US.
This paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, I
provide the first evidence of the impacts of contemporary U.S. drinking water
lead level on elementary school test scores, showing that exposure even at the
low levels typical of regulated U.S. water systems may cause damages. Lead in
drinking water is an ongoing public health crisis in some cities and has larger
impacts on very young children and pregnant mothers. While the United
States (US). has one of the best water supply systems (Columbia Water Center
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2016), elevated lead concentrations in drinking water in Flint, MI, Newark, NJ,
and Washington DC are among recent high-profile occurrences. Most papers
that estimate damages from lead exposure focus on airborne lead from gasoline,
and few studies examine the impact of lead exposure from drinking water.
Second, this paper provides the first evidence that the negative effects
of early childhood lead exposure persist through longer educational milestones,
such as high school graduation. Previous studies have documented lead’s im-
pact on children’s early cognitive ability, intelligence score (Ferrie et al. 2012),
educational outcomes (Reyes 2015b, Aizer & Currie 2019), and later crime
rate, risky behavior (Reyes 2015b) and juvenile delinquency (Aizer & Currie
2019). However, few studies estimate the long-run impacts of lead exposure,
such as the impact on higher educational attainment or future earnings.
Third, this paper also contributes to the literature on lead exposure’s
implications for inequality. Economic and racial inequality can cause poor and
minority children to have greater exposure to lead, and prior work suggests
that lead may be one cause of continuing disparities in test scores (Aizer &
Currie 2019). Studies have shown wide racial and class inequality in lead ex-
posure. From 1999-2010, 7.7% of non-Hispanic black children aged 1–2 years
had blood lead levels (BLLs) ≥5 µg/dL, compared with 1.6% of Mexican-
American children aged 1–2 years (Raymond & Brown 2017). While existing
research finds that differences in housing conditions and exposures to lead-
contaminated house dust contribute strongly to the racial disparity in urban
children’s BLLs (Lanphear et al. 2000), other work reports that the racial
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disparity in BLLs persists even after controlling for detailed controls such
as neighborhood-level education, poverty, and age of neighborhood housing
(Sampson & Winter 2016). Moreover, not only are children from minority and
poor neighborhoods disproportionately exposed to lead, but they also have
less access to mitigating measures such as good nutrition to offset damages
caused by lead exposure (Gallicchio et al. 2002, Committee on Environmental
Health and others 2005). Following the resurgence of the Environmental Jus-
tice (EJ) literature, understanding the causes of inequality in lead exposure
and consequences of lead exposure for social inequality could contribute to the
discussion on new approaches and policies for reducing inequality (Banzhaf
et al. 2019).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, I review the
literature on the health and educational impacts of lead exposure. Section
3.3 provides a brief introduction of the law governing lead concentrations in
drinking water in the United States. Section 3.5 describes the data used in
this paper, and Section 3.4 presents econometric models. Main results and
robustness checks are presented in Section 3.6. In Section 3.7, I include a
rough back-of-the-envelope estimation from the benefits of eliminating lead in
drinking water, along with conclusions.
3.2 Literature review
Despite more than 30 years of efforts limiting lead exposure, 4.5 million
households in the United States are still exposed to high levels of lead, and half
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a million preschool-aged children have elevated BLLs. The share of U.S. chil-
dren with elevated BLLs increased slightly from 2009-2014 (Raymond & Brown
2017). Lead contamination disproportionately affects children in minority and
low-income families; average BLLs among African American children ages 1-5
in the United States are 38 percent higher, and levels among low-income chil-
dren are 23 percent higher than the national average (Wheeler & Brown 2013).
Using data from more than 1 million blood tests in Chicago, Sampson & Win-
ter (2016) show that disproportionate exposure of lead by race is a pathway
through which racial segregation has contributed to racial inequality. Racial
and income differences in exposure can be exacerbated by the fact that good
nutrition and cognitive stimulation can protect against some negative effects
of lead exposure, but children in low-income and minority households may be
less likely to benefit from these protective measures (Benfer 2017).
The three main historical sources of lead in the U.S. are lead paint,
leaded gasoline, and lead in drinking water (Reyes 2015a). Many laws and
regulations have been passed to restrict lead use in commercial products. The
phase-down of lead in gasoline began in 1974 under the authority of the Clean
Air Act of 1970 (Newell & Rogers 2003). By 1996, lead was banned as a fuel
additive in the United States. Thus, the only remaining sources of airborne
lead from gasoline in the United States are the vehicles in which leaded fuel is
still legal, professional auto racing (Hollingsworth & Rudik 2020) and aircraft
(Zahran et al. 2017). Federal regulations banned the use of lead-based paint
in homes built after 1978, but lead paint remains the most common source of
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lead exposure in childhood.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2017) estimates that lead
in drinking water contributes to 20% or more of a U.S. individual’s total ex-
posure to lead. Lead in drinking water has a larger impact on very young
children and pregnant mothers. For example, infants who consume mostly
mixed formula can receive 40%-60% of contemporaneous lead exposure from
drinking water (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2017). EPA promul-
gated the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR) under the Safe Drinking Water Act in
1991. The LCR requires public water systems to monitor lead concentrations
at customer taps. If observed lead concentrations exceed an action level of 15
parts per billion (ppb), water utilities are required to undertake several actions
to control corrosion, which reduces the leaching of lead from water pipes and
fixtures (U.S. EPA 2000).
Early childhood exposure to lead has irreversible health and behav-
ioral consequences (Hanna-Attisha et al. 2016), and it is particularly dan-
gerous for fetuses and young children, who absorb lead more efficiently than
adults and are also at stages of rapid development of the neurobehavioral sys-
tem (Bellinger 2008). The public health and epidemiology literature suggest
that lead affects children’s brain development, resulting in reduced intelligence
quotient (IQ), increased likelihood of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD), behavioral changes such as reduced attention span and increased
antisocial behavior, and unsatisfactory educational outcomes (Schwartz 1994,
Chen et al. 2007, Bellinger 2008, Aizer et al. 2018).
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Economists and sociologists also have documented near-term social and
behavioral impacts of lead exposure outside of the educational system. Ferrie
et al. (2012) estimate the negative impacts of water-borne lead onWorld War II
Army enlistees’ cognitive ability and IQ. Others have documented the impact
of lead on criminal and other risky behavior in and after adolescence (Reyes
2015b), as well as juvenile delinquency (Aizer & Currie 2019, Sampson &
Winter 2018).Other studies focus on infant mortality (Clay et al. 2014a), IQ
(Ferrie et al. 2012) and violent behavior (Feigenbaum & Muller 2016).
But extrapolating the effects of short-term impacts (IQ and education
outcome in third grade) to long-term impacts (higher education participation,
employment, and earnings) is challenging for two reasons. First, the relation-
ship between primary school test scores or IQ and educational attainment is
unlikely to be linear. So marginal effects from studies linking lead exposure
to these intermediate outcomes cannot easily predict impacts on educational
attainment and eventual labor-market outcomes. Second, many existing stud-
ies that estimate lead’s intermediate impacts use BLL as the key indepen-
dent variable. But good nutrition can reduce lead absorption, making BLL
a noisy measure of absorption. In addition, absorption is itself, a noisy mea-
sure of damages. Lead damages may accrue over years of childhood exposure,
mitigated to differing degrees by nutrition, cognitive stimulation, and other
parental and school inputs, so estimates of marginal effects of pre-school BLL
on early grade test scores (for example) may not provide an accurate picture
of eventual educational attainment in later years. Moreover, the differential
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impact of lead exposure may affect educational attainment across generations.
Thus, studies that quantify the impacts of lead exposure from drinking
water at current (non-historical) levels on long-run outcomes are desirable.
However, to my knowledge, the only prior work that is Grönqvist et al. (2020).
They use linked individual data in Sweden and find that lead phaseout from
gasoline is associated with 4% increase in future income annually.
3.3 The Lead and Copper Rule
The regulation governing lead concentrations in U.S. drinking water
is the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR). The LCR was promulgated by EPA in
response to the 1986 SDWA Amendments and regulates lead contamination
at households’ taps. It sets a Maximum Contamination Level Goal (MCLG)
for lead of 0, which means there is no safe level of lead in drinking water, and
any amount is considered harmful to human health. Unlike many other well-
studied regulations under the SDWA, the LCR is a treatment technique rule„
without an enforceable maximum contamination level (MCL). It specifies a
list of treatment, monitoring, and public education guidelines to ensure that
water systems provide safe water to their customers, requiring water systems
to sample water from the taps with a higher chance of having lead in drinking
water twice every 6 months and measure the lead concentration. A series of
actions are triggered when the fraction of samples exceeding 0.015 mg/L of
lead is found to be greater than 10 percent. Actions include examining source
water quality, installing a state-designated corrosion control treatment (CCT)
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program, public education, and lead service line removal. All the required
actions are aimed to reduce the amount of lead leaching into the water from
different plumbing materials. If a public water system violates the required
monitoring, treatment, and public education guidelines, it triggers an LCR
violation.
The LCR is one of the most complicated drinking water regulations for
states and drinking water utilities to implement due to the need to control
corrosivity of treated drinking water as it travels through distribution systems
to the consumer’s tap (US Environmental Protection Agency 2016). States
and public water systems must have expertise and resources to identify the
sampling locations and to collect and analyze samples correctly. They also
need more resources to identify and install the optimal CCTs and maintain
the effective operation of the CCTs. Given the requirements in resources and
expertise to comply with LCR, small systems that may lack these resources
are more likely to have LCR violations. Using data from U.S. EPA’s Safe
Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS), the utilities that experience
LCR violations serve about 3500 people on average. 90% of systems that
experienced LCR violations serve fewer than 10,000 people, which is the EPA
upper threshold for small systems(USEPA 2012).
The LCR has two main types of violations: monitoring and report-
ing violations, and treatment technique violations. Monitoring and reporting
violations occur when public water systems fail to monitor and report water
quality in a timely manner. It includes when they fail to test both lead concen-
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tration at consumers’ taps and test water quality parameters, such as pH and
alkalinity, in the source water. Treatment technique violations include failing
to submit an optimal corrosion control technique (OCCT) study or recommen-
dations, failing to install OCCT on time, not meeting water quality parameter
requirements, having lead or copper above a state-designated permissible level,
not replacing lead service lines, or failing to send out public education materi-
als. It is important to note that having lead concentration over the action level
does not trigger a violation. Violations only occur when public systems fail to
follow designated treatment techniques and their associated timelines. Under
the SDWA, PWSs can violate drinking water standards by having health-based
violations, monitoring and reporting violations, or public notice violations (US
EPA 2019). The health-based LCR violations are more serious since they
mean systems fail to follow the treatment technique requirements. However,
the non-health-based violations, such as monitoring and reporting violations
can also pose threats to drinking water quality (Fedinick et al. 2017). We may
not know about the exceedance in lead concentration when a PWS fails to
monitor water quality.
Since the protocols are set to ensure that public water systems (PWSs)
minimize lead in drinking water, there are good reasons to believe that viola-
tion of these protocols is associated with a potential threat to public health.
Even though violations may not indicate the presence of lead in a system’s
drinking water, they may be correlated with increased lead concentrations.
For instance, when a public water system does not report a lead concentration
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to the appropriate state agency, high lead levels can go unobserved. During the
Flint water crisis, Flint was not listed as having an LCR violation in the EPA
violation database in 2015 but its underlying lead concentration was already
high (Olson & Fedinick 2016). According to a study of 72 Flint households
in August 2015, 20% of the samples had lead levels that exceeded the action
level (0.015mg/L), and the 90th percentile was 30 µg/L (Masten et al. 2016).
Table 3.1: The association between lead concentration and LCR violation
(1) (2) (3)
LCR LCR LCR
Lead concentration 17.93∗ 30.18∗ 32.75∗∗
(9.258) (17.08) (14.16)
Year FE No Yes Yes
County FE No No Yes
Observations 6900 2497 1949
R2 0.0018 0.0113 0.0610
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
To demonstrate this correlation, consider the coefficients reported in
Table 3.1, which shows results from a logistic regression of LCR violations in
3010 Texas public water systems from 2006-2011 on observed lead concentra-
tions as measured in mg/L, controlling for year and county fixed effects. The
results indicate that lead concentration is positively associated with a PWS
having an LCR violation1. Also it is important to note that once in violation,
it takes the PWSs years to be back in compliance. As is shown in Table 3.2,
1Because the LCR status of some counties does not change during the time, adding
county and year fixed effects shrinks the sample size.
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the average duration of a violation is 1115 days, more than 3 years.
The LCR violation and current LCR rule could also pose environmental
justice issues. Lead service lines (LSLs) are the most important source of lead
from drinking water. But under the LCR, water systems are only account-
able for the public portion of the LSL replacement, leaving on average $3,000
dollars to homeowners(US EPA 2021b). Past studies have found strong cor-
relation between full LSL replacement and family income and race using data
from Washington DC (Environmental Defense Fund 2020). Moreover, when
corrosion control alone is not sufficient, consumers need to take further actions
to reduce their exposure to lead, such as installing water filters or switching
to bottled water. Consumers’ ability to understand and afford these actions
pose additional challenges to low income families.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
I identify the effect of early childhood exposure to lead from drinking
water on school-aged and young adult outcomes by exploiting variation in the
magnitude and timing of exposure among individuals born between 1992-2001
and 2006-2011. The amount of lead exposure experienced by an individual
depends on their year and county of birth. The identifying assumption is
that after flexibly controlling for many observable and unobservable potential
confounders, changes in a county’s drinking water lead concentration at the
birth year affects the educational outcome of individuals born in the particular
county in later years.
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3.4.1 Baseline Econometric Model
Following Isen et al. (2017), my baseline econometric model is an OLS
regression:
Outcomeaict = β0 + β1logLeadct + Xiθ + Nctψ + γc + αt + εict (3.1)
Because I only have lead concentration data from 2006-2011, I use the baseline
OLS regression to examine the impact of lead on individuals born during this
period on their short-term outcomes. Outcomeaict is the scaled 3rd grade read-
ing or math score, or a categorical variable indicating whether the child failed,
met or mastered one of these tests. logLeadct is the log transformation of
average lead concentration from drinking water of an individual’s birth county
in the year of birth. Because the response function for lead is a “hockeystick
shape" and unlikely to be linear, I use log-transformed lead in my analysis
(Grönqvist et al. 2020). Xi is a vector of individual characteristics including
gender, race and economic disadvantage status. Nct is a vector of county-level,
time-varying characteristics, including median income, percentage of people
below the poverty line and the unemployment rate. γc is a birth-county fixed
effect that controls for time-invariant, unobserved characteristics that could
affect 3rd grade standardized test scores for individuals born in a particular
county. αt is a birth-year fixed effect that controls for time-varying determi-
nants of standardized test scores that are common to all individuals born in
Texas a given year. By using these fixed effects, we are comparing individuals
born within the same county in different years. β̂1 is the coefficient of interest
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and measures the effect on third-grade test scores of an increase in the lead
concentration in drinking water in the birth year.
The OLS model assumes that the unobserved determinants of test
scores should not covary with changes in lead exposure conditional on the
covariates. However, this assumption can be violated if there exist any unob-
served determinants that also change with lead exposure over time by county.
For instance, neighborhoods with higher level of lead may be in older cities
and have higher population density. If unobservable factors change differently
overtime between old and newer cities, or between urban and rural areas, the
OLS model coefficient estimates are likely to be biased.
Moreover, people from certain racial groups and economically disad-
vantaged families are more likely to be exposed to higher levels of lead from
drinking water (Banzhaf et al. 2019, Marcus 2020). Though I use birth-county
fixed effects to capture time-invariant characteristics, this identification strat-
egy may still suffer from omitted variable bias. Locations with different levels
of lead may also have different underlying conditions such as average income or
crime rates. People with different backgrounds or preferences for clean water
might sort into locations with varying levels of lead concentration (Deschenes
& Meng 2018). To address concerns about endogenous lead exposure, I use
the three identification strategies including the plausibly exogenous variation
from Cl– levels in surface water and the presence of lead pipes in 1900 as in-
struments (Clay et al. 2014a, Stets et al. 2018), and the exogenous timing of
LCR violations.
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To analyze the endogenous exposure to lead, I use the directed acylic
graph (DAG) (Figure 3.1) to explain my identification strategy. DAG is a
graphic presentation of the causal effects using nodes and arrows (Cunningham
2021). Nodes represent random variables created by some data-generating pro-
cess and arrows represent a causal effect between two random variables moving
in the direction of the arrow. In Figure 3.1, I have a list of variables including:
drinking water lead exposure at birth, educational outcomes, lead pipes, wa-
ter treatment, source water chemistry, geology, neighborhood characteristics
(public funding, neighborhood resources, urbanization), and individual char-
acteristics (family income, race and ethnicity). These variables are connected
by arrows representing the causal relationship among them.
There are a list of direct and indirect paths between drinking water
lead exposure and later educational outcomes:
1. Drinking water lead at birth −→ Educational outcome (direct path 1)
2. Drinking water lead at birth ←− Lead pipes ←− Family income, race
and ethnicity −→ Educational outcomes (backdoor path 1)
3. Drinking water lead at birth ←− Lead pipes ←− Neighborhood charac-
teristics (public funding, resources and urbanization)←− Family income,
race and ethnicity −→ Educational outcomes (backdoor path 2)
4. Drinking water lead at birth ←− Water treatment ←− Neighborhood
characteristics (public funding, resources and urbanization) ←− Family
income, race and ethnicity −→ Educational outcomes (backdoor path 3)
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5. Drinking water lead at birth←−Water chemistry←− Urbanization←−
Family income, race and ethnicity −→ Educational outcomes (backdoor
path 4)
6. Source water chemistry and geology −→ Water chemistry −→ Drinking
water lead at birth −→ Educational outcomes (direct path 2)
Figure 3.1: DAG of drinking lead impacts
Notes: Figure shows the DAG of drinking water lead impact on educational out-
comes.
There are 6 paths between drinking water lead exposure at birth and
later educational outcomes. The first path is the direct causal relationship be-
tween drinking water lead exposure at birth and educational outcomes. Paths
2 through 5 are backdoor paths, which means that the correlations between
lead exposure and educational outcomes are driven solely by fluctuations in
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variables such as family income and neighborhood resources. Path 6 is another
direct path from drinking water lead exposure to educational outcomes. This
is different from the first direct path because this path is driven by changes in
source water chemistry and geology, which are unrelated to backdoor variables.
Lead enters drinking water when water corrodes pipes and fixtures that
contain lead (US EPA 2021a). There are three crucial parts to the process.
First, there need to be plumbing materials containing lead, such as pipes,
solders, or fixtures. Second, water utilities are required to implement optimal
corrosion control techniques, such as adjusting pH or adding orthophosphate to
make lead-phosphate scale in pipes. But these approaches may not always be
useful and could have unintended consequences given the complexity of water
chemistry in pipes and new findings from environmental engineering research
(Pelley 2018). Moreover, water utilities need to test for drinking water lead
concentration. Failing to meet the monitoring schedule at the water utility
level could cause lead pollution to go undiscovered. Third, water corrodes
lead pipes when drinking water is acidic or contains disinfectant, inorganic
carbon, iron, manganese, and aluminum compounds, or other components that
promote the corrosion of scale in lead pipes and cause a release of lead particles.
While water utilities alter the water chemistry, factors such as temperature
and weather may influence the chemistry of drinking water even after utilities
implement corrosion control techniques. (Roy & Edwards 2019).
The backdoor paths in Figure 3.1 show the complex relationship be-
tween various socioeconomic variables and the factors affecting drinking water
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lead exposure. Backdoor path 1 shows that the family background of an in-
dividual, such as parents’ income, race, and ethnicity, affects the probability
that an individual is born in a house with lead pipes. As mentioned before,
replacing lead pipes could be expensive to many low-income residents even
with federal and state funding programs. For example, the Trenton (New Jer-
sey) Water Works Lead Service Line Replacement Program limits homeowner
expenses to $1,000 by covering the rest of the cost for replacement, which
typically runs between $3,000 and $7,000 (Santucci & Scully 2020). Fam-
ily income could also affect students’ educational outcomes by investment in
students’ education and productivity.
Backdoor path 2 suggests that on top of backdoor path 1 relationships,
family income, race, and ethnicity could also sort people to live in certain
neighborhoods. While the LCR has a requirement on the lead service line
replacement rate, it is up to communities and utilities to make plans for this
replacement. Wealthy neighborhoods may have more resources to replace lead
pipes. There are also better schools in those neighborhoods that would lead to
better student educational outcomes. Backdoor path 3 and backdoor path 4
show a similar story. Water districts and communities with more funding and
resources could implement better corrosion control techniques. Urbanization,
though, can also influence drinking water chemistry and lead to a higher level
of lead from drinking water.
Since there are 4 open backdoor paths, I control for family income,
race and ethnicity, neighborhood income, population, and poverty to remove
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bias. Also, I use exogenous variation in surface water chemistry, the presence
of historical lead pipes, and the timing of LCR violations to discern a causal
relationship between drinking water lead exposure and educational outcomes.
3.4.2 Instrumental variables models
Prior research has shown that surface water trends in Cl– affect corrosiv-
ity in water distribution systems, which further affects drinking water quality
(Stets et al. 2018). I use two different instruments that exploit this fact: the
level of Cl– in source water in an individual’s birth county-year, and the inter-
action of surface water Cl– and the presence of lead pipes in an individual’s
birth county in 1900. Surface water Cl– level is a likely valid instrument for the
following reasons. First, Cl– is strongly related to elevated lead concentration
in the drinking water. Past studies have found that high Cl– concentration
promotes galvanic corrosion of materials containing lead, such as lead service
lines and lead solder in water distribution systems (American Water Works
Association 1996, Edwards & Triantafyllidou 2007, Willison & Boyer 2012,
DeSantis et al. 2018), a water chemistry issue that played a role in the ongo-
ing crisis in Flint. 2 Similarly, in Washington DC from 2004-2006, where the
city’s PWS switched from free chlorine to chloramine as a disinfectant, the
failure to control corrosion caused elevated lead levels(Edwards et al. 2009).
2When the water authority in Flint switched its water source from Lake Huron to water
from the Flint River, the high level of Cl– in Flint river was not properly treated to optimize
corrosion control, and Flint water ended up having observed lead concentrations over 5000
ppb, way above the action level of 15 ppb (Pieper et al. 2017, 2018, Torrice 2020).
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Second, surface water Cl– concentration is strongly correlated to Cl–
level in finished drinking water. Cl– is a naturally occurring ion and mostly
exists in the form of sodium chloride in water. There are no federal or state
primary health-based drinking water standards for Cl–, but only an advisory
standard for the aesthetic purpose (e.g. taste) (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency 2003). Though it is possible that people drink less water if the water
is too salty from a high level of Cl–, the average level of Cl– in my data is
less than the standard that the US EPA identifies as a concentration that Cl–
can be expected to cause a salty taste in drinking water (New Hampshire De-
partment of Environmental Services 2010). Moreover, typical drinking water
treatment techniques, such as alkalinity or pH adjustments, do not remove Cl–
and drinking water treatment plants do not desalinate, and therefore high Cl–
concentrations should be conserved even after treatment (Stets et al. 2018).
It is important to note that I’m using the surface water Cl– concentration,
because finished drinking water Cl– source are not available.
Third, Cl– is not likely to be correlated with educational outcomes other
than by affecting lead concentrations. Cl– is an essential nutrient for human
health. But drinking water would typically contribute only 2.5% to 5% of the
dietary salt goal if tap water consumption is 2 L/day (U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency 2003). Since the intake of Cl– from drinking water is only
a small portion compared to other pathways, it is not likely to affect human
health or educational outcomes.
The identifying assumption is that after controlling for individual and
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neighborhood characteristics and fixed effects, changes in surface water Cl– of
a county are unrelated to the changes in education outcomes of people born
in the county later in life except through the changes in drinking water lead
concentration. One threat to my identification is that the change in the Cl–
across counties over the years could relate to factors that would affect education
outcomes that my models do not control for. For example, anthropogenic
sources of Cl– include but are not limited to the use of fertilizers and irrigation
in agricultural fields, road salts, and wastewater discharge or runoff from urban
areas (Panno et al. 2006, Steele & Aitkenhead-Peterson 2011). As a result, the
change in surface water Cl– could be correlated with the change in the degree
of urbanization, which may be correlated with educational outcomes later in
life. However, I believe this is less of a concern given that Cl– concentrations
in source water are also increased by the use of irrigation and fertilizers in
agricultural fields. Using data on surface water quality from 1982–2012, Stets
and coauthors find that freshwaters are being salinized rapidly in all kinds of
landscapes in the U.S. (Stets et al. 2020). Moreover, one major source of Cl–
in the U.S. is from the use of road salts for melting snow, which is less common
in Texas.
I also use the interaction of birth-year surface Cl– level and the presence
of lead pipes in 1900 as an additional instrumental variable. For each individ-
ual, I use the data from Clay et al. (2014b) on lead pipes to determine if her
water system historically had lead pipes. While Clay et al. (2014b) data only
has information on the presence of lead pipes in 172 large and medium-sized
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cities, I geocode the cities to the counties of location. My instrument is not
the presence of lead pipes but the interaction of surface water Cl– and the
historical presence of lead pipes. While the temporal and spatial variations
in Cl– level may be affected by the changes in the degree of urbanization and
agricultural activity over time and across counties, having lead pipes in 1900
is correlated with the contemporary presence of lead pipes but less likely to be
correlated with the urbanization and agricultural activities of counties during
my sample period. The identifying assumption is that Cl– level in surface wa-
ter is more predictive of lead concentration changes where there is a historical
presence of lead pipes.
The first-stage regression in the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator
is as follows:
Leadict = α0 + α1Zict + Xiθ + Xctψ + γc + ηt + εict (3.2)
where Leadict indicates the lead concentration in drinking water. In
the first IV, I use an indicator of lead concentration action level exceedance
in a county c and year t when an individual i was born. In the first IV, I
regress lead on the weighted average Cl– concentration of surface water in an
individual’s birth county and birth year. I first calculate the average Cl– level
of a watershed at a given year. Then I estimate the average Cl– concentration
of a county using the overlapping area between a county and a watershed as
weights. In the second IV, I use the concentration of drinking water lead as
98
the dependent variable and use the interaction of surface water Cl– and lead
pipes as the Zict.
In the second stage, I use the predicted indicator of lead from equation
(3.2) in the place of actual lead concentration.
Outcomeict = δ0 + δ1L̂eadict + Xiθ + Nctψ + γc + ηt + εict (3.3)
The coefficient of interest in equation (3.3) is δ1, which measures the effect
of having lead concentration over the SDWA action level in an individual’s
birth county-year on her 3rd-grade standardized test scores in the first IV.
The second IV measures the effect of lead concentration in an individual’s
birth county-year on her 3rd-grade standardized test scores.
3.4.3 Using LCR violations for long-run outcomes
While the IV approach can solve potential endogeneity problems, it
is constrained by the availability of lead concentration data, so I cannot use
it to study the effect of lead on long-run outcomes, such as the high school
graduation rate. Thus, for longer-run outcomes, I use plausibly exogenous
variation from the timing of water quality violations (Currie et al. 2013, Marcus
2020) and employ a fixed-effects model to estimate impacts of childhood lead
exposure from drinking water on individuals in Texas. I explore the effect of
LCR violations on individual outcomes using the following specification:
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Outcomect = β0 + β1LCRict + Xiθ + Nctψ + γc + ηt + εict (3.4)
where the outcome is the average standardized test score in 3rd grade, or the
likelihood of passing the standardized tests for the younger cohorts and high
school graduation rate for the older cohorts. LCRct measures if the cohort
experiences a new LCR violation in their birth county c in the birth year t.
Similar to Equation 3.1, I also control for individual characteristics, county-
of-birth fixed effects and year-of-birth fixed effects. With the fixed effects, I
compare children born in counties without a new LCR violation to children
born exposed to a new LCR violation. β1 is the coefficient of interest, which
measures the effects of exposure to LCR violations on the outcome of interest.
Standard errors are clustered by county.
One key advantage of this approach is that it allows me to use data for
all the cohorts from 1992-2011 and examine the impact of lead on long-run
outcomes, such as high school graduation. The assumption for this specifica-
tion is that the variation in LCR violation exposure is “as good as random".
The assumption is likely to hold with the county fixed effects for the cross-
sectional difference between counties that might be related to LCR violations
and the educational outcomes of children. For instance, individuals born in
poor counties with worse public schools may also have a higher probability of
exposure to LCR violations since the PWS may have less funding to test lead
concentrations in a timely manner. However, in the presence of time-varying
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unobservable confounders, my estimate will be biased. For example, LCR vi-
olations may happen because a PWS’s funding is reduced during the financial
crisis, which could also affect the children’s health and educational outcomes.
If this is the case, I may overestimate the impacts of LCR violations.
Thus, I use a difference-in-difference estimator for this specification. As
mentioned before, the LCR is a treatment technique rule. All the technical
requirements in the LCR are designed to reduce the likelihood of lead exposure
in drinking water. From the IV models, I estimate the impacts of lead from
drinking water. The difference-in-difference estimator with this specification
evaluates the effectiveness of the policy that aims to reduce lead levels from
drinking water.
3.5 Data
I use data from multiple sources. Educational outcome data come from
the Texas Education Research Center (ERC), which provides linked individual-
level education and workforce administrative data. Drinking water quality
data comes from the EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS)
data, and EPA’s National Contaminants Occurrence Database (NCOD). Sur-
face water quality data is obtained from the Water Quality Portal from the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) and the Surface Water Quality Monitoring program
of the Texas Commission on Environment Quality (TCEQ). The U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides measures of children’s
BLLs. I also use data from other administrative surveys, such as the Amer-
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ican Housing Survey, to obtain estimates for population, household income,
unemployment rates, poverty levels, and other community characteristics.
3.5.1 Texas education and income data
I use administrative data from the Texas Education Research Cen-
ter (ERC) for my outcome variables. The Texas ERC collects student-level
data from the Texas Education Agency (TEA) and the Texas Higher Educa-
tion Coordinating Board (THECB). It also links students to their workforce
participation data from the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC). The data
include all students who ever enrolled in public schools in Texas and cover
enrollment, standardized test scores, disciplinary action records, high school
graduation status, public secondary school enrollment, quarterly earnings, and
basic demographics such as race, gender, and economic disadvantage status.
To match the inter-temporal availability of lead concentration data, I
use individuals born in Texas from 2006 to 2011 for whom I have 3rd-grade
standardized test scores to estimate short-term impacts, and individuals born
in Texas from 1991 to 2001 who ever enrolled in 9th grade in Texas to esti-
mate long-term impacts. A key limitation is that the data do not identify an
individual’s date of birth or place of birth. The TEA enrollment data has the
year of enrollment, grade of enrollment, and age as of September 1st. I identify
the list of individuals who enrolled in early education (EE), prekindergarten
(PK), or kindergarten (KG) in Texas and estimate their year of birth using
year of enrollment and age as of September 1st. I refer to students using their
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estimated year of birth, so my first cohort is students who were born in 1989.
The TEA data has the county in which a school is located, and I use as a
proxy that the county where an individual enrolled in EE, PK, or KG is her
county of birth. I also obtained the detailed location (latitude and longitude)
of public schools from the Common Core of Data from the National Center
for Education Statistics. Of the 11,849 public K-12 schools in Texas, 181 of
those schools do not have location information. Thus, I assume the latitude
and longitude of enrolled schools as the location of birth as a robustness check.
I consider several outcome variables. First, I use scaled reading and
math standardized test scores in third grade. My study period includes a
major change in Texas standardized testing, the 2012 shift from the Texas
Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) to the State of Texas Assessments
of Academic Readiness (STAAR). For cohorts born between 2006 to 2011, I use
their STAAR scores. For cohorts born between 1989 to 1994, I use their TAKS
scores3.Because the STAAR and TAKS are different tests, I do not merge
them together and compare outcomes. I also use flags indicating whether an
individual passes the relevant standardized tests as a binary outcome variable.
Table 1 reports summary statistics, with the the IV sample in Panel
A and the DID sample in Panel B. The IV models use 3rd-grade test scores
from more than 1 million students born between 2006-2011. The average
3STAAR is designed to measure students’ ability to apply the knowledge and skills defined
in the state-mandated curriculum standards, the Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills.
STAAR was first administered in 2012 and is the current standardized test used in Texas.
TAKS is the test implemented in Texas before STAAR, from 2003 to 2011.
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scaled reading score is 1431 points with a standard deviation of 173 points.
The average scaled math score is 1465 points with a standard deviation of
174 points. I use the scaled test scores because the scaled scores consider the
difficulty level of each individual test question and allow me to compare test
results from year to year (Texas Education Agency 2015). About 40% of the
students born between 2006-2011 passed the reading standard in 3rd grade
and 44% students passed the math standard in 3rd grade. The average age of
students enrolled in 3rd grade in Texas is 8 years old.
Second, I examine two different long-run outcomes - high school grad-
uation and enrollment in Texas public universities for the early cohorts. Panel
B of Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics for the sample used in the DID
model. There are about 1.3 million students born in Texas enrolled in Texas
high school from 1991-2004. 78.4% of these students graduate high school but
only 25.8% of these students enrolled in Texas public universities. Of this
sample, 48.9% are female students. 47.6% of these students are Hispanic and
35.4% of these students are white. 38.7% students receive free lunch, 8% stu-
dents receive reduced lunch and, 7% have other economic disadvantages.
3.5.2 Water system and drinking water quality data
Data on public water systems and water quality violations comes from
the Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS) from the U.S. EPA,
obtained via FOIA request by prior researchers (Baker et al. 2019) and shared
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics
count mean median sd min max
IV sample
Reading score 1318783 1431.163 1427.000 174.506 100.000 4011.000
Math score 1318783 1464.782 1458.000 175.466 111.000 4378.000
Meet reading standard 1318783 0.404 0.000 0.491 0.000 1.000
Meet math standard 1318783 0.446 0.000 0.497 0.000 1.000
ALE 1318783 0.022 0.000 0.148 0.000 1.000
Lead concentration (ppb) 1318783 1.856 1.700 1.138 0.000 12.729
Cl concentration (mg/L) 1318783 190.691 73.910 473.370 7.973 23032.160
CSMR 1318783 1.704 1.179 1.309 0.059 23.393
Presence of lead pipes 1318783 0.021 0.000 0.144 0.000 1.000
Female 1318783 0.496 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
Native American 1318783 0.006 0 0.075 0 1
Asian 1318783 0.037 0 0.188 0 1
Black 1318783 0.129 0 0.335 0 1
Hispanic 1318783 0.558 0 0.5 0 1
White 1318783 0.253 0 0.435 0 1
Free lunch 1318783 0.466 0 0.499 0 1
Reduced lunch 1318783 0.068 0 0.251 0 1
Other economic disadvantage 1318783 0.132 0 0.338 0 1
Age 1318783 8.088 8.000 0.278 8.000 9.000
Unemployment rate 1318783 6.541 6.700 2.003 1.900 15.300
Poverty rate 1318783 17.913 17.000 7.074 6.000 39.900
Median household income 1318783 48757.090 47159.000 12353.890 23096.000 83968.000
Population 1318783 1591577 779213 1513040 272 4179796
Maximum temperature 1318783 26.433 26.273 1.615 21.351 30.991
Precipitation 1318783 2.747 2.615 1.081 0.294 5.672
DID sample
High school graduate 1341729 0.784 1 0.412 0 1
Enroll in public university 1341729 0.258 0 0.438 0 1
LCR violation status 1341729 0.195 0 0.396 0 1
Female 1341729 0.489 0 0.5 0 1
Native American 1341729 0.004 0 0.061 0 1
Asian 1341729 0.022 0 0.145 0 1
Black 1341729 0.145 0 0.352 0 1
Hispanic 1341729 0.476 0 0.5 0 1
White 1341729 0.354 0 0.478 0 1
Free lunch 1341729 0.387 0 0.487 0 1
Reduced lunch 1341729 0.082 0 0.274 0 1
Other economic disadvantage 1341729 0.069 0 0.254 0 1
Birth year 1341729 1993.691 1993 2.016 1991 2001
Unemployment rate 1341729 7.33 6.3 4.234 0.9 39.3
Poverty rate 1341729 19.514 17.75 8.27 3.5 52.55
Population 1341729 1011788 1109330 424312 331 3471291
Median household income 1341729 31426.83 32071.5 8109.405 11269.5 77303
Maximum temperature 1341729 25.593 25.464 1.639 19.75 31.674
Precipitation 1341729 3 2.977 2.553 3.981 19.219
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with me. The lead concentration data is from the 3rd Six-Year Review pol-
lution occurrence data in the National Contaminant Occurrence Database
(NCOD), also obtained via FOIA request.
3.5.2.1 SDWIS data
SDWIS provides the public water system (PWS) identifier, the PWS
name, number of people served, and dates of the beginning and the ending of
each violation. I focus on violations in public community water supply systems
(CWS) in my study. CWSs are defined as the public water systems that supply
water to the same population year-round. Out of 15,736 PWSs in Texas, 49%
(7,713) are CWSs. Using the methods in Baker et al. (2019), I match LCR
violations with the PWS inventory from EPA for PWS characteristics, such
as name and state served. I also merge LCR violations with the Government
Performance and Results Act from Fiscal Year 2013 to identify the county
each PWS serves. Given that the FOIAed SDWIS data obtained from Baker
et al. (2019) has violations through 2014, I use the current SDWIS database
available from the EPA website to update the data to the second quarter of
2020 and estimate the duration of violations.
I focus on LCR violations that occur in 2006-2011 for the younger
cohorts and violations between 1991-2004 for the older cohorts to measure
individuals’ early childhood lead exposure. I generate an indicator variable
of having a new LCR violation in county c in year t and link the indicator
variable with each individual’s birth county and birth year to define early
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childhood exposure. During the periods of interest, 1336 new LCR violations
happened in CWSs in Texas, affecting 5,675,603 individuals. Figure 3.3 shows
the distribution of violations by year. Most Texas LCR violations happened
in 1992, 2010, and 2011. By the second quarter of 2020, 1236 violations had
returned to compliance. The average duration of a violation is 1115 days, with
a standard deviation of 788 days. The average population served by CWSs
with LCR violations is about 3700. There is a large variation among counties in
terms of the number of LCR violations. On average, each county experienced
60 violations of the LCR from 1991-2011, with a standard deviation of 91.
Each public water system had an average of 1.6 LCR violations during the
same period.
I use all the LCR violations in this paper including both health-based
and non-health-based violations. Among the 1336 violations in Texas, 1305 vi-
olations are monitoring and reporting violations (non-health-based violations)
and 31 violations are health-based violations. In my sample of the older co-
hort, 19.5% of students who enrolled in high school were born in counties with
new LCR violations in their birth year.
3.5.2.2 NCOD data
The lead concentration data come from the 3rd Six-year Review of
pollution occurrence data from NCOD. The SDWA requires EPA to review
each National Primary Drinking Water Regulation (NPDWR) at least once
every six years. During the Six-Year Review process, EPA analyzes SDWA
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Figure 3.2: Number of LCR violations by year, 1992-2011
Notes: Figure shows the distribution of LCR violations by year. The red lines show 
years when changes happen to the Lead and Copper Rule.
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compliance monitoring data from public water supplies for regulated drinking
water contaminants and publishes review results. The NCOD collects data
used for the review process. The NCOD data provide information on the
public water system ID, lead concentration, detection limit, and the date of
testing. I use the date of testing to merge with a cohort’s birth year. Given
that the NCOD data do not have information on the service area of PWSs, I
use the geographic area data from the SDWIS to define the county each PWS
serves. The NCOD reports two lead measures. One lead measure reports
0 if the lead concentration is lower than the detection limit of the testing
technique, while the other measure reports a missing data point when the lead
concentration is below the detection limit. I use the lead concentration when
the non-detected value is treated as 0 in my main analysis and use the other
value for robustness checks.
The average lead concentration in Texas from 2006-2011 is 0.0019 mg/L
with a standard deviation of 0.0011. Figure 3.5 shows the temporal and spatial
variation in lead concentrations. As Panel (a) of Figure 3.5 shows, the lead
concentration in Texas remains fairly constant over time with a small decrease
in 2009. Panel (b) shows that lead concentration varies largely across counties.
The counties with higher lead concentrations are mostly in central and eastern
Texas, corresponding to the state’s population distribution.
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(a) By year (b) By county
Figure 3.3: Lead concentration by year and county 2006-2011
Notes: Panel (a) shows year fixed effects plus a constant from regressions that control 
for county fixed effects following Keiser & Shapiro (2019c). Blue connected dots show 
yearly values and red dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval for year fixed 
effect estimates, with 2006 as the reference year. Standard errors are clustered by 
county. Panel (b) shows the county average lead concentration over the full period, 
2006-2011.
3.5.3 Surface water quality data
Surface water quality data come from Kuwayama et al. (2020). Chlo-
ride (Cl–) concentration in surface waters was collected from multiple publicly 
available data sources. The first data source is the Water Quality Portal, 
a platform that provides water quality data from the USGS National Wa-
ter Information System, the EPA STOrage and RETrieval Data Warehouse
(STORET), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Sustaining The Earth’s
Watershed-Agricultural Research Database System. Additional Cl– data are 
collected from the Surface Water Quality Monitoring Information System pro-
vided by TCEQ.
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Surface water quality observations are obtained at the monitoring sta-
tion level. I obtain the watershed boundary database from the Texas Natural
Resources Information System (TNRIS), which is derived from the 1:24,000
USGS National Hydrography Dataset (NHD) (Texas Natural Resources Infor-
mation System 2014). I define the Cl– level of a watershed in a given year
by calculating the average Cl– concentration of all water quality monitoring
stations located within the watershed using ArcGIS. I also obtain the county
boundary shapefile from the US Census Bureau (US Census Bureau 2020) and
use ArcGIS to estimate the area of overlap between a county and a watershed.
I then estimate the average concentration of Cl– of a county in a given year
weighted by the area of overlap.
There is large variation in the Cl– concentration across counties and over
time in Texas. The weighted average Cl– level is 190.7 mg/L in Texas surface
water with a standard deviation of 473.4 mg/L. Figure 3.6 shows the temporal
and spatial variation of surface water Cl– concentration data in Texas. Figure
3.6a shows the year fixed effect plus a constant from regressions that control
for county fixed effects following Keiser & Shapiro (2019c). As it is shown in
Figure 3.6a, the average Cl– concentration increases from 2006 to 2011. 3.6b
shows the spatial distribution of surface water Cl– concentration by county.
Cl– concentrations tend to be higher in northwestern and southeastern Texas.
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(a) By year (b) By county
Figure 3.4: Chloride concentration by year and county 2006-2011
Notes: Panel (a) shows year fixed effects plus a constant from regressions that control 
for county fixed effects following Keiser & Shapiro (2019c). Blue connected dots show 
yearly values and red dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval for year fixed 
effect estimates, with 2006 as the reference year. Standard errors are clustered by 
county. Panel (b) shows the county average chloride concentration over the full 
period, 2006-2011.
3.5.4 Lead pipes data
The presence of lead pipes and cities’ historical water characteristics 
data are from Clay et al. (2014a). The authors collect information on cities’ 
use of lead pipes from the Manual of American Water-Works (Baker 1897).
Clay et al. (2014a) collect data on 172 large and medium U.S. cities in 1900. 
When I match city-level lead data to the county in which each city is located,
only have 5 counties in Texas have information on lead pipes’ presence in 
1900: Galveston, Harris, Jefferson, McLennan, and Tarrant counties. Figure
3.7 shows in location these counties within the state. Those without lead pipes
present in 1900 as shaded yellow and those with lead pipes are shaded pink. I
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also map the top 11 big cities by population in Texas in 2019 with red circles.
As it is shown in the figure, the presence of historical lead pipes is not strongly
correlated with the current level of urbanization.
Following Clay et al. (2014a), I use two lead pipe variables. One
variable is a categorical indicator of the presence of lead pipes. It is coded as 1
if the city has pipes made only with lead or a mix of lead and non-lead service
pipes. Table 3.2 shows that 2% of the younger sample in my study are born
in counties with the historical presence of lead pipes.
The other variable is the interaction of lead pipes and surface water
characteristics. Because water chemistry affects corrosivity, thus affecting the
lead concentration in drinking water, the authors also create a categorical
variable using the interaction of lead pipes with the pH in source water 4.
I use the first lead pipes variable in the main analysis and use the second
variable as a robustness check.
3.5.5 Additional controls
Neighborhood characteristics controls include the country year unem-
ployment rate, median home income, poverty rate, and population. Unem-
ployment and population data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Lo-
cal Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) county data. Income and poverty
4The presence of lead pipes is coded as having no lead pipes, having a mix of leaded
pipes and no lead pipes, and only lead pipes. The pH in source water is coded as if the pH
is below or above 7.3 (the median pH level in the data)
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estimates come from the Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty
Estimates (SAIPE) program county estimates.
Summary statistics from Table 3.2 show that the average unemploy-
ment rates for the younger cohorts and older cohorts are about 6.5% and 7.3%
respectively. The average poverty rate is 17.9% for the younger cohort and
19.5% for the older cohorts. The median household income for the younger
cohorts is $48757 on average and the median income for the older cohort is
$31427. The average county population is 1591577 for the younger cohorts
and 1011788 for the older cohorts.
I also include a list of weather control variables as they may affect
educational outcomes through their impact on drinking water consumption.
There is also evidence that temperature change over time affects the biochem-
ical attributes of rivers (Ouellet et al. 2020). Weather controls data are from
Schlenker & Roberts (2009), obtained from the author’s website, which has
daily minimum and maximum temperature and total precipitation on a 2.5 ×
2.5 mile grid for the U.S. from 1900 to 2019. I estimate county-year average




Table 3.3 shows OLS estimates from equation (3.1), where Panel A
presents results using the scaled standardized test scores and Panel B presents
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results where the outcome variable is an indicator of whether or not an individ-
ual meets the standard. I add control variables from left to right. Columns 1 to
5 show the OLS estimates of the impact of lead concentration on reading scores
and Columns 6 to 10 show the estimated impacts on math scores. Columns
1 and 6 include only birth county and birth year fixed effects. Columns 2
and 7 show the results of adding individual controls, including gender, race,
and economic disadvantage status. Columns 3 and 8 add controls for addi-
tional neighborhood characteristics, such as median household income, unem-
ployment rate, and the poverty rate of the birth county in the birth year. I
add county-by-year level average maximum temperature and precipitation in
Columns 4 and 9. Columns 5 and 10 are robustness checks by including birth
county by birth year trends.
Table 3.3: OLS estimates of the impacts of lead concentration on 3rd grade
standardized test scores
A 3rd grade reading 3rd grade math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(lead) -2.335*** -2.296*** -2.191*** -2.029*** -1.299** -1.2 -1.235* -0.882 -0.863 0.898
(0.624) (0.609) (0.696) (0.684) (0.506) (0.758) (0.706) (0.817) (0.774) (0.976)
Observations 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142
R2 0.021 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.028 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.089
B Met reading standard Met math standard
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(lead) -0.00636*** -0.0062*** -0.00606*** -0.00555*** -0.00334** -0.00301 -0.00302* -0.00186 -0.00199 0.00361*
(0.00202) (0.00209) (0.00202) (0.00208) (0.00148) 90.00191) (0.00175) (0.00183) (0.00168) (0.00194)
N 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142 1323142
R2 0.018 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.021 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084
Birth county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County by year trend No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood controls No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at county level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Columns 1-5 in Panel A of Table 3.3 suggest that the lead concentration
in the year of birth reduces 3rd grade reading scores. The estimated coefficients
115
on log(lead) are fairly consistent as more control variables are added 5. Since I
do not have controls that have been found highly predictive of child outcomes,
such as maternal education, birth order, birth weight, or maternal education,
the consistent magnitude of coefficients shows similar results with the past
literature that a set of basic control variables may be sufficient to control for
confounding bias (Aizer & Currie 2019). The coefficient in Column 1, -2.335,
implies that a 1% increase in drinking water lead concentration decreases the
3rd-grade standardized reading scores by 0.023 points. This change seems
small. But recall that the mean lead concentration in Texas (1.856 ppb) is well
below the action level (15 ppb). Even so, if the average lead concentration in
Texas increased to the 15 ppb action level under the LCR, the mean reading
scores in Texas would decrease by 16.7 points (719 times 0.023), or 1.16 percent
of the average reading score. Past studies have found that a mean BLL increase
by 10 ppb is associated with a decline of average 3rd and 4th grade English
Language Arts (ELA) scores by 2.6 percentage points in Massachusetts (Reyes
2015b) and a change of 3rd-grade reading scores by -0.335 points in Rhode
Island children(Aizer et al. 2018). Because my study uses lead concentration in
drinking water, not BLL, it is hard to compare these two measures. However,
the fact that I find a statistically significant negative impact at levels two
orders of magnitude smaller than the federal action level is notable.
Columns 6-10 in Panel A report suggest mixed results for the impact of
5I also checked the asinh transformation of lead as a robustness check and it did not
change the main results (Table available upon request)
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birth-year exposure to lead in drinking water on 3rd grade math scores. The
estimated lead coefficients are of the expected signs but only weakly significant
when I include birth county FE, birth year FE and individual controls, and
insignificant in the other specifications. Estimated coefficients are also smaller
than those in the reading models. If we interpret the insignificant Column
6 coefficient, a one percent increase in the drinking water lead concentration
is associated with a decrease in 3rd-grade math scores of 0.012 points. The
smaller impact on math scores is consistent with the epidemiological literature
that suggests lead has a stronger relationship with verbal functioning (Bellinger
et al. 1992, CDC 2004).
Panel B of Table 3.3 shows the regression results using Equation (3.1)
where the dependent variable is an indicator variable set equal to one for
individuals that meet STAAR standards for reading and math. Because the
dependent variable is an indicator, I use linear probability models. Results
are consistent with those from Panel A. Drinking water lead exposure in the
birth year reduces the probability of passing reading tests,robust to controlling
for various confounding factors. Impacts on the likelihood of passing the 3rd
grade math test are not robust, and there is one counter-intuitive, positive and
weakly significant coefficient in Column 10.
3.6.2 Instrumental variables results
Table 3.4 shows the first stage results from using Cl– and the interac-
tion between Cl– and the historical presence of lead pipes as instruments for
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a lead action level exceedance (ALE). Columns 1-5 are estimated using equa-
tion (3.2), where I add control variables as one moves across columns. The
coefficients on the mean Cl– level are all positive and significant, suggesting an
association between surface water Cl– concentration and drinking water lead
ALE that is robust to the addition of individual and neighborhood controls.
The coefficient on mean Cl– level in Column 4 suggests that holding indi-
vidual characteristics, neighborhood characteristics and weather constant, the
increase in the probability of having an ALE in one’s birth county-year from
a one-unit increase in surface water Cl– concentration is 0.0184 percentage
points.
The first stage estimates using the second instrument are in Columns
6-10 of Table 3.4. Similar to the first stage results for the first instrument,
the interaction of source water Cl– and historical lead pipes also has a positive
and significant relationship with the drinking water lead concentration. The
coefficient in Column 9 suggests that holding individual and neighborhood
characteristics constant, in cities with lead pipes in 1900, the lead concentra-
tion in drinking water increases by 0.00148 ppb (0.08% of the average lead
concentration) for each 1 mg/L (0.5% of average Cl– level) rise in the source
water Cl– concentration.
I also report the first stage F statistics and the Sanderson-Windmeijer
(SW) first-stage under-identification test in Table 3.4. The F statistics are
lower than 10 for the first IV, suggesting the first instrument could be a weak
instrument. The F statistics for the second IV is well above 10 suggesting the
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Table 3.4: First stage result of IV strategies
ALE Lead concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Mean chloride 0.000209** 0.000209** 0.000191** 0.000184** 0.000188**
0.0000845) (0.0000845) (0.0000782) (0.0000777) (0.0000789)
Mean chloride *
presence of lead pipes in 1900 0.00165*** 0.00165*** 0.00155*** 0.00148*** 0.00143***
(0.0000270) (0.0000266) (0.0000369) (0.0000644) (0.000145)
Observations 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 361103 361104 361105 361106 361106
R2 0.347 0.347 0.405 0.417 0.408 0.744 0.744 0.865 0.944 0.946
F statistics 6.12 6.12 5.97 5.67 6.79 3748.53 3860.22 1761.13 529.17 30.86
SW Chi-sq test (p-value) 0.013 0.0131 0.0142 0.0169 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansens J statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Birth county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County by year trend No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood controls No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at county level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: This table reports the first-stage regression results of the two instrumen-
tal variables. Columns 1 to 5 report results on ALE and Columns 6 through 10
report the results on lead concentration. Columns 1 and 6 report the coefficient
estimates using only birth county and birth year FEs. Columns 2 and 7 include
individual-level controls. Columns 3 and 8 include neighborhood controls
including poverty rate, unemployment rate, and median household income.
Columns 4 and 9 include weather control variables. Columns 5 and 10 also
include county-by-year trends. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at
the county level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
second instrument is unlikely to be a weak instrument(Stock & Yogo 2005).
The SW chi-square under-identification tests suggest that both instruments are
relevant. The over-identification test of both instruments (Hansens J statistics)
is 0, suggesting both models are just identified.
Panel A of Table 3.5 reports second-stage results from the Cl–-only IV
models. Since the F statistics from the first stage are weak, I use the LIML
estimator instead of 2SLS since it is more robust to weak instruments (Stock
et al. 2002). I partial out the fixed effects and controls since the covariance ma-
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trix of orthogonality conditions S is not of full rank, and the overidentification
tests are infeasible when I’m clustering standard errors (Baum et al. 2007).
Columns 1 to 5 present the effects of ALE on 3rd grade scaled reading scores
and Columns 6 to 10 present the effects on scaled math scores. The coefficient
in Column 4 suggests that after controlling for individual, neighborhood, and
weather characteristics, having a lead concentration in drinking water over 15
ppb is associated with an 18.3-point decrease in 3rd-grade reading scores.
Table 3.6 presents regression results using the second IV. The coeffi-
cients I present here are 2SLS estimates. LIML estimators of the approach are
identical and available upon request. Panel A of Table 3.6 shows estimates
of lead impact on 3rd-grade scores with additional controls added across the
columns. In all the specifications, the average lead concentration has a nega-
tive and statistically significant impact on 3rd-grade standardized test scores
in both subjects, except for Column 4. Contrary to previous findings, the
impact of lead seems to be larger for math scores than reading scores. Column
5 reports the effect of lead on 3rd-grade reading scores controlling for indi-
vidual, neighborhood characteristics, as well as a birth county by year trends.
The coefficient suggests that a 1 ppb increase in average lead concentration is
associated with a 3.911 point decrease in 3rd-grade reading scores. If the av-
erage lead concentration in drinking water increased to 15 ppb, a 13 ppb raise
from the current average lead concentration in Texas, the associated decrease
in 3rd-grade reading scores would be 50.8 points, 3.6 percent of the average
reading scores. The magnitudes of the IV estimates are similar to the OLS
120
Table 3.5: IV estimates of lead impact on 3rd grade test scores using chloride
level as instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A Reading scores Math scores
ALE -17.99*** -19.83*** -18.99*** -18.3*** -14.88** -4.116 -5.480 -4.044 -1.525 5.065
(3.257) (5.126) (5.583) (5.17) (6.856) (3.725) (5.035) (5.391) (6.804) (6.513)
B Meet reading standard Meet math standard
ALE -0.647*** -0.0701*** -0.0682*** -0.0676*** -0.0646* -0.00791 -0.0117 -0.0059 0.00458 0.0582
(0.00853) (0.0129) (0.0143) (0.0131) (0.0355) (0.0144) (0.0149) (0.0166) (0.0181) (0.046)
Observations 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783
First stage F statistics 6.12 6.12 5.97 5.67 6.79 6.12 6.12 5.97 5.67 6.79
Birth county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County by year trend No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood controls No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the effects of lead exposure at birth on 3rd-grade
standardized test scores using instrumental variables. Panel A reports the effects
of having an ALE at birth on 3rd-grade reading and math scores using the
surface water Cl– as an instrument. Panel B reports the effects of average lead
concentration on 3rd-grade reading and math test results using the interaction
of surface water Cl– and historical presence of lead pipes as an instrument.
Columns 1 to 5 report results on reading and Columns 6 through 10 report
the results on math. Columns 1 and 6 report the coefficient estimates using
only birth county and birth year FEs. Columns 2 and 7 include individual-level
controls. Columns 3 and 8 include neighborhood controls including poverty rate,
unemployment rate, and median household income. Columns 4 and 9 include
weather control variables. Columns 5 and 10 also include birth county by birth
year trends. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
estimates. Column 10 shows the equivalent estimates of lead impact on 3rd-
grade math scores. A 1-ppb increase in the drinking water lead concentration
is associated with a 5.198 point decrease in math scores. If the average lead
concentration increase tod 15 ppb, the average 3rd-grade math scores would
decrease by 4.6 percentage points.
Panel B of Table 3.6 presents IV results using the indicator for whether
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Table 3.6: IV estimates of lead impact on 3rd grade test scores using interac-
tion of chloride and lead pipes as instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A Reading scores Math scores
Lead -0.910*** -2.192*** -2.304*** -1.453 -3.911** -2.416*** -3.537*** -4.093*** -5.637*** -5.198**
(0.061) (0.039) (0.121) (0.886) (1.956) (0.0952) (0.0403) (0.0625) (0.520) (2.345)
B Meet reading standard Meet math standard
Lead -0.00119*** -0.00494*** -0.00605*** -0.00844*** -0.00217 -0.00675*** -0.00999*** -0.0112*** -0.0174*** -0.00645
(0.000273) (0.0000834) (0.000502) (0.000883) (0.00604) (0.000181) (0.00005) (0.00016) (0.0011) 90.00438)
Observations 361106 361106 361106 361106 361106 361106 361106 361106 361106 361106
First stage F statistics 3748.53 3860.22 1761.13 529.17 30.86 3748.53 3860.22 1761.13 529.17 30.86
Birth county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County by year trend No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood controls No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the effects of average lead concentration on 3rd-grade
reading and math test results using the interaction of surface water Cl–
and the historical presence of lead pipes as an instrument. Columns 1 to 5
report results on reading and Columns 6 through 10 report the results on
math. Columns 1 and 6 report the coefficient estimates using only birth
county and birth year FEs. Columns 2 and 7 include individual-level controls.
Columns 3 and 8 include neighborhood controls including poverty rate, un-
employment rate, and median household income. Columns 4 and 9 include
weather control variables. Columns 5 and 10 also include birth county by birth
year trends. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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an individual meets the reading and math standards, using the second in-
strument (Cl– × lead pipes) . Since these dependent variables are dummy
variables, the models reported here are linear probability models. Following
the previous tables, I report results for reading standards in Columns 1 to 5
and results for math standards in Columns 6 to 10. Coefficients in Panel B
suggest that the drinking water lead concentration at birth has robust, signif-
icant negative impacts on students’ probability of passing 3rd grade reading
and math standards. The coefficient in Column 4 of Panel B suggests that a 1
ppb increase in average lead concentration leads to a decrease in the probabil-
ity of meeting the 3rd-grade reading standard by 0.8 percent, holding all else
constant. From Column 8, a 1 ppb increase in lead concentration is associated
with a 1.74% decrease in the probability of passing the math standardized
test. The coefficients on the lead are negative but insignificant in Columns 5
and 10. This may be caused by the fact that I only have 5 counties with the
lead pipes data so the birth county by year trend absorbs a lot of variation.
Given the robustness of the results, the IV strategy using the interaction
of surface Cl– concentration and presence of lead pipes may be the preferred
approach to estimate the impact of lead in drinking water. However, it is
important to note that the sample size is significantly smaller than the OLS
sample because I must have data on the presence of lead pipes in 1900. In
Texas, this information is available for only 5 counties. Even though I find
consistent negative impacts of lead in drinking water on academic performance,
the IV sample may not be representative of the impact of lead statewide. For
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these reasons, I use the fixed effect model to examine the long-run effect of
lead in the next section and plan to apply this approach to the whole U.S. in
the future.
3.6.3 Long-run impacts of LCR violations
The results presented so far are based on the availability of lead con-
centration data and the IV. However, given that I only have lead concentration
data from 2006-2011, I cannot estimate the long-run impacts of lead exposure
with these strategies because children born in 2006-2011 have not yet grad-
uated from high school. Since the LCR violations have plausibly exogenous
timing, I use a difference-in-difference design to exploit changes in LCR vio-
lation status across counties and examine this long-run question. With the
difference-in-difference design, I compare the difference in outcomes between
cohorts born in counties with LCR violations and cohorts born in counties
without LCR violations.
The key assumption underlying this identification strategy is that treat-
ment and control counties would have the same trends in high school gradu-
ation rates without the LCR violation. To test the validation of the parallel
trends assumption, I regress the high school graduation on the interaction of
LCR violation status at birth and the years since the LCR violation initially
occurred, including birth county and birth year fixed effects. Figure 3.8 shows
the coefficient for the interaction term with 1 year before the LCR violation
as the reference year. In the pre-period, the coefficients of LCR violation are
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small and insignificant, suggesting the parallel trends assumption holds. The
treatment is negative and statistically significant in periods T+1 and T+2
suggesting that an LCR has negative impacts on high school graduation rate
persistent for 2 years. It is important to note that the coefficients of years
T-8 to T-6 and T+4 to T+6 have large standard errors. This is because the
majority of LCR violations happen in 1992 and last for an average 3 years,
so the coefficients for the years before T-6 and after T+4 are less precisely
estimated.
I estimate the DID model using the cohort born between 1990 and
2001 enrolled in a Texas public school in 9th grade. Table 3.7 presents the
regression results with Equation (3.4). Panel A shows results from estimating
the impacts of lead in drinking water on high school graduation, and Panel B
shows results for public university enrollment in Texas.
Results in Panel A suggest that an LCR violation in the birth year has
a significant robust negative impact on the high school graduation rate. Col-
umn 4 suggests that holding all else constant, students experiencing an LCR
violation at birth are 0.6 percent less likely to graduate high school. Panel
B results suggest that, contrary to the high school graduation rate, an LCR
violation at birth does not have an impact on public university enrollment in
Texas. It is also important to note that the ERC data only has information
on an individual’s enrollment in Texas universities. A child who enrolls in a
private university in Texas or any university outside of the state does not show
up in these data. Moreover, Texas has the Top Ten Percent rule where anyone
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Table 3.7: Long run impact on high school graduation rate and public univer-
sity enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: High school graduation rate
LCR -0.00860*** -0.00861*** -0.00571*** -0.00574*** -0.00526***
(0.00320) (0.00286) (0.00263) (0.00263) (0.00300)
Observations 1341729 1341729 1341729 1341729 1341729
R2 0.024 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.053
B: Public university enrollment
LCR -0.00236 -0.00187 0.00242 0.00267 0.00353*
(-0.00278) (-0.00271) (-0.00222) (-0.00232) (-0.00192)
Observations 1341757 1341757 1341757 1341757 1341757
R2 0.023 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088
C: High school graduation rate with all violation years
LCR -0.00758*** -0.00671*** -0.00252 -0.00257 -0.00398
(0.00257) (0.00250) (0.00190) (0.00193) (0.00270)
Observations 1341757 1341757 1341757 1341757 1341757
R2 0.024 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.053
Birth year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County by year trend No No No No Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Panel A reports the effects of LCR violation exposure at birth on high
school graduation rate and Panel B reports the effects of LCR violation exposure
at birth on Texas public university enrollment rate. Panel C reports the effects of
LCR violation exposure at birth on high school graduation rate using all violation
years. Column 1 reports the coefficient estimates using only birth county and
birth year FEs. Column 2 includes individual-level controls. Column 3 includes
neighborhood controls including poverty rate, unemployment rate, and median
household income. Column 4 includes weather control variables. Column 5
includes birth county by birth year trends. Standard errors are in parentheses
and clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
in the top 10 percent of their high school class is guaranteed entrance to a pub-
lic university. This rule may also attenuate my coefficient on public university
enrollment. My estimate may be an underestimate of the true effect of early
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exposure to drinking water lead treatment violation on college enrollment.
It is important to note that I only include those who were born with a
new LCR violation in their birth county in my main DID sample. Given that
the average duration of an LCR violation in Texas is about 3 years, and PWSs
are required to notify the public about the violation, parents of individuals
who were born in the 2nd or 3rd year of an LCR violation may be aware of
the potentially high level of lead in their drinking water and take avoidance
actions. In Panel C of Table 3.7, I use the sample of people who are born
with any year of an LCR violation. The coefficients in Panel C are smaller
and less robust, consistent with potential mitigation methods may be taken
for the cohorts born with existing LCR violations in their birth counties.
3.6.4 Heterogeneity in impacts of lead exposure
I examine the heterogeneous effects of lead exposure by individual de-
mographics, such as gender and race, using regressions for the second IV
strategy and the DID strategy. I include an interaction term of my key treat-
ment variables with indicators for race, gender, and economic status. Since
the models contain interaction terms between instrument/treatment and the
group-specific dummy variable, I also include the group dummy variables in
the regressions, so the effect on each group is the sum of these two coefficients.
Table 3.8 presents results for 3rd-grade standardized test scores (Panel A and
B) and high school graduation rate (Panel C). Columns 1 and 2 show the het-
erogeneous impact of lead exposure by gender. As is shown in Columns 1 and
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2 of Panel A and Panel B, the interaction coefficient is significantly positive for
male students and significantly negative for female students, suggesting that
female students’ 3rd-grade standardized test scores may be more vulnerable
to lead exposure.
Columns 3 through 7 of Table 3.8 suggest that there may be significant
heterogeneous treatment effects of lead exposure at birth on later educational
outcomes across different racial groups. Black students are disproportionately
impacted by lead exposure at birth on both 3rd-grade reading and math scores
and also on high school graduation rates. Surprisingly, white students in Texas
experience more negative impacts from drinking water lead exposure at 3rd
grade, but less negative impacts when they are graduating from high school.
Asian students and Hispanic students also experience more negative impacts
from drinking water lead exposure by 3rd grade.
Columns 8 to 10 of Table 3.8 present the heterogeneous effects of lead
by economic status. Children born to families with economic disadvantages















Big cities in Texas
County with lead pipes in 1900
County without lead pipes in 1900
County boundary
Figure 3.5: Texas counties with information on lead pipes in 1900.
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Figure 3.6: The estimated treatment effects by event time
Notes: Figure presents estimated trends in high school graduation rate using sample 
from the primary analyses plus years “T-8" to “T+6" to better map out the pre-
treatment periods and treatment response. I regress the high school graduation rate 
with an interaction of LCR violation status and time dummies for all period before 
and after treatment. Blue connected dots show coefficient and red dashed lines show 
the 95% confidence interval, with the year before an LCR violation as the reference 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this section, I explore the robustness of my results to a variety of
additional tests and specifications.
3.6.5.1 Include median house age as control
A common pathway of lead entering into children’s bodies is through
lead paint and the contaminated dust and soils it generates (Lanphear & Rogh-
mann 1997, Jacobs et al. 2002). Though lead paint was banned in 1978, older
homes are more likely to still have lead paint and lead pipes. To control for
the potential presence of lead paint, I include the median home age in the
birth county in the birth year as an additional control variable in the first IV
strategy and report the coefficients in Table 3.9.
Column 1 of Table 3.9 reports the first-stage result using the interaction
of surface water Cl– concentration and historical presence of lead pipes as an
instrument. Columns 2 and 3 show results for 3rd-grade reading and Columns
4 and 5 report results for math. All coefficients are estimated with birth year
FE, birth county FE, individual controls, neighborhood controls, and weather
controls as before.
Columns 2 and 4 are consistent with previous results that having lead
exposure at birth significantly reduces 3rd-grade reading and math scores.
Relative to the baseline results without median home age controls, the effect
of drinking water lead on 3rd-grade scores is slightly larger.
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3.6.5.2 Include county trends
Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 also presents additional results including county
by year trends, to address the concern that broad trends at the county level
might be influencing my results. The results are of the same sign and similar
magnitude to the main results.
Table 3.9: Robustness checks with housing age
Lead Reading Math
(1) (2) Scores (3) Meeting standards (4) Scores (5) Meeting standards
Chloride * lead pipe 0.00148***
(0.0000644)
Lead -2.647* -0.00944*** -8.844*** -0.0271***
(1.365) (0.00107) (0.939) (0.00205)
Observations 361106 361106 361106 361106 361106
First stage F statistics 134.64 134.64 134.64 134.64 134.64
SW Chi-sq (p-value) 0.000
Hansens J statistics 0.000
Notes: This table reports regression coefficients using the interaction of surface
water Cl– and the historical presence of lead pipes as an instrument. Column 1
reports first stage results. Columns 2 and 3 show results on 3rd-grade reading
results and Columns 4 and 5 are results on math. Columns 2 and 4 show results
on test scores and Columns 3 and 5 show results on indicators of whether
a student passes the tests. I also include birth year FE, birth county FE,
individual controls, neighborhood controls, and weather controls as described
before. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
3.6.5.3 Control for PWS size
As noted before, LCR violations are more likely to happen in small
PWSs. People born in households served by small PWSs may differ from
people born in larger PWSs in unobservable ways. As a robustness check, I
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estimate the second IV model using the interaction between Cl– concentration
and lead pipes and controlling for the sum of the population served by PWSs
and the number of small and very small PWSs in a county. Table 3.10 reports
the results, where Columns 1 and 2 control for the population served by PWSs,
and Columns 3 and 4 control for the number of small and very small systems.
Columns 1 and 3 are results from specification 3.4, while Columns 2 and 4
add birth county by birth year trends. Comparing the coefficient estimates in
Table 3.10 to those in Table 3.7, controlling for PWSs sizes has little effect on
the educational impact of LCR violations at birth.
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Table 3.10: Robustness checks controlling for PWS size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population served Number of small and very small systems
LCR -0.00575** -0.00527* -0.00575** -0.00553*
(0.00263) (0.003) (0.00263) (0.00305)
Observations 1340066 1340066 1340066 1340066
R2 0.052 0.053 0.052 0.053
Birth year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County by year trend No Yes No Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood controls No No Yes Yes
Weather controls No No No Yes
Notes: This table reports regression coefficients using the interaction of
surface water Cl– and the historical presence of lead pipes as an instru-
ment. Columns 1 and 2 are results controlling for the population served by
PWSs whereas Columns 3 and 4 are results controlling for the number of
small and very small systems. Columns 1 and 3 are results controlling for
birth year FE, birth county FE, individual controls, neighborhood controls, and
weather controls as described before. Columns 2 and 4 add birth county by birth
year trends. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
3.6.5.4 Use Chloride-Sulfate Mass Ratio (CSMR)
The last robustness check uses the Chloride-Sulfate Mass Ratio (CSMR)
instead of Cl– as an instrument. While high Cl– can promote solubility of lead
in drinking water, sulfate may inhibit corrosion of lead-bearing materials both
in isolation and in galvanic connections to copper(Edwards & Triantafyllidou
2007). Environmental engineering experiments and utilities’ practical expe-
rience have shown that the chloride-to-sulfate mass ratio (CSMR) may also
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be an important indicator to control lead leaching to potable water (Edwards
& Triantafyllidou 2007). In Tables 3.11 and 3.12, I report results from a set
of IV models using this alternative instrument, interacted with the historical
presence of lead pipes.
In the first stage, the CSMR has a consistently positive impact on ALE
and lead concentration. The F statistics on CSMR suggest that CSMR alone,
like Cl– is a weak instrument, but the interaction of CSMR and lead pipes is
a strong instrument.
Panel A and Panel B in Table 3.12 report 2nd stage results using the
CSMR as an alternative instrument. Panel C and Panel D report results
using the interaction of CSMR and the historical presence of lead pipes as
an instrument. Columns 1 to 5 report results on reading and Columns 6
through 10 report the results on math. Columns 1 and 6 report the coeffi-
cient estimates using only birth county and birth year FEs. Columns 2 and
7 include individual-level controls. Columns 3 and 8 include neighborhood
controls including poverty rate, unemployment rate, and median household
income. Columns 4 and 9 include weather control variables. Columns 5 and
10 also include birth county by birth year trends. Similar to the results us-
ing Cl– as an instrument, ALE has consistent negative impacts on 3rd-grade
reading tests and the lead concentration has negative and significant impacts
on both reading and math results.
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Table 3.11: First stage of IV using CSMR
ALE Lead concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CSMR 0.0615 0.0615 0.0610* 0.0581 0.0615*
(0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0367) (0.0354) (0.0368)
CSMR*
presence of lead pipes in 1900 0.564*** 0.565*** 0.765** 0.657*** 0.586***
(0.00556) (0.00561) (0.137) (0.107) (0.027)
Observations 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 361106 361106 361106 361106 361106
R2 0.281 0.281 0.354 0.369 0.361 0.574 0.575 0.775 0.872 0.895
F statistics 2.34 2.34 2.77 2.79 3.08 10289.35 10119.34 31.24 38.06 121.97
SW Chi-sq test (p-value) 0.125 0.125 0.095 0.094 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansens J statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Birth county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County by year trend No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood controls No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports first stage results using CSMR as instruments.
Columns 1 to 5 show impacts of CSMR on ALE and Columns 6 through 10
show results of interaction terms on lead concentration. Columns 1 and 6
report the coefficient estimates using only birth county and birth year FEs.
Columns 2 and 7 include individual-level controls. Columns 3 and 8 include
neighborhood controls including poverty rate, unemployment rate, and median
household income. Columns 4 and 9 include weather control variables. Columns
5 and 10 also include birth county by birth year trends. Standard errors are in
parentheses and clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.12: IV estimates results using CSMR and lead pipes as instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A Reading scores Math scores
ALE -14.52* -18.25* -22.69* -25.55** -16.50 -5.431 -9.267 -10.53 -5.265 20.34
(8.529) (9.583) (10.25) (11.08) (14.03) (10.87) (12.12) (13.08) (12.76) (18.33)
B Meet reading standard Meet math standard
ALE -0.0559** -0.0679** -0.0695** -0.0829*** -0.0646* -0.0284 -0.0403 -0.0456 -0.0206 0.0582
(0.0268) (0.030) (0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0355) (0.0273) (0.0322) (0.0354) (0.0310) (0.0460)
Observations 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783 1318783
First stage F statistics 2.34 2.34 2.77 2.79 3.08 2.34 2.34 2.77 2.79 3.08
C Reading scores Math scores
Mean lead -2.396*** -4.081*** -4.070*** -3.902*** -7.387*** -2.943*** -4.402*** -5.049*** -7.623*** -8.184***
(0.144) (0.220) (0.932) (1.124) (2.307) (0.292) (0.222) (0.623) (0.743) (2.241)
D Meet reading standard Meet math standard
Mean lead -0.00372* -0.00858* -0.0108** -0.0128** 0 -0.00666*** -0.0110*** -0.0132*** -0.0225*** 0
(0.0005000) (0.000237) (0.00236) (0.00305) (.) (0.000931) (0.000730) (0.00162) (0.00286) (.)
Observations 361106 361106 361106 361106 361106 361106 361106 361106 361106
First stage F statistics 10289.35 10119.34 31.24 38.06 121.97 10289.35 10119.34 31.24 38.06 121.97
Birth county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County by year trend No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood controls No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the effects of average lead concentration on 3rd-grade
reading and math test results using two instrumental variable strategies.Panel
A and Panel B report results using CSMR as an instrument. Panel C and Panel
D report results using the interaction of CSMR and the historical presence
of lead pipes as an instrument.Columns 1 to 5 report results on reading and
Columns 6 through 10 report the results on math. Columns 1 and 6 report the
coefficient estimates using only birth county and birth year FEs. Columns 2
and 7 include individual-level controls. Columns 3 and 8 include neighborhood
controls including poverty rate, unemployment rate, and median household
income. Columns 4 and 9 include weather control variables. Columns 5 and
10 also include birth county by birth year trends. Standard errors are in
parentheses and clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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3.7 Discussion and Conclusions
Using restrictive education data and drinking water data in Texas from
1991 to 2011, this study investigates the educational impacts of drinking water
lead exposure in early childhood. I exploit variation in lead concentrations
via changes in surface water Cl– concentration, which affects treated drinking
water chemistry, as well as the historical presence of lead pipes. I also exploit
the plausibly exogenous timing of LCR violations by comparing the outcomes
of children born with and without a new LCR violation in their birth county-
year.
My results provide empirical evidence that drinking water lead exposure
in the birth year has significant negative impacts on standardized test scores
in the third grade, even when exposure is well below the federal action level
for lead in drinking water under the SDWA. Specifically, I find that a 1-ppb
increase in lead concentration in drinking water is associated with a 4-points
and 5.2-point decrease in 3rd-grade reading and math scores, respectively.
Given the average concentration of lead is about 2 ppb, eliminating lead in
Texas could increase average reading scores by 52 points and math scores by
65 points, corresponding to 30 percent and 37 percent of a standard deviation.
These are relatively modest gains given that the average scores of both tests
are around 1400, but the magnitude is actually bigger than the estimates
for BLLs in the existing literature (Aizer & Currie 2019). Eliminating lead
in drinking water is also associated with a 0.8% and 1.74% increase in the
probability of passing reading and math tests in 3rd grade. These estimates are
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also consistent with the existing literature using BLLs in both economics and
epidemiology (Aizer & Currie 2019). Importantly, the effects that I estimated
occur in a state and at a time when the lead concentration in drinking water
is, on average, quite low.
This study also suggests that violation of the federal regulation for
drinking water lead treatment in the birth year leads to a smaller probability
of graduating from high school. Results suggest that being born in a county
with a new LCR violation is associated with a 0.6% decrease in the probabil-
ity of graduating from high school. A high school drop-out’s weekly income
is $606, $143 less than people with high school diplomas, in the U.S (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019). Thus, an LCR violation at birth may be
associated with a $45 or 0.14% decrease in average annual income through its
impact on high school graduation. For the older cohort in my sample, the ben-
efits in terms of increased income from eliminating LCR violations would be
around $12 million annually in Texas alone. My estimates are smaller than the
only existing study of the long-term impact of lead, which suggests reducing
childhood BLL from 10 µg/dL to 5 µg/dL in the U.S. would have a benefit of
around $198 million annually (Grönqvist et al. 2020). However, it is important
to note that my study uses LCR violations that are associated with a very low
level of lead concentration. Given the 1.85 ppb in lead, concentration is only
about 4% of the 5 µg/dL reduction, eliminating LCR violations is associated
with a sizeable economic benefit.
If the $45 income loss persists over the life cycle, an individual’s life-
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time wage loss alone from having an LCR violation at birth is about $900 6.
However, given an individual’s wage is unlikely to be constant through the life
cycle, Carnevale et al. (2011) estimate that workers with a high school diploma
on average earn $331,000 more than people without during their working lives.
Exposing to an LCR violation at birth, then the loss in the present discounted
value of lifetime earnings is about $2,000. Given 20% of individuals in my sam-
ple are exposed to new LCR violations at birth, the loss in lifetime earnings
ranges from around $241 million to $535 million in Texas.
President Biden’s The American Jobs Plan includes $45 billion to re-
place lead pipes and service lines across the U.S. While I do not have an
accurate estimate of how many people are exposed to LCR violations at birth
during 1991-2004, one can generalize my estimates assuming that the rate of
the population exposed in Texas is the same as the rest of the country. Given
the average number of births in the U.S. is around 4 million, 56 million people
were born during the period. If 20% of them (11.2 million) are exposed to a
new LCR violation at birth, the annual loss of income is about $504 million.
The loss in lifetime earnings would be around $10 billion to $22 billion. A
back-of-the-envelope calculation based on EPA’s estimate of average replace-
ment cost per line ($4,700) and assumption of 6 to 10 million lead service lines
across the country suggests the cost could range from $28 billion to $47 billion
(Campbell & Wessel 2021). The benefit from an increase in lifetime earnings
alone could not cover the cost of replacing all lead pipes in the U.S. But since
6I assume an individual can work from 18 to 78 and use a discount rate of 5%.
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this is just one slice of potential benefits from eliminating lead from drinking
water, the total benefit is likely much larger.
I also find that female children and children from African American
families and families with economic disadvantages are more vulnerable to lead
exposure, in line with the existing literature (Chetty et al. 2016, Heckman &
Karapakula 2019, Grönqvist et al. 2020). The findings suggest that early child-
hood lead exposure may be on contributing factor to the racial-achievement
gaps in the U.S.
This study using data in Texas provides the first empirical evidence that
early childhood exposure to lead from drinking water well below action levels
has a significant impact on educational outcomes in both the short and the long
run. However, my IV sample of 5 Texas counties and the comparably lower lead
concentration in Texas may not provide a comprehensive estimate of drinking
water lead impact on the whole U.S. An important direction of my future
research is to take the approach and apply it to a broader geographic area.
One educational data set that I plan to use is the school district level standard
test scores data from the Stanford educational archive (Sorensen et al. 2019).
I have also recently obtained access to the restrictive federal Census survey
data. The federal restrictive data will enable future work evaluate drinking




Water Pollution Control in Developing
Countries: Policy Instruments and Empirical
Evidence 1
4.1 Introduction
Severe water pollution problems are widespread in developing coun-
tries, where many major river systems are highly impaired. For example,
within the monitored areas of China’s main river systems, only 28 percent
have water suitable for drinking, and about one-third do not meet the coun-
try’s lowest ambient water quality standards (standards that focus on water
quality within lakes, rivers, streams and other raw water sources), which makes
these rivers unsuitable even for irrigation (World Bank 2006). India’s Ganga
River, alone, receives point-source pollution comprising more than 1.3 billion
liters of untreated domestic waste and 260 million liters of untreated industrial
waste, which is in addition to agricultural and urban runoff (Dakkak 2018). In
China, Brazil, India, and Indonesia (the four most populous developing coun-
tries), dissolved oxygen levels, which are an important indicator of healthy
1This chapter is published in Olmstead, S. and Zheng, J., 2021. Water Pollution Control
in Developing Countries: Policy Instruments and Empirical Evidence. Review of Environ-
mental Economics and Policy, 15(2), pp.000-000. Olmstead and I designed the study,
performed the literature review, and wrote the manuscript together.
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aquatic ecosystems, are well below average levels in industrialized countries
(Greenstone & Jack 2015).
Ambient water pollution in developing countries harms human health
(Ebenstein 2012, Do et al. 2018, Garg et al. 2018). Poor water quality may
also reduce agricultural output (Hagerty 2018), educational outcomes (Zhang
& Xu 2016), and labor productivity (Meeks 2017). Polluted surface water
in developing countries also causes damages to recreational opportunities and
other ecosystem services (Choe et al. 1996, Day &Mourato 2002, Beharry-Borg
et al. 2010, Mishra 2017). These damages suggest that water pollution control
policies in developing countries are likely to generate substantial benefits. The
standard economic approach to cost-effectively reduce municipal, agricultural,
and industrial water pollution in developing countries would be to use market-
based policy instruments. Even in industrialized countries, however, market-
based policy instruments have proven to be more difficult to apply effectively
to water pollution than to air pollution (Fisher-vanden & Olmstead 2013).
This article examines the policy instruments that can be used to con-
trol ambient water pollution in developing countries and reviews the empirical
evidence in the economics literature on the effectiveness of these policy op-
tions in practice. The article is organized as follows. In the next four sections,
we discuss the categories of policy instruments that can be used to control
ambient water pollution – prescriptive approaches, market-based approaches,
voluntary approaches, and infrastructure investments, respectively – and the
results of empirical assessments of their effectiveness. We focus primarily on
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developing countries, but mention specific policies and empirical evidence from
industrialized countries where appropriate. Then we highlight challenges to
the effective design, implementation, and evaluation of water pollution control
policies in developing country settings. These include sparse and/or poor qual-
ity data, inadequate monitoring and enforcement, rent-seeking in regulatory
settings, and inter-jurisdictional spillovers when regulation is decentralized. In
the final section, we summarize our findings, discuss the gaps in the empirical
literature on the impacts of water pollution policy as well as some priorities
for future research, and present some concluding thoughts.
4.2 Prescriptive Policies
The most common approach to environmental regulation focuses on
prescriptive policy instruments, sometimes called command-and-control in-
struments, which regulate the behavior or performance of individual factories,
power plants, and other commercial and industrial facilities. For example,
a technology standard requires firms to use a particular pollution abatement
technology. A performance standard may impose a maximum allowable emis-
sions rate, and thus allow polluters more flexibility in the choice of control
technology. Most existing water quality regulations in industrialized countries
use these approaches. Similarly, developing countries regulate water pollution
primarily through the use of prescriptive standards. For example, India’s 1985
National River Conservation Plan (NRCP) established a set of designated uses
for surface waters and approaches for achieving levels of water quality appro-
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priate to those designated uses (Greenstone & Hanna 2014). Although the
NRCP requires the construction of sewage treatment plants and other capital
investments to reduce water pollution, it does not provide a dedicated source
of revenues to fund those investments. Greenstone and Hanna (2014) find that
India’s NRCP has not reduced water pollution concentrations in river segments
covered by the Plan. They argue that this failure is due to low public demand
for ambient water quality improvements and weak institutional support (e.g.,
from the Supreme Court and monitoring agencies) for the NRCP’s goals. In
China, the main policy on water pollution reduction is currently the Water
Pollution Prevention and Action Plan, known as the “Water Ten Plan” (State
Council 2015). The Water Ten Plan establishes targets for water pollution
reduction and approaches for achieving them, including setting pollution re-
duction targets for small factories in polluting industries and shutting down
those that fail to meet the targets. The Water Ten Plan also requires plants
in ten major polluting industries to install specific abatement technologies.
For instance, all pulp and paper factories in China are required to switch to
either Elemental Chlorine Free or Total Chlorine Free bleaching technologies.
Empirical estimates suggest that the Water Ten Plan may be associated with
reductions in water pollution (Wang & Wei 2019), but causal estimates have
not yet appeared in the literature.
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4.3 Market-based Policies
Market-based policy instruments are decentralized, focusing on aggre-
gate or market-level outcomes, such as total pollution levels or total emissions,
rather than individual facilities. Examples of such instruments include pollu-
tion taxes and subsidies, tradable pollution permits, payments for ecosystem
services, and information disclosure. In this section, we describe each of these
market-based water pollution policies as well as relevant applications in indus-
trialized and developing countries.
4.3.1 Pollution Taxes and Subsidies
The standard market-based economic approach is to tax negative ex-
ternalities and subsidize positive externalities. Under a uniform tax, marginal
abatement costs are equal across firms, thus generating the least-cost alloca-
tion of emissions reductions. However, in the case of water pollution, a uniform
tax is often not efficient, because marginal damages usually depend on the lo-
cation of the source of the pollution. This means that an efficient tax must also
vary by source or at a more aggregate level, for example, dividing sources into
“zones” that recognize the spatial heterogeneity in damages (Boyd 2003). The
standard Pigouvian tax, set equal to the marginal damages at the efficient level
of pollution, easily addresses pollution from point sources. Taxing non-point
source pollution (e.g., diffuse runoff from farms and cities), which generally
accounts for a large share of total water pollution, is more complicated, partly
because effluent is not easily monitored or measured, and has thus prompted
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much discussion in the literature (Shortle & Horan 2001). Water pollution
taxes are fairly uncommon in industrialized countries. Although France, Ger-
many, and the Netherlands all have systems of water pollution taxes, with
some dating to the 1970s (Boyd 2003), only the Dutch water pollution fee
system has been found to have a statistically significant association with pol-
lution reductions (Bressers 1988). In contrast, a few developing countries have
experimented with more robust water pollution taxation, and some of these
policies have been evaluated econometrically.
China’s pollution levy system, established in the early 1980s, initially
required industrial plants to pay a fee on the (one) pollutant that exceeded
the applicable standard by the greatest amount. Since a 2003 reform, plants
must pay levies on the three pollutants that exceed the standard by the great-
est amount, and the levy rates have increased dramatically. Even before the
2003 reform, analyses showed that the pollution levy system reduced emis-
sions (Jiang & McKibbin 2002, Wang & Wheeler 2003). Based on data on
plant-level pollution expenditures, Wang (2002) finds that industries respond
strongly to pollution charges but not to other regulatory approaches. In an-
other empirical analysis, Ebenstein (2012) finds that doubling China’s levy
for wastewater dumping would avert 17,000 premature deaths from digestive
cancers per year at a cost of about $500 million per year, which is a fraction
of value-of-statistical life (VSL) estimates for China.
Since 2009, a separate environmental tax – the “Pay for Permit” policy –
has been applied to chemical oxygen demand (COD) emissions from industrial
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sources in the Lake Tai Basin in Jiangsu province. This pilot program charges
firms for every unit of pollution (a classic Pigouvian tax). Participating firms
are required to purchase a permit from the local government for each unit of
expected COD emissions, with penalties for violations. He & Zhang (2018)
find that participating plants reduced emissions by about 40 percent in the
first two years of the policy.
Colombia implemented a national discharge fee system (Law 99) in
1993. The law mandated that a set of regional environmental regulatory au-
thorities (known as CARs) charge all polluters a fee per unit of biological oxy-
gen demand (BOD) and total suspended solids (TSS) discharged. According
to Colombia’s environment ministry, nationwide BOD discharges from point
sources covered by the program fell 27 percent and TSS discharges fell by
45 percent (Blackman, Morgenstern & Topping 2006). However, these effects
may not be causal. It is also important to note that these observed declines
in water pollution may be due in part to more effective permitting, monitor-
ing, and enforcement, as well as increased transparency and accountability of
CARs (Blackman, Morgenstern & Topping 2006).
In the 1980s, Malaysia began charging a fee on BOD emissions from
the palm oil industry. Unpublished studies suggest that the implementation
of these fees reduced the BOD load dramatically, even as palm oil production
increased (Vincent et al. 1997).
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4.3.2 Tradable Pollution Permits
Tradable pollution permits, or “cap-and-trade” systems, are another
market-based approach. Here the regulator sets an aggregate cap on pollution
and allocates the number of pollution permits implied by the cap to the regu-
lated community, either through auctions or a system of free allocation. The
pollution permits are transferable, and thus when the permit market clears,
each firm has equated its marginal pollution abatement cost with the prevail-
ing permit price. This results in equal marginal costs across firms, which is the
least-cost allocation of pollution control. When the marginal damages from
water pollution vary with the location of the discharge, establishing location-
based trading ratios (equivalent to a system of exchange rates) for each pair of
polluters is an efficient approach (Konishi et al. 2015). Experience with water
quality trading in industrialized countries is limited. Although there are active
programs in Australia, Canada, and the United States, few are operating on
a scale that could be considered economically significant (Fisher-Vanden and
Olmstead 2013). To the best of our knowledge, none of these programs have
been rigorously evaluated. We were not able to identify any examples of ac-
tive water quality trading programs in developing countries. This is consistent
with the fact that there are only a small number of tradable permit policies
for air pollution in developing countries (Montero et al. 2002).
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4.3.3 Payments for Ecosystem Services
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are another type of market-
based approach. When externalities create a divergence between those who
bear the costs of pollution control and those who enjoy the benefits, a sys-
tem of payments can potentially address these externalities. PES approaches
aimed at controlling water pollution are known as payments for watershed ser-
vices (PWS). As with taxes and tradable permits, efficient PWS systems must
account for the spatial and intertemporal heterogeneity of marginal damages
from pollution (Jack et al. 2008). A cost-effective PWS program maximizes
the impacts of expenditures and avoids paying for abatement that would be
undertaken even without a PWS incentive. This can be achieved through auc-
tions (Ferraro 2008). According to Salzman et al. (2018), there are 550 active
PES programs around the world.
4.3.3.1 Applications in industrialized countries
PWS approaches have been implemented for water pollution control
in many industrialized country contexts. For example, in 2018, the US De-
partment of Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) paid more
than $1.8 billion to more than 300,000 US farms for environmentally-beneficial
practices on 22 million acres (USDA 2018). Water quality improvement is an
important CRP goal. Roberts & Lubowski (2007) find that the CRP results
in the lasting retirement of agricultural land. Estimates of the causal impact
of the CRP on water quality are not available, but empirical analysis by the
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USDA suggests that the CRP generates tens of millions of dollars in recre-
ational water quality benefits each year (Feather et al. 1999).
4.3.3.2 Applications in developing countries
The literature contains many reviews of PES applications in develop-
ing countries, including some robust PWS programs (Pagiola et al. 2005, Bulte
et al. 2008, Pattanayak et al. 2010). We discuss some examples below. Note
that we identified no PWS programs in developing countries that use auctions
to select payment recipients, which suggests that there may be room to im-
prove cost-effectiveness in these programs. In 2006, the city government of
Beijing began paying farmers upstream of Miyun Reservoir to convert land
from rice cultivation to dryland crops, in order to increase water yield in the
catchment and reduce nutrient flows into the reservoir. Zheng et al. (2013)
find evidence that this program, known as Paddy Land-to-Dryland, has been
very successful, with an estimated benefit-cost ratio of 1.5 and net benefits
flowing to both upstream service providers and downstream payees. In fact,
by 2010, all rice fields upstream had converted to dryland crops (mostly corn),
and concentrations of total nitrogen and total phosphorus (which are used in
fertilizer) had been reduced significantly (Zheng et al. 2013).
Watershed protection and aquifer recharge are among the many goals of
Mexico’s federal conservation payments program. The program’s main stated
goal is to protect forests in order to maintain their “hydrological services”.
This program, which is financed by water user fees, has significantly reduced
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deforestation (American et al. 2015, Alix-Garcia et al. 2018), has increased
land-cover management activities (Alix-Garcia et al. 2018), and does not
appear to have crowded out private environmental stewardship (Alix-Garcia
et al. 2018). While these induced changes may have improved water quality,
we have not found any rigorous assessments of the program’s water quality
impacts.
Many smaller-scale PWS systems have been established in Latin Amer-
ica. For example, in Colombia’s Chaina watershed in the eastern Andes, down-
stream water users pay upland farmers to switch to land-management prac-
tices that reduce soil compaction and erosion. Although no causal estimates
of program impacts are available, Moreno-Sanchez et al. (2012) suggest that
the program has both reduced deforestation and regenerated riparian vegeta-
tion, which could improve water quality. PWS programs in Bolivia’s Upper
Los Negros watershed and Ecuador’s Palahurco watershed have also been dis-
cussed in the literature (Pattanayak et al. 2010). Kosoy et al. (2007) present
case studies of three small-scale PWS programs in Honduras, Costa Rica, and
Nicaragua, but the impacts of these programs on water quality have not been
rigorously evaluated.
A PWS program has been piloted in Tanzania’s Uluguru Mountains,
which is the upland catchment area for the basin that provides water for most
of Dar es Salaam and the surrounding regions. The Equitable Payment for
Watershed Services program connects upland farmers with downstream water
utilities, beverage companies (including Coca-Cola), and breweries (Mussa
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& Mwakaje 2013). Water quality monitoring is occurring for this program,
suggesting that it may be possible to measure its impacts (Branca et al. 2011).
4.3.4 Mandatory Information Disclosure
Mandatory information disclosure policies (e.g., requiring companies
to publicly release information about their environmental performance) may
correct a type of market failure – information asymmetry. The disclosure of
information concerning a company’s pollution emissions may affect consumers’
demand for polluting firms’ goods; firms’ stock prices and their ability to
hire and retain employees; private citizens’ incentive to sue polluters; political
support for more stringent pollution control standards or enforcement; and
pressure from community groups and nongovernmental organizations. It may
also provide new information to managers about plants’ discharges and options
for reducing them (Tietenberg 1998, Powers et al. 2011).
4.3.4.1 Applications in industrialized countries
Many information disclosure policies have been established and evalu-
ated in industrialized countries. One of the most well-studied is the US Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI) program, which requires manufacturing firms to re-
port annual chemical releases into the air, water, and land to the US Environ-
mental Protection Agency, which then publicly releases the information. Total
annual releases of reportable chemicals fell by nearly 50 percent from the TRI’s
inception in 1986 through the mid-2000s. This decrease has not been causally
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attributed to the TRI (Bennear & Coglianese 2005), but studies of outcomes
other than environmental performance have found that firms whose high TRI
releases receive media coverage experience reduced stock returns (Hamilton
1995, Khanna et al. 1998). Similarly, the disclosure of environmental incidents
and violations appears to have strong negative effects on the market value of
firms in Canada (Laplante & Lanoie 1994) and Korea (Dasgupta et al. 2006).
4.3.4.2 Applications in developing countries
Information disclosure programs have often been used as environmen-
tal policy instruments in developing countries, although only a few have been
rigorously evaluated. Indonesia’s national Program for Pollution Control,
Evaluation and Rating (PROPER) was created in 1995 to rate and disclose
the environmental performance of factories (Tietenberg 1998). Early studies
found that PROPER had a short-term impact on improving the performance
of below-average firms but did not increase the number of firms using more
than the required environmental management technologies (Tietenberg 1998,
Blackman et al. 2004). More recently, García et al. (2007, 2009) evaluated
PROPER’s effectiveness and found that the program does reduce pollution
emissions, especially for low-compliance firms.
India’s Green Rating Project (GRP), which began in 1997, evaluates
the environmental performance of large industrial plants in India, assigns nu-
meric ratings to these plants, and awards them “leaves” to indicate their score.
It also informs the public about the ratings and offers plants information about
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their pollution abatement options. In an evaluation of the impact of the GRP
on discharges from India’s largest pulp and paper plants, Powers et al. (2011)
find that the program significantly reduced pollution from dirty plants.
4.4 Voluntary Approaches
Voluntary approaches (VAs) are alternative policy tools that do not
fall into either the market-based or the prescriptive category. Under VAs,
regulators either offer polluters incentives (e.g., cost-sharing programs, envi-
ronmental leadership programs) to reduce pollution or induce participation
by threatening stricter regulation if polluters do not adopt the VA (Borck &
Coglianese 2009). The advantages of VAs over traditional regulations include:
(1) potential cost savings, because polluters have the flexibility to choose abate-
ment techniques to achieve environmental targets (as under a market-based
approach); and (2) increased cooperation and communication between pol-
luters and regulators (Alberini & Segerson 2002). However, a clear potential
downside is that firms may be unlikely to engage in costly pollution reduction
unless there are specific requirements, monitoring, and enforcement. In ad-
dition, when evaluating such programs, empirical analyses must address the
issue of selection bias, because the firms most likely to join the VA are those
for whom it is the least costly.
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4.4.1 Applications in Industrialized Countries
VAs have been applied in several cases in the United States, Europe,
and Japan, at both the federal and state levels. The evidence has been mixed
on the effectiveness of one well-studied VA in the United States – the 33/50
program, which sought to achieve major reductions in releases reported under
the TRI during the 1990s. For example, Vidovic & Khanna (2012) find no sta-
tistically significant decrease in pollution attributable to the program, while
Khanna & Damon (1999) and Innes & Sam (2008) attribute significant reduc-
tions in releases to participation in the 33/50 program. These mixed results
may be due to the fact that most empirical assessments of 33/50 do not ac-
count for the possibility that information about cost-effective abatement may
spill over from enrolled to non-enrolled facilities. Zhou et al. (2020), who ex-
amine such spillovers directly, find that firms that do not participate in 33/50
may still reduce emissions, and that accounting for this possibility significantly
increases the emissions reductions attributable to the program. Overall, it is
not clear whether VAs actually improve water quality in industrialized coun-
tries or how they compare with mandatory regulations (Borck & Coglianese
2009).
4.4.2 Applications in Developing Countries
Several studies have examined VAs in developing countries, including
those in Chile, Mexico, Colombia, China, and Brazil (Blackman & Sisto 2006,
Blackman, Lyon & Sisto 2006, Jiménez 2007, Hu 2007, Blackman et al. 2010,
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2013). However, only the study on Chile (Jiménez 2007) provides credible ev-
idence that a VA improved environmental outcomes. Blackman et al. (2010)
analyze the effectiveness of Mexico’s Clean Industry Program, under which
industrial facilities that agree to a third-party audit and implement the rec-
ommended changes can avoid penalties for any violations uncovered during
the audit; they can also avoid government regulatory inspections for an ad-
ditional two years. The results suggest that dirty firms recently punished by
the government were more likely to participate in the program, but that after
firms had met the requirements of the program, their pollution was not sig-
nificantly lower than the pollution levels for nonparticipants. Blackman et al.
(2013) find that VAs had minimal short-run effects on firms’ environmental
performance in Colombia. The authors argue that while empirical studies of-
ten fail to establish immediate impacts of VAs on environmental performance
in developing countries, VAs may facilitate capacity-building in both govern-
ment institutions and the private sector, which may help reduce pollution and
improve regulatory outcomes over time.
4.5 Infrastructure Investment
Another tool that governments can use to reduce the impacts of wa-
ter pollution is to directly fund or subsidize the construction of wastewater
collection and treatment infrastructure or drinking water treatment and dis-
tribution infrastructure. An extensive literature suggests that the provision
of safe drinking water and sanitation benefits households in many different
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ways. Although drinking water interventions can reduce economic damages
from ambient water pollution (by weakening the link between ambient pol-
lution and human health), we would not expect drinking water interventions
to have any direct effect on ambient pollution itself. In contrast, major in-
vestments in sanitation infrastructure can improve ambient water quality and
thus affect human and ecosystem health. Untreated waste is a classic nega-
tive externality, while centralized wastewater collection and treatment provide
public goods. Although most positive externalities of piped water are likely to
be internalized within a region (i.e., most of the benefits of piped water provi-
sion tend to accrue to individuals living within the jurisdiction that pays for
it), wastewater treatment generates spillover benefits to downstream regions
(Chiang 2016). Thus, there is a strong economic rationale for government
provision of sanitation infrastructure, and large-scale investments are indeed
common in both industrialized and developing countries.
In the case of industrialized countries, the literature has emphasized the
role of water treatment and sewerage systems in the decline in mortality rates
in US and European cities in the early 20th century, which had very substantial
net economic benefits (Alsan & Goldin 2019, Cutler & Miller 2005, Delaney
et al. 2011). The literature also finds positive impacts of toilets, latrines, and
safe drinking water on health and educational outcomes in developing countries
(Soares 2007, Duflo et al. 2015, Zhang 2012, Zhang & Xu 2016).
In developing country settings where the share of untreated sewage is
large, and especially in urban areas with large exposed populations, large-scale
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sanitation investments could have significant impacts on downstream water
quality as well as significant economic benefits via avoided morbidity and pre-
mature mortality (Kresch et al. 2020). However, the literature on the impacts
of large-scale sanitation investments on downstream ambient water quality
is generally very thin and mixed. As noted earlier, Greenstone and Hanna
(2014) find that India’s NRCP, which focuses on investments in wastewater
collection and treatment (as well as community toilets, crematoria, and pub-
lic education), has had no significant impact on ambient water quality. The
dominant role of community sanitation improvements, rather than in-home
improvements, in producing health benefits (e.g., Andres et al. (2017) sug-
gests that some of the positive effects of sanitation investments could be due
to ambient water quality improvements, but to our knowledge, this link has
not been made directly. Thus, this is an important area for further research.
4.6 Challenges for the Design, Implementation, and Eval-
uation of Water Pollution Control Policies in Devel-
oping Countries
In this section, we highlight challenges to the effective design, imple-
mentation, and evaluation of water pollution control policies in developing
country settings. These challenges include sparse and/or poor quality data,
weak monitoring and enforcement, rent-seeking in regulatory settings, and
jurisdictional spillovers when regulation is decentralized.
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4.6.1 Data Availability
One major challenge for evaluating water pollution control policies in
developing countries is a lack of data on outcome variables such as pollution
emissions or pollution concentrations in receiving waters. One tool for address-
ing this challenge is the increasing availability of satellite data that measures
pollution (Schaeffer et al. 2012). Another option for evaluating policy effective-
ness in data-poor settings is for researchers to use variation in water pollution
that is due to exogenous shocks that have direct connections to ambient pol-
lution concentrations (e.g., policy interventions, natural events), but that do
not require direct pollution measurement. For example, Do et al. (2018) ex-
ploit variation in industrial pollution on India’s Ganga River (due to Supreme
Court rulings that mandated pollution reductions from the tanning industry)
to estimate the impacts of pollution reductions on neonatal mortality; they
do not use any direct measures of river water quality. Field experiments such
as randomized control trials can also be used to evaluate water and sanita-
tion interventions without needing to rely on observational data provided by
regulators or other sources (Kremer et al. 2011). Such experiments have been
successfully used to examine the impacts of specific regulatory interventions
on the emissions of individual firms or households, which certainly contribute
to ambient water pollution concentrations (e.g., Duflo et al. (2013)). But it
would be problematic to extrapolate from these relatively small-scale causal
estimates to large-scale ambient water pollution reductions. Innovative use
of available monitoring technologies and increased monitoring frequency could
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improve data availability and quality in developing countries. One recent
example of such an effort is China’s automatic water quality monitoring sys-
tem. Data quality has been a significant concern for studies of pollution in
China (Ghanem & Zhang 2014). China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environ-
ment (MEE) (formerly the Bureau of Environmental Protection) has collected
data on major rivers and lakes using an automatic water quality monitoring
system since 1999, with monitoring stations collecting and publishing real-
time water quality data online. Compared to previous monitoring regimes, it
may be more difficult to manipulate these data. China’s central government
recently expanded the automatic water quality monitoring system from 100 to
2,050 stations across the country (Xinhua Net 2018).
Third-party monitoring can also improve water quality data in devel-
oping countries. For example, Duflo et al. (2013) find that in India, having
a paid third-party auditor who is externally selected results in more accurate
reporting of firms’ water pollution emissions. Citizen science, whereby indi-
viduals voluntarily participate in the data collection and monitoring process,
can also function as a form of third-party monitoring. However, thus far, the
literature provides only theoretical support for the idea of such crowdsourcing
of water quality data (Borden et al. 2016).
4.6.2 Inadequate Monitoring, Enforcement, and Compliance
There is a large environmental economics literature that examines the
monitoring and enforcement of pollution control regulations (Shimshack 2014).
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Indeed, dozens of studies have found that monitoring and enforcement of en-
vironmental regulations reduce pollution, deter future violations, and even
encourage over-compliance by regulated entities (Shimshack 2014). Most of
these studies have focused on the United States, likely because of both data
availability and the country’s long history of pollution regulation. Many stud-
ies have examined the weak institutional capacity for stringent monitoring
and enforcement in developing countries and the challenges this poses (Afsah
& Makarim 1999, Wang & Wheeler 2000, Dasgupta et al. 2000). Although it is
not unusual for developing countries to have environmental standards that are
actually quite stringent, they are often not met simply because enforcement
is weak (Greenstone and Jack 2015). A few empirical studies have focused
specifically on the importance of monitoring and enforcement of water pol-
lution policies in developing countries. For example, Dasgupta et al. (2001)
show that in China, inspections may play a more significant role in reduc-
ing emissions than the pollution levies themselves. ? find that the impacts
of China’s pollution levies are higher in areas of the country where regula-
tory institutions (and hence monitoring and enforcement) are stronger. Using
plant-level pollution data, Lin (2013) shows that inspections increase plants’
self-reported pollution by more than 3 percent but may not result in reduced
pollution. In another study of China, Zhang et al. (2018) assess the central gov-
ernment’s National Specially Monitored Firms (NSMF) pilot program, which
was established in 2007 and oversees the local monitoring of firms that are
major emitters of air and water pollution and hazardous waste. More specif-
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ically, monitored firms are required to install automatic monitoring systems
and transmit emissions information in real time to the central government,
which verifies the accuracy of the data through monthly inspections. Zhang
et al. (2018) find that the additional central supervision of local authorities in
the NSMF program reduced industrial COD emissions by 26.8 percent in the
first year of the program, with reductions continuing in subsequent years.
4.6.3 Rent-seeking and Environmental Regulation
Rent-seeking under regulatory systems can drive a wedge between what
policy makers expect an environmental policy to achieve and actual results
(Wilson & Damania 2005). For example, firms may simply lobby for less
stringent environmental regulation or regulators may be “captured” (be sub-
ject to influence) by the industries they monitor. A small number of studies
explicitly examine the effects of corruption and related rent-seeking behavior
on water pollution outcomes in developing countries. For example, Duflo et
al. (2013) find that in India, aligning environmental auditors’ and regulators’
incentives (by randomly assigning auditors to plants, paying auditors from a
central pool rather than by plant, and verifying their reports with follow-up
inspections) significantly reduces under-reporting of water pollution emissions
from audited plants, although the effects on reporting are somewhat smaller
for water pollution than for air pollution. The firms in this experiment actu-
ally reduced water pollution emissions in response to better auditing, but air
emissions showed no statistically significant impact (Duflo et al. 2013).
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4.6.4 Decentralized Regulation and Inter-jurisdictional Spillovers
When regulation is decentralized, local jurisdictions are able to set stan-
dards that reflect local preferences for environmental quality, and individuals
may sort across jurisdictions according to their preferences for environmental
quality and other factors (Tiebout 1956, Oates & Schwab 1988). However,
because water pollution moves across political and geographic boundaries, it
creates negative externalities (in which pollution spills over from the originat-
ing jurisdiction to jurisdictions downstream) and free-riding problems. Pol-
luting facilities may even move in response to regulatory stringency within a
jurisdiction, offsetting any water quality improvement within the more strin-
gent jurisdiction with increases in pollution elsewhere (Decheleprêtre and Sato
2017). Although centralized regulation is less responsive to local preferences
for environmental quality, it can internalize spillovers by considering all im-
pacts of pollution and pollution control, regardless of their location. Which
regulatory approach – centralized or decentralized – is most efficient depends
on whether the efficiency loss from centralized standard-setting (which ignores
local conditions) exceeds the efficiency gain from eliminating the spillovers
that occur in decentralized policy settings (Banzhaf & Chupp 2012). In the
remainder of this discussion, we examine the empirical evidence concerning
the existence of free-riding in water pollution across jurisdictional borders, as
well as potential policy solutions.
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4.6.5 Empirical evidence of spillovers
There is some empirical evidence of water pollution spillovers both
within and across country borders in industrialized country settings (e.g., Sig-
man (2005)). Empirical studies suggest that such transboundary spillover and
free-riding problems also exist in developing countries. For example, in 2001,
the Chinese government mandated pollution reduction targets for all provinces
in its Five-Year Plan, but did not indicate how local Bureaus of Environmental
Protection (BEPs) should coordinate to achieve these targets. Because local
BEPs are controlled by local governments, they had an incentive to strate-
gically place polluting industries in border counties. Cai et al. (2016) assess
the impacts of this approach and find that water-polluting production and
new entry into water-polluting industries are significantly higher downstream
of county borders, providing evidence of the jurisdictional spillovers described
above. Thus, in response to the 2001 policy directive, provincial governments
appear to have allocated the most lenient enforcement to downstream border
counties (Cai et al. 2016). Similarly, Chiang (2016) finds that local Chinese
government officials who receive incentives from the central government to
expand the fraction of households within their jurisdictions that are covered
by clean piped water and sanitation systems do more to expand access to
piped water than to expand access to sanitation. This is because sanitation
expansion creates positive spillovers to downstream jurisdictions (via reduced
ambient water pollution) that are not captured locally. In a study of Brazil,
Lipscomb & Mobarak (2017) examine the potential water pollution spillovers
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in rivers as they approach county borders. They find that pollution increases
as rivers travel towards downstream borders and that the rate of pollution
increases as rivers approach a border. As with the studies of China, these
findings provide evidence of the jurisdictional pollution spillovers that result
from decentralization.
4.6.6 Addressing the problem of spillovers
While there is now clear evidence of the impact of inter-jurisdictional
spillovers on water quality, there are no clear solutions to the problem. The-
ory suggests that under certain restrictive circumstances, private negotiation
among actors can provide efficient solutions to such negative externalities
(Coase 1960, Anderson & Libecap 2014). Coasian solutions appear to have
some potential in developing countries. For example Kremer et al. (2011)
show that privatization of communal property rights to local springs in Kenya
(i.e., internalizing the benefits of spring protection) could increase welfare as
incomes rise, costs of protection fall, or water becomes more scarce. How-
ever, such private solutions to ambient water pollution are unlikely to arise
in an international context where there is no binding legal framework to fa-
cilitate negotiation and enforce contracts. Another possible solution to the
problem of inter-jurisdictional spillovers is to provide stronger incentives to
local regulators to improve water quality in contexts where regulation is de-
centralized. Three studies have examined the impacts of such an approach
in China, where, beginning in 2005, the central government included water
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quality as a criterion for promotion of local government officials. Kahn et al.
(2015) find that while COD decreased significantly at local boundaries after
this policy change, emissions of more harmful pollutants, such as petroleum
and mercury, were not affected. In a follow-up study, Chen et al. (2018) show
that the policy has had unintended consequences. After the policy change,
water quality in the Yangtze River deteriorated despite all provinces having
achieved their COD reduction goals. This is because upstream provinces of
the Yangtze River are less economically developed and have relatively better
water quality, and thus also have less stringent COD reduction targets; as a
result, water-polluting industries have shifted to less-regulated areas upstream
(Chen et al. 2018). Local government officials also appear to have enforced
tighter standards on polluting firms immediately upstream of monitoring sta-
tions after the central government explicitly linked political promotion to water
quality improvements (He et al. 2020).
4.7 Conclusions and Research Gaps
Our review of the literature on water pollution control policies in de-
veloping countries provides a map of the gaps in the evidence on policy ef-
fectiveness, thus highlighting important topics for future research. Overall,
we identified only about a dozen plausibly causal estimates of the impacts of
specific pollution control policies on either water pollution emissions or ambi-
ent water pollutant concentrations in developing countries. The majority of
these studies focus on water pollution policies in China. The volume of liter-
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ature assessing the impacts of policies on water pollution emissions or ambi-
ent concentrations is similarly thin for developing countries and industrialized
countries. The literature evaluating other water pollution policy impacts, such
as those on human health and educational outcomes, is even thinner. Given
the low number of studies with plausibly causal estimates and the fact that
the evidence for human health and other impacts is quite convincing in those
studies that have been published (e.g., Ebenstein 2012, Do et al. 2018, Garg
et al. 2018), our first key finding is that there is a a great need for rigorous
evaluation of water pollution control policies in the literature.
A second key finding is that the theory of market-based approaches
to environmental policy is well-established and applications of taxes, tradable
permits, and information disclosure policies in industrialized and developing
countries have demonstrated that market-based approaches can achieve pollu-
tion reduction goals. However, only two studies in the literature rigorously
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of these approaches in a developing-country
setting (Ebenstein 2012, Zheng et al. 2013). Given the scale of water pol-
lution problems in developing country rivers, lakes, streams and coastal wa-
ters, market-based pollution control policies are a promising tool for countries
to consider. Indeed, recent benefit-cost analyses of primarily prescriptive ap-
proaches in the United States suggest that their costs may exceed their benefits
(Keiser & Shapiro 2019c), highlighting the need to focus on cost-effective ap-
proaches.
Unfortunately, developing countries have few concrete examples on
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which to draw when designing new market-based water pollution control poli-
cies. China’s pollution levy system provides one good example, with multiple
analyses suggesting that it has reduced water pollution emissions. The newer
pilot tax policy in China’s Lake Tai Basin is an even better example, given
that the tax is assessed on all units of pollution, and it appears to have dra-
matically reduced water pollution. Perhaps it is not surprising that we have
uncovered so few clear examples of successful market-based policies for water
pollution control in developing countries; the record in industrialized countries
is also thin.
A third important finding of our review is that PWS and information
disclosure policies have been applied to water pollution control in developing
countries more often than one might expect, perhaps even exceeding their use
in industrialized countries. However, there are too few rigorous evaluations of
their impacts to draw clear conclusions about the effectiveness of these policies
for improving ambient water quality.
Fourth, the literature suggests that major public infrastructure invest-
ments, particularly in municipal wastewater treatment, clearly paid off for in-
dustrialized countries during the early stages of their development. Given the
evidence, it seems likely that major urban wastewater treatment investments
would be net beneficial in developing countries, but projects and investments
would need to be evaluated individually.
Finally, we note that where regulatory institutions, monitoring, and
enforcement are weak, the impacts of water pollution control policies are also
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likely to be weak. The challenges of decentralization and water pollution
spillovers must also be considered in developing country settings. On a pos-
itive note, recent experiments with industrial pollution auditors in India and
econometric analysis of policies that increase central oversight of local pollution
monitors in China provide evidence that fairly simple, low-cost interventions
may be effective in overcoming some of the challenges that are specific to water




5.1 Conclusion and contribution
This dissertation contributes to the literature by examines three im-
portant questions on the economics of water pollution control.
In the first paper, I investigate the benefit of water pollution abatement
using an integrated two-stage model of hedonic analysis and RUM model. I
find that increases in dissolved oxygen (DO) improve both recreational and aes-
thetic amenities and that homeowners in Tampa Bay have significant MWTP
for both of these improvements. Using data from the Tampa Bay Estuary
Program on the cost of nutrient pollution reduction projects from 1998-2014,
I find very favorable benefit-cost ratios when compared to other water quality
benefit-cost analyses in the literature (Keiser & Shapiro 2019b,a, Keiser et al.
2019).
This work adds to our understanding of how people value water qual-
ity improvements, especially nutrient pollution abatement. Eutrophication,
a consequence of nutrient pollution, may cause large economic damages in
the United States and elsewhere. Many local, state, and federal regulations
have been implemented to address this problem. Further work to help poli-
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cymakers better understand how people value nutrient pollution abatement,
and how these values are capitalized in housing markets, can contribute to a
more comprehensive evaluation of such regulations.
This paper also contributes to the literature on hedonic valuation of
pollution control, more generally. We estimate the first hedonic model valuing
water quality that controls comprehensively and flexibly for property char-
acteristics, using two different approaches. Our long-difference hedonics ap-
proach may comport better with hedonic theory than other approaches in the
literature, given that the hedonic model considers the property location deci-
sion in long-run equilibrium. Lacking data on recreation site visitation at the
property level—likely a problem faced by other researchers examining similar
questions, unless they implement a household survey—we use multiple impu-
tations to address the resulting measurement error relative to recreation data
observed by property. These innovations may enable future work valuing wa-
ter pollution and pollution control with a broader geographic scope than we
have examined in this paper.
In the second paper, using restrictive education data and drinking wa-
ter data in Texas from 1991 to 2011, I investigate the cost of an important
drinking water pollution in the United States by estimating the educational
impacts of drinking water lead exposure in early childhood. My results pro-
vide empirical evidence that drinking water lead exposure in the birth year
has significant negative impacts on standardized test scores in the third grade.
The magnitudes of my coefficients are similar to that estimated for blood lead
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levels in the existing literature (Aizer & Currie 2019). Importantly, the effects
I estimate occurred in a state and at a time when the lead concentration in
drinking water is, on average, quite low, and the magnitude (on average) below
the federal action threshold under the SDWA. I also find that violating the
federal regulation of drinking water lead treatment in the birth year leads to a
smaller probability of graduating from high school. Given the income premium
of having a high school diploma, an LCR violation at birth may be associated
with a foregone wage of $12 million annually in Texas alone. The associated
life earning the loss in lifetime earnings range around $241 million to $1.6 bil-
lion. Lastly, I find that female students and children from African American
families and families with economic disadvantages are more vulnerable to lead
exposure in line with existing literature (Chetty et al. 2016, Heckman & Kara-
pakula 2019, Grönqvist et al. 2020). The findings suggest that early childhood
lead exposure may be on contributing factor to the gender-achievement gap
and racial-achievement gaps in the U.S.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing the first evidence
of the impacts of contemporary U.S. drinking water lead levels on elementary
school test scores. It also provides the first evidence that these effects per-
sist through longer educational milestones, such as high school graduation,
in the United States. Third, this paper contributes to the literature on lead
exposure’s implications for inequality. Lastly, it uses the surface water Cl–
concentration as an instrument for drinking water lead concentration. This
instrument was not used before in the economics literature.
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In the third paper, I reviewed the literature on water pollution con-
trol policies in developing countries and provided a map of the gaps in the
evidence on policy effectiveness. Overall, I find there is a great need for rig-
orous evaluation of water pollution control policies in the literature given the
lack of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of water quality control policies.
Second, the evidence on the cost-effectiveness of market-based approaches in
both developed and developing country contexts needs more research. A third
important finding of the review is that PWS and information disclosure poli-
cies have been applied to water pollution control in developing countries more
often but there are too few rigorous evaluations of their impacts to draw clear
conclusions about the effectiveness of these policies for improving ambient wa-
ter quality. Fourth, the literature suggests that major public infrastructure
investments, particularly in municipal wastewater treatment, but the evidence
on the effectiveness of such investments on water quality in developing coun-
tries need to be studied on a project basis. Finally, the literature review notes
that where regulatory institutions, monitoring, and enforcement are weak, the
impacts of water pollution control policies are also likely to be weak. The
challenges of decentralization and water pollution spillovers must also be con-
sidered in developing country settings.
5.2 Future Research
This dissertation studied three important aspects of the cost-benefit
analysis on water pollution control. My future research will include:
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The first study using data in Texas provides the first empirical evidence
that early childhood exposure to lead from drinking water has a significant
impact on educational outcomes in both the short and the long run. However,
my IV sample of 5 Texas counties and the comparably lower lead concentration
in Texas may not provide a comprehensive estimate of drinking water lead
impact on the whole U.S. An important direction of my future research is to
take the approach and apply it to a broader geographic area. It serves as a
pilot for a larger project to examine the impact of lead in drinking water across
the whole United States. I have recently gained access to the Federal Census
Restrictive Data Center to use the restrictive census data for my project for
up to 5 years. The federal restrictive data will enable future work to evaluate
drinking water lead impacts with a broader geographic scope than I have
examined in this paper.
In the second paper, collaborated with Dr. Olmstead and Dr. Kuwayama,
though our study only focuses on one city in the United States, our estimation
suggests that the omission of recreational benefits may be the reason for the
lack of evidence that the benefits of water quality improvement exceed the
cost of water pollution control. We are also interested in follow-up with this
project and apply the approach to the whole United States, with the goal of
providing a more comprehensive estimate of the value of U.S. water quality
improvements under the Clean Water Act.
I would like to build on the existing literature review I have done and
examine the costs and benefits of water pollution control in the context of
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developing countries. Developing countries’ context poses unique challenges
for estimating the benefits of water quality improvements. For instance, many
developing countries may lack a well-functioning housing market, which is a
basic assumption of the hedonic model. Since my co-author and I examine
the empirical evidence for the effectiveness of water pollution control policies
in developing countries and find that evidence regarding market-based policies
is quite thin in the third paper, I would like to examine policy evaluation of
water pollution control in developing countries and its impact on health and
labor market participation. One example of my future research direction is
my sole-authored working paper on China’s River Chiefs program. This paper
examines how the River-Chief policy in China affects surface water quality,
seeking to understand whether assigning local officials responsibility for river
segments in their jurisdiction contributes to reducing water pollution and the
negative externalities of pollution to a jurisdiction’s downstream neighbors.
As surface water pollution may reduce agricultural productivity in developing
countries like China, one negative externality of surface water pollution I will

























































































































































Ü 0 5 102.5 Miles
Gulf of Mexico
Tampa Bay
Figure A.1: Location of fishing sites and Tampa Bay water quality monitors
Notes: Water shapefiles data from the Tampa Bay Water Atlas website. We use
the Gulf of Mexico and Bay waterbodies to define Tampa Bay. We then spatially
join water quality monitors from STORET with the Tampa Bay shapefile to
define Tampa Bay monitors. Fishing site locations are from the MRIP dataset,
and zip code boundaries are from the U.S. Census Bureau.
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obs (without missing) 209336
monitoring sites 5913
mean readings per monitor per year 53
mean readings per monitoring site 443
mean years per monitoring site 8
missing 44
yearly average







Table A.2: Summary statistics by DO level in nearby water
Variable DO ≥ 5mg/L DO<5mg/L Full sample
DO level 6.786 3.995*** 5.792
(4.76) (0.781) (4.075)
ECSjt 35.88 36.16*** 35.98
(2.64 ) (1.96) (2.42)
Property age 32.16 34.48*** 32.99
(20.44) (22.08) (21.07)
Price (2014 dollars) 235534.5 218013.8*** 229306.5
(158425.1) (147162.2) (154742.5)
Distance to local water 896.36 987.95*** 928.92
(1052.92 ) (1004.02) (1036.73)
Distance to Tampa Bay 14479.78 16836.08*** 15317.35
(13633.68) (17619.91 ) (15212.89)
Local water front 0.046 0.046 0.046
(0.209 ) (0.209 ) (0.209)
Tampa Bay front 0.0107 0.011 0.0109
(0.103) (0.105 ) (0.104)
N 94,684 52,219 146,903
Hillsborough County
Number of bedrooms 3.208 3.131*** 3.17
(0.806) (0.815) (0.811)
Number of bathrooms 2.095 2.042*** 2.069
(0.671) (0.703) (0.687)
Number of stories 1.181 1.172*** 1.177
(0.408) (0.407) (0.407)
Heated area 1764.56 1697.05*** 1731.83
(674.65) (663.30) (670.02)
Lot acreage 0.292 0.230*** 0.267
(0.478) (0.269) (0.407)
N 33,641 31,660 65,301
Notes: Means, with standard deviations in parentheses, for observations used
in regression analysis. Asterisks in column 2 indicate significant difference in
means between the two groups, according to a t-test for difference in means.
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: First-stage recreation demand model with DO dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Travel cost (3km) Travel time (3km) Travel cost (5km)
Travel cost (US dollars) -0.110*** -0.113***
(0.00078) (0.00080)
Travel time (minutes) -0.0639***
(0.00044)
DO > 5mg/L 0.184*** 0.208*** -0.034
(0.0289) (0.0287) (0.0376)
Seagrass abundance -0.164*** -0.128*** -0.139***
(0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0104)
Alternative-specific constants Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,765,796 1,765,796 1,801,615
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Notes: Models are estimated using conditional logit, with a choice set of 85 fishing sites visited
during the study period. Columns 1 and 2 link fishing sites to Tampa Bay water quality monitors
within 3km. Column 3 links sites with monitors within 5km. Travel cost is estimated as the
sum of the value of travel time (1/3 of foregone wages times round-trip travel time) and the
operational cost of travel (AAA’s driving cost times round-trip distance).
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Table A.4: Hedonic results without property fixed effects (Hillsborough
County)
(1) (2)
Basic 3km No ECSjt 3km
ln(DO) -0.00293
(0.00295)




Property age -0.00338*** -0.00339***
(0.000172) (0.000174)
Lot acreage 0.0282*** 0.0288***
(0.00747) (0.00762)
Heated area 0.000563*** 0.000563****
(0.00000669) (0.00000626)
Number of bedrooms -0.0296*** -0.0295***
(0.00425) (0.00424)
Number of bathrooms 0.102*** 0.101***
(0.00568) (0.00574)
Number of stories -0.0643*** -0.0642***
(0.00686) (0.00680)
Property FE No No
Year FE Yes Yes
N 65,301 65,301
R-squared 0.704 0.704
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is the log property transaction price. Both columns use a 3-km radius to
define average water quality around properties. Reported coefficient estimates and standard errors are














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.7: Hedonic model with proximity to water
(1) (2)
Property FE Long difference
ln(DO) 0.0160***
(0.00515)














∆ECSj × Distance to Tampa Bay 1.98e-09
(6.13e-08)
∆ Property age 0.0351***
(0.00178)
Property FE Yes No
Year FE Yes No
N 146,903 14,390
R-Squared 0.627 0.049
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by property.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Notes: Column 1 includes interactions of ln(DO) with the distance from a property to
local water and of ECSjt with the distance from a property to Tampa Bay. Column
2 is the long difference model with the same interaction terms. Reported coefficient
estimates and standard errors are obtained using multiple imputation, using methods
described in Section 5.2.1.
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Table A.8: Hedonic model and long difference model with park water quality
monitors
(1) (2)















∆ Property age 0.0410***
(0.00313)
Property FE Yes No
Year FE Yes No
N 41,618 3,590
R-squared 0.622 0.054
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Notes: Dependent variable is the log property transaction price. Reported coefficient
estimates and standard errors are obtained using multiple imputation, using methods
described in Section 5.2.1. Robust standard errors are clustered by property.
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Table A.9: Estimated coefficients for local DO using smaller radii for monitors
(1) (2) (3)
Property FE Property FE Long difference
Continuous DO DO ≥ 5 mg/L Continuous DO
5km monitors -7.03e-06 0.00422* 5km monitors 0.0486***
(N=183,582) (0.00390) (0.00251) (N=19,210) (0.00999)
3km monitors 0.0114*** 0.00729*** 3km monitors 0.0226***
(N=146,903) (0.00307) (0.00256) (N=14,390) (0.00645)
1km monitors 0.0158* 0.0187*** 1km monitors 0.00274
(N=32,996) (0.00865) (0.00587) (N=2,515) (0.0316)
500m monitors 0.0249*** 0.0282*** 500m monitors -0.0430
(N=18,403) (0.00956) (0.00743) (N=1,438) (0.0342)
300m monitors 0.00623 0.0235 300m monitors 0.0222
(N=3,056) (0.0216) (0.0178) (N=205) (0.0707)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Notes: Dependent variable is the log property transaction price in columns 1 and 2, and the log long-
difference in price in column 3. Only lnDO coefficients are reported, but columns 1 and 2 contain
the same covariates as Table 2.3, column 1, and column 3 contains the same covariates as Table
2.4, column 1. Reported coefficient estimates and standard errors are obtained using multiple
imputation, using methods described in Section 5.2.1. Robust standard errors are clustered by
property.
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Table A.10: Hedonic regression results using DO moving averages
(1) (2) (3)
1 year 6 months 3 months
ln(DO) 0.0106*** -0.000246 -0.00796**
(0.00350) (0.00347) (0.00319)
ECSjt 0.154** 0.163** 0.174**
(0.0677) (0.0743) (0.0833)
Property age -0.0121*** -0.0122*** -0.0122***
(0.00329) (0.00329) (0.00329)
N 162,765 147,489 133,027
R-square 0.604 0.610 0.612
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Notes: Dependent variable is the log property transac-
tion price. Columns 1-3 average local and recreational
water quality 12 months, 6 months, and 3 months prior
to each property transaction, respectively. Reported co-
efficient estimates and standard errors are obtained using
multiple imputation, using methods described in Section




Table B.1: Second IV estimates of lead impact using LIML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A Reading scores Math scores
Lead * pipes -0.910*** -2.192*** -2.304*** -1.453 -3.911** -2.416*** -3.537*** -4.093*** -5.637*** -5.198***
(0.061) (0.039) (0.121) (0.886) (1.956) (0.095) (0.040) (0.063) (0.520) (2.345)
B Meet reading standard Meet math standard
Lead * pipes -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.0137*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.0174*** -0.0127***
(0.0003) (0.00008) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.005) (0.0002) (0.00005) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.00287)
Observations 361106 361024 361106 361106 361106 361106 361024 361106 361106 361106
First stage F statistics 3748.53 3860.22 1761.13 529.17 30.86 3748.53 3860.22 1761.13 529.17 30.86
Birth county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County by year trend No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood controls No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at county level.
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